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Abstract 
This thesis will examine how the emerging concept of the right to development in 
international human rights has influenced the policy and practice ofNew Labour with 
regards to their international development work. It will focus on some of the main 
aspects which the right to development incorporates, such as partnerships and 
participation, and will examine how these principles have been established in the 
work of DFID. Its aim is to assess whether the changes in recent development policy 
and practice, under New Labour, have been the result of the creation of a right to 
development, or whether the corresponding changes in theory and practice can be 
attributed to other factors. 
It will explore the existing literature on the right to development, the historical 
changes in British development policy, the incorporation of participatory and 
partnership methods into the work of DFID, and the relationship between security 
and the right to development. 
The thesis will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the changes in 
policy and practice under New Labour can be attributed to the emerging concept of a 
right · to development, and its corresponding codification in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development, and offer suggestions of the effect that 
these findings may have on the concept. 
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Introduction 
This thesis will examine how the emerging concept of the right to development in 
international human rights has influenced the policy and practice of New Labour with 
regards to their international development work. It will focus on some of the main 
aspects which the right to development incorporates, such as partnerships and 
participation, and will examine how these principles have been established in the 
work of DFID. Its aim is to assess whether the changes in recent development policy 
and practice, under New Labour, have been the result of the creation of a right to 
development, or whether the corresponding changes in theory and practice can be 
attributed to other factors. 
In order to establish the relationship between the right to development and UK 
practice, chapter one wJll firstly examine the context in which the right has developed 
and will highlight the theoretical and practical challenges with which it is faced. In 
doing so, the place of the right to development within the literature will be brought to 
light, thus noting the gaps that exist in the literature into which this thesis will fit. 
The emerging practice of other states with regards to the right to development will 
also be discussed, as too will the recommendations for implementation given by the 
Independent Expert on the right to development, as an indicator of the changes and 
patterns that we can expect to see in UK policy. 
Before a full assessment of the relationship between the right to development and 
changes to UK policy can be undertaken however, it is 'necessary first of all to 
establish that changes have in fact occurred under New Labour. This will be done in 
chapter two, which discusses the historical practices in British development policy 
and the differences and similarities that these .practices have with the current 
approach to development. The chapter will look in particular at the White Papers of 
1965, 1973 and 1i997 which serve to highlight both the underlying aims of policy 
makers and the way in which aid was to be administered. 
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Having established that changes have occurred under New Labour, and discussed 
what these changes were, chapters three and four wiH proceed to look at the 
incorporation of the main principles of the right to development into the work of 
DFID. Chapter three will concentrate on the issue of partnerships, discussing its 
relationship with conditionality, the general context in which it operates, and finally 
its incorporation into DFID's development programmes. Chapter four will continue 
in a similar way, looking firstly at the place of participation within development 
theory, and how it is unde:r:stood by the international community. The chapter will 
then examine how New Labour is pursuing their goals by incorporating into their 
work participatory methods of development, and highlight the extent to which this 
method too helps to further the right to development project. In both chapters three 
and four an analysis of the effect that the incorporation of these two principles have 
had on development programmes will be made, looking at the theoretical and 
practical challenges that have arisen, as well as the successes that have been achieved 
since their incorporation into development policy and projects. 
Chapter five will look finally at the relationship between the :r:ight to development and 
contemporary security concerns, focusing predominantly on the issue of terrorism. 
The chapter will establish whether security considerations have been the principle 
force behind changes to British development policy, rather than the inception of the 
right to development within the international community. The use of aid in the 
pursuit of foreign policy aims will come under discussion, alongside an examination 
of the effect that the September 11th attacks have had on both the pattern of aid giving 
and of development policy. The potential links between poverty and terrorism will 
also be discussed, as will th~ policy implications that such academic findings may 
have. Chapter five highlights the essential role that the right to development has in 
security considerations. Yet the discussion also emphasises the significant challenges 
that the right to development now faces and the potential for it to become obsolete if 
current security policy continue unchanged. 
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The thesis concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the changes in policy 
and practice under New Labour can be attributed to the emerging concept of a right to 
development, and its corresponding codification in the United Nations Declaration on 
the Right to Development, and suggestions are offered on the affect that these 
findings may have on the concept. The final hypothesis suggests that while obvious 
changes have occurred in British development policy, changes that appear to be based 
on those principles found in the Declaration on the Right to Development, they do not 
in fact stem from the Declaration on the Right to Development or from the notion of 
a right to development itself. It appears that, due to the lack of attention that the right 
to development receives in policy papers, the influencing factor on British 
development policy has instead been the same theories and ideas that led to the initial 
conception of a right to development. I argue however that, with emerging state 
practice that incorporates such similar principles, difficulties that are inherent in the 
Declaration can be addressed, and thus become a firm guideline for successful future 
development policy in which the right to development can be realised. 
This research rests upon academic articles, government documents, and reports from 
newspapers, the United Nation and international NGOs. Both primary and secondary 
sources were examined in order to determine the main causes of those changes noted 
in the development policy and practice under New Labour. Using primary sources, 
such as government policy papers and DFID reports, ensured the accuracy of 
information about projects that had been undertaken and were currently being 
planned by the Department for International Development. They also provided, 
through the language they used, a good insight into the relationship with, and place 
of, human rights and the right to development within the development projects. 
Ministerial comments contained in these documents, on the aims of current 
development projects, were especially useful in assessing the motives behind the 
methods that were being introduced for project implementation. By relying upon a 
number of sources, from Government documents, to academic writings, newspaper 
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articles and records of personal experiences, the accuracy of the information 
provided was improved and a good overview of the opinions of all involved in the 
development process could be established. Thus, all of the relevant information 
needed to make a judgement about DFID's policy and practice, and the influence of 
the right to development, was available in primary and secondary sources. Textual 
analysis became therefore, the most effective research method for this particular area 
of research. 
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Chapter 1 
The Right to Development in Existing Literature: Debates, 
Challenges and Recommendations 
The right to development is embedded within many contestable theoretical positions. 
It relies on very specific understandings of human rights and economic theory, both 
of which have collie under serious debate and challenge. The concept of a right to 
development itself has received sceptical responses, from both governments and 
commentators. 
Therefore to understand the context in which development policy operates, and the 
practical and theoretical challenges it faces, this chapter will examine the different 
theoretical positions, and highlight the gaps that exist in the literature into which this 
research will fit. 
Historical. Theoretical. and Practical Challenges 
Statements such as that by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address 
1,944, in which he argued that true individual freedom was not possible without 
economic security and independence, show that those ideas that are at the centre of 
arguments on the right to development were at the core of the post war human rights 
movement. 1 Yet the development of this idea faced problems from the ideological 
and political split brought on by the Cold War. The end of post-war solidarity saw 
rights codified into two separate treaties, one for civil and political rights and the 
other for economic, social and cultural rights, instead of the unified covenant that was 
envisaged. What the right to development as conceived now in the Declaration does, 
is to unify these two sets of rights, and highlight how they are an indivisible and 
1 A. Sengupta. 'Realizing the Right to Development', Development and Change Vol. 3•1, No. 3(2000) 
pp-553-578. p.553 
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interrelated set of human rights. 2 Thus, when viewed historically, the right to 
development can be understood as part of the natural progression of human rights 
theory, and can actually be seen as the eventual fulfilment of the original desires of 
human rights pioneers such as the Roosevelts.3 
It is to this human rights grounding for the right to development that we should firstly 
tum for, as Forsythe in particular highlights, disputes about the origin and nature of 
human rights have not been settled, the notion of human rights is a contested one 
even amongst Western philosophers.4 He says: 
For Edmund Burke, the concept of human right was a monstrous fiction. For Jeremy 
Bentham, it was absurd to base human rights on natural rights because "Natural 
rights is nonsense ... nonsense upon stilts." The contemporary philosopher Alasdair 
Macintyre tells us there are no such things as human rights; they are similar to 
witches and unicorns and other figments of our imagination. 5 
Forsythe continues in such a way demonstrating numerous questions that surround 
human rights, such as whether rights belong to the col1lective or the individual, 
whether certain rights are more fundamental than others, and whether rights can be 
economic, social and cultural as well as civil and political. He argues that every 
notion advanced with regards to human rights is a 'contested concept.' 6 
The disputes between the Western philosophical positions have laid the foundations 
for critical schools of thought. As Dower recognises, the most challenging of these 
2 Sengupta, Realising the Right to Development p.555 
3 For a further discussion·on the historical context of the rightto·development see Orford, in A:lston's 
People's Rights 2001, and Sano, 2000 
4 Forsythe, D.P. Human Rights In International Relations. 28d Edition (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) p.29 
5 Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.29 
6 Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.30-3·1 
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positions for a theory of universal human rights is the relativist view which contends 
that moral values are relative to cultures or societies. From this point of view, any 
overlap in values between cultures is not an indication of the existence of universal 
values but a reflection that two cultures are responding to similar needs in similar 
ways.' This viewpoint is singled out as being especially problematic because, as will 
shortly be discussed, it is a position that is widely held and which often influences 
policy making. Dower criticises this viewpoint however, and makes a convincing 
case as to why this theory does not hold. He says, firstly, that this view portrays 
society to be a monolithic whole, thus, from this stance no sense can be made of 
minority views which see a cultural practice as being wrong. Secondly he says that 
this view provides no principled basis for interaction with other societies, 8 yet living 
in a globalized world where the transfer of culture and ideas is a common part of our 
existence, we know that different societies can, and do interact with each other every 
day. Dower furthers this argument by recognising the fact that, for many people the 
significant communities to which they belong are ones of shared concern that cross 
national borders and are not defined in terms of territorial space. 9 He also 'Says that, 
within territorial boundaries, diversity in practices between cultures does not 
necessarily negate the idea of a universal set of values; it merely suggests that there 
can be different expressions of core values. 10 
One concern that does remain though is the challenging view that the human rights 
agenda is an attempt to impose the values of a particular culture onto the rest of the 
world. This has, Dower says, the implication that those advocating the specific set of 
moral values believe them to be superior to those of other peoples. 11 As Falk argues, 
this critical discourse is especially persuasive in postcolonial circumstances, as the 
promotion of universal human rights can be understood as primarily another pretext 
7 Dower, N. An Introduction to Global Citizenship (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2003) 
.124 
f Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship p.126 
9 Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship p.127 
10 Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship p.126 
11 Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship p.128 
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for continued neo-colonial intervention. 12 A response to this challenge can also be 
made though. Many writers argue there are values that are common to the culture 
and teaching of different societies and religions. As Tomuschat notes: 
... Michael Walzer rightly speaks of a 'minimal and universal moral code' which is 
accepted on a worldwide level without any objections. This minimal code comprises, 
in his view, the prohibition ofmurder, of slavery, torture and genocide. Infact, in no 
country of the world do public authorities claim to be allowed to deal with the life, 
the freedom, and the physical integrity of citizens according to their arbitrary 
pleasure. 13 
Brown believes that the human rights regime has not been effective, because of the 
unwillingness of rights activists to recognise these philosophical and cultural 
problems associated with their position.14 However, arguments within the literature 
suggest that it has been the practice of states that has been the challenge for universal 
human rights, and not just the contentions about the philosophical foundations of the 
idea. As Forsythe says, the dominance of the Western powers in international 
relations has meant that these states have been in a position to either advance or 
impede the application of human rights. ts Yet with what Forsythe sees as a 
widespread practice of realist foreign policy, the lack of commitment to human rights 
by the Western powers also acts as a challenge to the notion of human rights itself. 
Human rights become a foreign policy tool, used only when it affects states' own 
interests, thus undermining the ideas on which human rights is built; such as that of 
12 Falk, R.A. Human Rights Horizons: Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (London, New York, 
Routledge, 2000) p.40 
13 Tomuschat, C. Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003) p.81. For further discussion on; Relativism see Perry 1997, the philosophical foundations of 
rights see Raphaell967; for more rights critiques see Campbell2006; and for different cultural 
viewpoints on human rights see Brems, 2001 
14 Brown, C. 'Universal Human Rights: A Critique' in Dunne, T. and Wheeler, N.J, Human Rights In 
Global Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp.1 03-124, p.121 
IS Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.35 · 
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the inviolability of humans. 16 It also makes impossible the task of spreading human 
rights to al,l, nations, when those leading the cause systematically abuse human rights 
themselves. A brief examination of the human rights record of Britain and the USA · 
highlights this fundamental challenge to human rights. The USA continues to oppose 
international treaties that are designed to protect the rights of its citizens, such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Additionally, Forsythe says, the USA has 
found it increasingly difficult to play the role of leader in human rights after the 2001 
September 11th attacks.17 Curtis emphasises this in his work with reference to the 
Red Cross Report (May 2004), which accuses US forces of brutality during custody, 
physical and psychological coercion during interrogation, and disproportionate force 
that resulted in death of prisoners in many of their detention centres. 18 Similar 
accusations have been made with regards to Britain, over the detention of suspects in 
Bebnarsh prison under new anti-terror laws. Amnesty International made reports of 
inadequate healthcare and restricted access to legal advice for inmates and the 
conditions within the prison were said to be cruel, inhumane and degrading.19 
Similar realist attitudes, which prioritise national interests over human rights, can 
also be noted in the United Nation Security Council which, on many occasions has 
failed to take action on situations of violence when the major states did not see their 
narrow interests threatened. For example in the case of Somalia most of the military 
personnel were removed from the country when eighteen US rangers were murdered, 
despite the ongoing violence and need for assistance. This event also caused 
Washington to block the deployment of UN forces to Rwanda regardless of 
overwhelming evidence of the genocide. Thus, there is a significant and worrying 
gap between the resolutions and statements by states endorsing human rights, and the 
political will to make these statements effective. 20 
16 Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.36,51 
17 Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.48 
18 Curtis, M. Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses (London, Vintage, 2004)p.20 
19 See p, Winterman, BBC News. 2004/10/06 
httD:I /news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/frl-/l/hi/magazine/3714864.stm 
20 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations p.60-63. This· concern will be discussed further 
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Both the theoretical debates and the practice of states show the difficulties in 
establishing a set of universal human right norms. The existence .of evidence within 
the literature, such as human rights abuses in the West, demonstrates how the case for 
universal human rights is weakened, and so too therefore is the foundational basis of 
the right to development. This raises many questions that wiU be discussed further in 
the course of the thesis. For example do ~he theoretical challenges to human rights 
prevent their application in state policy? If governments accept the idea regardless of 
the continuing theoretical debates, does the challenge to rights instead come from 
competing state concerns such as security? Do these challenges and the evidence of 
human rights violations render the idea of human rights obsolete? If not, do 
situations such as the war on terror suggest that some rights are suspended in order to 
fulfil others? If yes where does this leave our hopes for a right to development 
(considering especially the notion that this right acts as a unifying and integrating 
mechanism of other human rights)? 
A New Economic Theory 
While the concept of a right to development clearly grew out of the post-wat human 
right movement, subsequent changes in economic theory have also had a significant 
impact on the way in which development is understood, and how the right has been 
fonnulated. As Udombana says 'with the adoption of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development, the international community questioned for the first time ·the idea that 
that the primary objective of economic activity was to improve economic and 
financial indicators. ' 21 To gain a deeper understanding of the theoretical issues that 
lie behind the right to development therefore, we must look beyond the literature on 
human rights to that on economic theory. The most influential writings for 
development thinking and policy, written from an economic perspective, have been 
in chapter five. 
21 l!Jdombana, N.J. 'The Third World and' the Rightto Development: Agenda for the Next 
Millennium' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 22,.No. 3 (2000) p.770 
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those by Amartya Sen, who forms a new approach to development that expands our 
traditional understanding of the development process and whose work has had a great 
bearing upon the formation of the concept of the right to development. It is therefore 
both useful and necessary to look funher at what Sen has achieved, and what 
limitations his work may have. 
Sen critiques formal economics which, in judging the states and interests of people, 
has not, he says, been interested in the plurality of conditions and situations that exist 
but instead uses one simple measure of a person's interest and its fulfilment; that 
measure being one of utility. This argues Sen, takes too narrow a view of human 
beings and therefore, while acting as the foundation of formal economics, 
significantly impoverishes the scope and reach of economic theory. 22 One of the 
central reasons for Sen's .rejection of the Utilitarian approach to economics is the fact 
that a person can be ill and undernourished, for example, and still be high-up on the 
scale of happiness and desire fulfi,lment if she/he has learnt to have realistic desires, 
given her/his situation, and takes pleasure in the small things that come to her/him in 
life. Under this approach the physical conditions of a person, no matter how bad, do 
not enter into the evaluation of personal well-being, yet the mental attitude of the 
person cannot remove the fact of her/his deprivation. 23 Sen, in identifying an 
alternative approach, moves the focus away from utility and onto the capability to 
function, that is, what a person ·Can dolbe.24 He distinguishes firstly between two 
ways of seeing a person's interests and their fulfilment: well being (which is 
concerned with a person's achievement) and advantage (which refers to the real 
opportunities that a person has, compared especially with others.)2S In order to get a 
22 Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities ~North-Holland, Amsterdam: New York: Oxford, Elsevier 
Science Publishers B.V, 1985) p.2-4 
23 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, pp.20;29 
24 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, preface 
2S Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, p.S. Sen emphasises that opportunity in this•evaluation should 
not be defined in a limited way. He says, when considering for example whether the doors of a school 
are open to John , that we must also take into consideration factors such. as whether John could actually 
attend that school because of a.physical disability, or whether he is financially able to go to that school. 
(p.S) 
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true idea of the weli being of a person, Sen argues, we have to look at the 
functionings of the person, what that person manages to do/be with the commodities 
and characteristics at her command. 26 
It is possible to understand, when following Sen's reasoning, why an assessment of a 
person's characteristics is vital to understanding their functionings, and why merely 
taking into account utility or the amounts of commodities at someone's dispense is 
insufficient. He claims that the conversion of commodity characteristics into 
functionings depends on a variety of factors, personal and social, for example their 
age, body size, or position in the family/society.27 Sen emphasises that the quality of 
life that a person enjoys does not come down only to what she/he manages to achieve,. 
but also has to entail a consideration of the options that she/he has had the 
opportunity of choosing from. To hold this view, Sen says, is to believe that the 
'good life' is partly a life ·Of genuine choice.28 
What then is the significance of this theory for issues ()f international development? 
Crocker argues that what Sen has developed is an original normative outlook for the 
improvement of economic theory that can address the ethical and conceptual failings 
whose existence can be seen in international concerns such as global hunger and 
severe deprivations. 29 This outlook, Crocker says, is based on the 'innovative and 
promising "capability ethic"' and on the belief that development (as theory and 
practice) should be defined with reference to what humans can/ should be and do. 
For Sen, then, development is the enhancement of human functionings, and the 
expansion of capabilities in order to achieve these functionings. 30 A correct approach 
to development, for Sen, must be based on an ethical foundation that is 'internalist', 
26 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, p.lO 
27 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, pp. 25,26 
28 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities; p:69,70 
29 Crocker, B.A. 'Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's 
Development Ethic' in Political Theory, Vol. 20, No.4 (November, 1992), pp. 584-612 p584 
30 Crocker, 'Functioning and Capability' pp.585-586 
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that is, based within human experience.31 The foundation he chooses therefore is the 
ethical space of human functionings and capabilities, the things he believes to be 
intrinsically valuable to human beings.32 Development, for Sen, is thus concerned 
with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy.33 For Sen, substantive 
freedom is crucial. He argues that it is: 
.. . a principle determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. Greater 
freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the 
world, and these matters are central to the process of development. 34 
In recognising that freedom enhances the ability for people to help themselves Sen 
can address the question of responsibility that is often raised with regards to 
development. It is possible, Sen says, to view development as both ethically 
problematic and defeatist. He too admits there is no substitute for individual 
responsibility, yet his theory shows that exercising responsibility is contingent on 
other factors such as personal, environmental and social circumstances. His central 
message in response to these criticisms is that responsibility requires freedom. 
Development that increases the freedom of people is therefore a means to ensure 
individual responsibility; it is not something that undermines it.3~ Freedom 
understood in this way is also, therefore, both a means to and an end of development 
and, as Sen notes, the effectiveness of freedom as an instrument of development lies 
in the fact that different freedoms interrelate with one another. In the expansion of 
one type of freedom, others too can be greatly enhanced. Those which Sen highlights 
as interrelating especially with each other are political freedoms, economic facilities, 
social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. 36 The fact that 
31 Crocker, 'Functioning and Capability' p.588 
32 Crocker, 'Functioning aQd Capability' p.590 
33 Sen, A, Development as Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) p.14 
34 Sen, Development as Freedom p.l8 
3~ Sen, Development as Freedom .pp.283·284 
36 Sen, Development as Freedom pp.37, 38 
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Sen highlights the interrelation between different types of freedom is especially 
important for international development for, as he notes himself, understanding the 
process of development in this way helps to dispel the dominant belief that 'human 
development' (for e:x:ample the expansion of education and health care) is a luxury 
that only richer countries can afford.37 
In rethinking our understanding of development in terms of freedom, Sen's theory 
also changes our understandings of related concepts, such as poverty. Poverty is seen 
by Sen as the deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than in terms of lowness of 
income. 38 
What the capability perspective does in poverty analysis is to enhance the 
understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting 
primary attention away from means (and one particular means that is usually given 
exclusive attention, viz., income) to ends that people have reason to pursue, and, 
correspondingly to the freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends ... deprivations are 
seen at a more fundamental level. 39 
In doing this Sen is showing that antipoverty policy cannot solely be focused on the 
reduction of income poverty.40 Thus our understanding of poverty has much the same 
effect as a new understanding of development and paves the way for a more effective 
international development policy. 
I would argue however, that Sen bases some of his ideas on essentially contestable 
notions. For example Sen challenges the argument advanced by others that economic 
development may be harmful to a nation because it has the potential to destroy 
37 Sen, Development.as Freedom p.41 
38 Sen, Development as Freedom p;87 
39 Sen, Development.as Freedom p.90 
40 Sen, Development.as Freedom p.92 
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cultural heritage and traditions. He argues that if losing tradition is the only way to 
overcome poverty, then that is a choice that all those directly affected must make. He 
sees the only conflict lying between an insistence by authorities that traditions must 
be followed and, what he calls the basic value of people to be allowed to decide 
freely what traditions they wish, or do not wish, to follow. 41 In an attempt to explain 
how this conflict can be resolved, Sen again emphasises the importance of education 
and democracy, vehicles through which people can make their own informed 
decisions about their futures. 42 Although this argument is useful in reiterating the 
importance of having a broad basis for development (Le. the benefits that can be 
made from education and' political freedom) I would argue that Sen dismisses too 
easily the importance of culture and traditions. Theorists specialising in cultural 
rights, such as Kymlicka, can convincingly challenge Sen's apparent understanding of 
the mutability of culture on which he relies in this part of his theory. Kymlicka 
would argue the importance of cultural history, practices and traditions towards a 
person's well being, and highlight the difficulty that exists in changinglleaving 
cultural groups even if the choice exists.43 These are arguments that Sen seems to 
have overlooked and therefore, in my opinion, is a potential problem in the 
acceptability of his theory. 
I do believe however that Sen makes a more convincing response to claims that 
portray development as a form of Western imperialism. He does this through an 
exposition of similar developmental ideas contained in the writings of Islamic and 
Asian traditions, which to some extent may rectify the aforementioned problems. 44 
This highlights the potential for his theory to be accepted across nations and within 
different traditions. As Crocker says 'USen's] work helps us to understand how 
moral inquiry can cut across cultural and national boundaries and contribute to the 
41 Sen, Development as Freedom pp.31-32 
42 Sen, Development as Freedom p.242 
43 See for example 'The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas' Political Theory, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 Feb 1992 pp.l40-146 
44 Sen, Development as Freedom p.233 
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forging of a global ethic. ' 4' Sen himself argues throughout his writing that a positive 
aspect of his theory is that it does not create restrictions with regards to its 
application. 
Capability reflects afreedom to choose between alternative lives ... and its value need 
not be derived from one particular 'comprehensive doctrine' demanding one specific 
way of living .46 
Sen recognises problems, such as those highlighted above, that e~ist in framing 
development in terms of human rights and therefore concentrates his efforts on a 
slightly di·fferent approach, that is, continuing to appeal to the idea of development as 
freedom. He says: 
'While we may be able to manage well enough with the language of freedom rather 
than of rights ... The language of rights can supplement that of freedom.' 47 Thus it 
may appear that in using Sen's theory to underpin the right to development, the 
problems with human rights theory which is also central to the right, may be 
overcome. However, I do not believe that freedom can be separated from human 
rights in the way that Sen attempts to do so. Human rights are often discussed in 
terms of guaranteeing freedoms in a way which requires the removal of obstacles that 
may prevent people from exercising that freedom. The way in which Sen discusses 
development is to see it in terms of creating the conditions that will give people the 
freedom to be the people they choose to be/ to live a life that they value. Can this 
really be said to be different from the human rights approach? Even if we accept 
Sen's argument his construction of freedom leaves us facing the same criticisms that 
face the human rights approach to development. Even though Sen sees importance in 
people taking responsibility for their own development, policy and aid are required to 
create the circumstances in which people can take responsibility, corresponding 
4
' Crocker, 'Functioning and Capability' p.586 
46 Quoted in Crocker, 'Functioning and Capability' p. 597 
47 Sen, Development as Freedom p. 231 
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duties still remain. Sen, in changing the approach we take to development, has not in 
my opinion overcome the problems faced by other development theorists. 
Yet Sen's theory does broaden the perspective in which we think about development 
and it is this broader foundation that holds great potential for creating an effective 
development policy.48 Sen has succeeded in taking our understanding of development 
beyond its traditional economic foundations, and has thus given us a greater insight 
into the needs and potentials for human life. Despite concerns that remain with 
regards to Sen's theory, it is these .aspects ofhis work that, in my opinion, make it of 
fundamental importance to international development. 
A Controversial Concept for the International Community 
It could be argued that what Sen presents us with is a workable guide for policy, yet 
his theory has been built upon further and adapted by the United Nations in their 
mission to gain acceptance for the notion of development as a right. As it is in this 
context that states recognise rights and duties that exist in international society, we 
must also look at the literature that focuses specifically on the right to development, 
as constructed by the United Nations. Thus, having recognised that the right to 
development is both supported and challenged by economic and human rights 
discourse, as the literature discussed above shows, it is important to also 
acknowledge that within the literature on the right to development itself, we are 
presented with many issues of concern that have surrounded the idea since its 
conception. These writings therefore also play an important role in highlighting the 
issues that may influence the understanding that state actors have of the right and 
thus, have the potential to affect the way policy is devised and implemented. 
As Marks says, the right to development as a concept, and the Declaration itself has 
been controversial since its beginning because of the perception by First World 
48 Sen, Development as Freedom pp.295, 297 
22 
countries that the right represented a challenge to the prevailing economic order by 
newly independent countries, who were attempting to advance the idea of a New 
Intemational Economic Order (NIEO) through the United Nations System. The 
initial reaction to the idea of a right to development by the West therefore, was one of 
caution and hostility. Despite the fact that Western delegations, during the drafting of 
the Declaration, made certain that the right would not lead to renewed efforts to 
enforce the NIEO, political obstacles to realising the right continued to exist. 49 As 
Marks says, the voting patterns in the UN illustrate the politics surrounding the 
Declaration on the Right to Development (RTD), and the way in which the US has 
influenced. the voting behaviour of other member states: 
In 2001 at the Commission on Human Rights, most European countries voted for the 
Resolution on the RTD, although the United States and Japan voted against it and 
the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and Canada abstained. From the 
March-April session ... to the September-December session of the General Assembly 
the voting had shifted and 123 voted in favour, four against ... with forty-four 
abstentions. Among the abstaining countries were the principal donors: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K, who had agreed 
to the resolution in 2000:50 
The fact that the major donor countries abstained from voting is a cause of concern 
when we consider the emphasis put on the need for international cooperation in the 
RTD. It also gives further fuel to what has been called the 'coherence critique', 
which draws its argument from the ambiguities of the RTD with regards to whom the 
duty to fulfil the right will rest with. This argument sees rights as entitlements that 
require correlative duties. Sen resists the claim, Sengupta says, by referring to Kant's 
theory of 'imperfect obligation' which prepossess that claims need not necessarily 
49 Marks, S. Obstacles To The Right To Development 
http://www .hsph.haryard.edulfxbcenter/FXBC WP17--Marks.pdf p.2 
so Marks, S. 'The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality' Harvard Human 
Rights Journal Vol. 17 (2004) p. 141 
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require one individual to fulfil that right, but can instead be addressed generally to 
anyone who may be in a position to help.51 
Sengupta notes that the criticism of justiciability also ari.ses from this problem of 
obligations though. He refers to the work of Stephen Marks who writes that 
obligations to promote and provide are general commitments to pursue a certain 
policy, or achieve certain results and are therefore not justiciable. With regards to 
these commitments, if the state does not fulfil its commitment, immediate individual 
remedies through the courts are not available.52 This is related to a view that Sengupta 
says exists especially among lawyers of the positivist school, who argue that rights 
which are not legally enforceable cannot be regarded as human rights. This raises 
considerable problems when we take into account that a significant aspect of the Fight 
to development will revolve around general commitments such as these, and as 
already noted, depends on policies that aim at a certain result and are pursued via a 
process that enables the fulfilment of rights and fundamental freedoms. As Sengupta 
argues though, this view confuses human rights with legal rights, 'human rights 
precede the law and are not derived from law but from the concept of human 
dignity. ' 53 However, Marks would go so far as to argue that these are legal 
obligations, for he says that states are required to take steps 'in the direction of sound 
progressive realization of the right.' A:t the very least, as Sengupta argues, even when 
the right to development is based upon 'impetfect obligations,' programmes of action 
can still be specified in which all parties (but especially the states in the international· 
community) have clear roles in advancing the right. These roles can, he claims, be 
translated into obligations with provisions for corrective action and enforceable 
remedies if the obligations are not fulfilled. 54 
Whether or not Marks' interpretation is accepted, the hopes for seeing the right to 
51 Sengupta, A. ''Vhe Human Right to Development', Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 32, No.2 
~2004.) pp.179-197, p.lO 
52 Sengupta, A. 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development', Human Rights Quarterly 
Vol. 24, No.4 (2002)'pp.837-889, p.85&-857 
53 Sengupta, 'Realising the Right to Development' p.558 
54 Sengupta, 'On the theory and Practice of the Rightto Development' p;857 
24 
development as a human right are not considerably hindered by this argument. As 
Sengupta says the absence of an individual complaints mechanism under the 
international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not prevented 
these rights from being recognised as human rights.55 He also suggests that although 
having legal1ly enforceable rights is desirable, other factors can help assist the 
fulfilment of the right to development, such as peer pressure, democratic persuasion 
and the commitment of civil society. 56 
One concern that 'Should also be noted is that, as Andreassen says, in order to define a 
human right to development one has to have an understanding of what development 
is. The difficulty that he recognises is that the concept is continuous flux, with 
alternative interpretations coming to the forefront over time.57 This concern is 
especially prominent when we consider that those involved in policy 
recommendations in this area, such as Sengupta whose work I will shortly tum to in 
more detail, may overlook the fact that states enter into such obligations with 
different understandings of the underlying principles, and therefore very different 
ideas about what it is they are committing themselves to do. Sengupta especially, 
sees his work as beginning from a point where all represented governments at the 
1993 Vienna Convention who adopted the Vienna Declaration and programme of 
action are obliged to treat the Right to Development as a human right in their dealings 
and transactions, regardless of whether or not they believe it is a human right, or what 
their understanding of development and rights actually is. 58 
Orford also touches upon this concern by noting Alston's argument that the 
Declaration was the result of conflicting perspectives of its drafters. Alston sees this 
ss Sengupta, 'Realising the Right to Development' p.558 
56 Sengupta, 'Realising the Right to Development' p.559 
57 Andreassen, B.A. 'Shifting Notions of Development- Implications for the Right to E>evelopment? 
in The Right to Development: Reflections on the First Four Reports of the Independent Expert on the 
Right to Development Edited by Franciscans International (Geneva, Franciscans International, 2003) 
fj-24-33, pp.24-25 
Sengupta, 'Realising the Right to Development' p.557 
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ambiguity as being a strength as it enables the concept to be interpreted and applied 
with flexibility, which he sees as being indispensable in the area of development. As 
Charlsworth argues though, the Declaration encompasses only one model of 
development, that is, a highly contested, purely economic one that is referring to 
westemisation.59 On this account, I would disagree with Charlsworth for, as 
previously noted, the right to development has been founded on economic ideas such 
as those by Sen, which takes a very broad understanding of development. However, 
when looking at case studies of the practical implementation of the right to 
development, we should bear in mind that the countries involved may not aH be 
acting with the same understanding of development. 
Another contentious issue arising from the right to development is ~hat of who is to 
be understood as the beneficiary of development rights. Udombana argues that, 
although the United Nations General Assembly resolution shows an understanding 
that both states and individuals enjoy the right to development, it is possible to view 
the right to development as a collective right. He highlights this view in two ways, 
firstly by considering· 'the right to development as an aggregate of the social, 
economic and cultural rights of all the individuals constituting a coHectivity.' 
Secondly he says the right could be seen as the economic dimension of the right to 
self..,determination, which would mean that the primary responsibility for 
development and human rights would rest with the nations themselves.60 This 
argument could thus have a significant impact on the way that the right is fulfilled, 
and on international actors' understanding of where responsibility for the right lies.61 
However, although we should keep this concern in mind, when dealing with policy 
that is being implemented to fulfil obligations laid down by the RTD it is safe to 
assume that the parties will be acting with the understanding laid down by the 
declaration, that is, the beneficiaries are individuals and states. 
59 Both• quoted in Orford, A. 'Globalization and the Right to Development' in Alston, P. Peqple's 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.127-l'84, p.145 
60 Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development p.770 
61 See Orford for further discussion 
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A huge concern that remains to be discussed is the fact that, as Orford notes, the right 
to development continues to be absent from international institutions, such as the 
World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, whose work has a major effect on development 
issues. 62 Structural adjustment conditions are attached to the World Bank and IMF 
resources, which require countries to adopt certain policies, including foreign 
investment deregulation, privatisation, cuts to government spending on health and 
education (a condition which glaringly goes against the aims of a right to 
development), and the lowering of minimum wages.63 Other writers have also 
touched on this challenge to the right to development: 
SAPs [IMF dictated Structural Adjustment programmes] have ... worsened the 
economic circumstance of developing countries ... [they] have placed an intolerable 
burden on the poorest populations of the developing world ... Countries of the Third 
World, therefore, should be wary of adopting policies that are not consistent with 
their own agendas.64 
As Orford says, the policies of these institutions clearly violate the right to 
development. The conditions which they impose on countries mean that citizens 
cannot participate in the development process, and are therefore prevented from 
choosing forms of economic and social arrangements that differ from the models 
chosen by the IMF and World Bank.6S Yet, despite the obvious influence that these 
institutions have on the development process, they continue to deny that human rights 
are an area with which they should concern themselves. 66 A possible solution to this 
challenge would be for those countries, which are committed to the right to 
development, to use their voting powers within these institutions to influence the 
62 Orford, 'Globalization and the Right to Development' p.l35 
63 Orford , 'Globalization and ,the Right to Development' p.l51 
64 Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development p.778 
6S Orford, 'Globalization and the Right to Development' p.l52 
66 Orford, 'Globalization.and the Right to Development' p.l57 
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policy. However, with the U.S. who has been seen to oppose the idea of a right to 
development, maintaining a strong influence within the 1MF and World Bank it is 
doubtful whether this solution will be effective in any significant way.67 Having 
examined the position of DFID with regards to the right to development, chapter four 
will discuss this issue in more depth, exploring the relationship that exists between 
Britain and the World Bank, and examining the effect that this relationship has on 
British development policy. 
While acknowledging the fact that conceptual concerns still exist and challenges to 
the realisation of the right are inherent in the pvactices of institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, we must also recognise the fact that the obligations placed 
on states to realise the right must still be fulfilled, even in the face of these 
challenges. Therefore, in order to assess how successful Britain has been in meeting 
the challenges and fulfilling its obligations it is useful to look at both the current 
experiences of other states, and the proposals offered as a practical guide for 
implementation, keeping in mind the questions of whether a successful model for the 
RTD to be implemented actually has been found, and to what extent these models 
differ from the way in which development policy is traditionally constructed and 
implemented (i.e. should we expect to see a significant difference in British 
development policy.) 
Prospects for Implementation 
Within the existing literature the main source of guidance for state policy making 
comes from the reports and articles written by Aljun Sengupta, the United Nations 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development. 
Sengupta argues that a textual analysis of the RID, studied alongside the discussions 
held during the preparation of the Declaration, highlights four clear propositions of 
67 For a discussion on other possible, but potentially unrealistic means by which to put pressure on 
international economic institutions, see Barsh, 1991 
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the Decimation: 
a) The right to development is a human right 
b) The human right to development is a right to a particular process of development 
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be realised 
c) Exercising these rights with freedom implies the free, effective and full 
participation of all the individuals involved in the decision making process. The 
process must therefore be transparent and accountable, and individuals must have 
equal opportunity of access to the resources for development and receive fair 
distribution ofthe benefits of development. 
d) The rights confer unequivocal obligation on duty-holders: individuals in the 
community, states at the national level, and states at the intemationallevel.68 
Sengupta emphasises that the outcome of a process, and the process itself can not be 
seen as the same thing. He argues that, with regards to the right to development, both 
the outcome and the process are human rights. This needs to be emphasised because, 
as he argues, a country can develop by many different processes, for example, 
through industrialisation, or sharp increase in GDP. However if processes of growth, 
such as these, are associated with violations of rights than they cannot be considered 
as fulfilling the human right to development. The process of development, Sengupta 
says, must be centred on the concepts of equity and justice; the entire population must 
see an improvement in their well-being. 69 He suggests five principles that would 
constitute a process that is consistent with human rights standards: equity, non-
discrimination, par:ticipation, accountability, and transparency.70 These principles 
will be especially useful as a guide in chapters three and four, which discuss new 
approaches and methods to development that DFID has introduced, for examining 
how closely DFID is working to a rightto development model. 
68 Sengupta, A. The Right to Development as a Human Right 
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Sengupta recognises that the right to development is built upon the traditional idea of 
the importance of the growth of income and output which provides the basis for the 
expansion of resources and therefore of the opportunities for development. He 
recognises that for improvements to be sustained, and for all rights to be realised, 
then the resources base of a country must expand to cover GDP, technology and 
institutions. 71 He notes though that, in rethinking the traditional approach within the 
context of human rights, the right now has to be realised in a way that ensures that the 
fundamental freedoms of the individuals are expanded. He argues this within the 
context of Sen's work by emphasising, as Sen himself does, that these freedoms 
should be seen as both the p:ti.mary role and the principle end of development, they 
have both a constitutive and an instrumental role within the process.72 The fact that 
the process itself can be seen as a human right, and considering that, in unifying the 
two covenants, the right to development has succeeded in making human rights 
intenelated and interdependent, ensures that the process of development within a 
country wm not lead to abuse of other rights. As Sengupta says therefore: 
... the right to development can improve only when at least one right is improved and 
none are violated. Since the component rights are all civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights, if q,ny of these rights are violated the whole right to 
development is violated. 13 
In all of his articles Sengupta proceeds to look in further detail at the issue of 
international cooperation . 
. . . when realising the right to development is seen not as realising a few rights in 
isolation but as implementing all or most rights in a planned manner in tandem with 
an appropriately high and sustainable growth of the economy and change in its 
11 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' p.874 
12 Sengupta, The Right to Development as a Human Right p.l4 
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structure, the importance of international cooperation becomes even more evident. '74 
I believe that Sengupta rightly places absolute importance on international 
cooperation, not only . because of the complex planning needed for development 
policies in a globalized world where the actions of states will affect all, but also 
because of the obligation that states have agreed to in supplying the resources needed 
for these development programmes. 
This is an important aspect of Sengupta's articles because it helps us to see the 
possibilities for implementation of the right to development, and address the criticism 
that is often formulated with reference to resource constraints. Critics argue that such 
social and economic rights cannot be enforced because of the lack of resources 
available. Sengupta argues though, that the existence of rights and the process to 
implement them should not depend on resource availability. The main issue is 
effective use of the resources available, both those within the state and in the 
international community. 7~ Sengupta discuss.es, therefore, the alternative means by 
which the states in the international community can assist each other to ensure the 
right to development is implemented. The argument he presents first and foremost is 
that developing countries which are short of resources require a significant transfer of 
resources from industrial countries as well as debt relief, commodity price 
stabilisation or preferential access to markets.76 Sengupta sees ODA (official 
development assistance) as having continued importance in ensuring . the right to 
development as it can be used to finance activities that have high social returns, such 
as education and health. Therefore when assessing programmes for the 
implementation of the right to development Sengupta argues that it would be 
beneficial for the volume of ODA to increase and to remain the most important 
instrument of international cooperation.77 Sengupta also calls for the use of 
74 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' p.855 
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development compacts, conditions on aid that are imposed only with the consent of 
the developing countries, a 'compact' that is based on mutual commitment to 
fulfilling conditions for implementing development programmes. They can, he says, 
be an effective instrument for realising the right to development.78 
Responses to Sengupta's recommendations are also existent in the literature and are 
extremely useful in highlighting the potential problems in his approach, and offering 
alternative ways for implementing the right to development. One concern that arises 
from an evaluation of Sengupta's argument is his recommendation of a 'three rights 
approach'. In arguing that food, health and education are the most basic rights, and 
therefore should be the first to he fulfililed in situations where resources for 
development are scarce, he creates a hierarchy of rights thus undermining a principle 
claim of the right to development; that all rights are interdependent and equal. 
Andreassen encapsulates this concern, saying: 
Although this may be a well-founded strategy for practical reasons, focus on these 
three subsistence rights should acknowledge that the realisation of these basic rights 
requires the interrelationship of other rights, particularly political rights and non-
discrimination. A major challenge of the rights based approach to development is to 
take rights together and to explore their instrumental interrelationship in a process 
of change. 79 
The literature does, on the other hand, show evidence of support for the basic needs 
approach. As Udombana argues one of the central concerns of economic planning 
should be the satisfaction of basic needs for, without these, democracy, stability and 
peace cannot survive.80 If we can, as Andreassen suggests, accept that for practical 
reasons this approach needs to be adopted then more concerns arise, such as who 
78 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' p.880 
79 Andreassen, • Shifting Notions of Development ... ' p.31 
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decides which rights are to be implemented first? As we have already seen, the right 
to development can be understood as the eventual fulfilment of the original desires of 
human rights pioneers such as the Roosevelts, that is the unification of civil and 
political, with economic, social and cultural rights into one unified . and 
interdependent set of rights. If certain rights are given priority over others, and states 
are gi.ven the power to implement policies that favour some aspects of development 
over others, then there arises the fear that we may return to a similar situation .that 
was observed during the Cold War, where fundamental rights are deriied at the hands 
of the state. It appears therefore, that in taking this stance Sengupta is undermining 
the very cause he is fighting for. As the case studies discussed later in the chapter 
will also show, development policy, in order to be effective, cannot and must not 
prioritise some rights over others, as this leads to further social, political, and 
economic problems. Hence I believe that this aspect of Sengupta's argument ought to 
be rejected, and advocate that development policy makers in the future learn from the 
experiences of other states. 
Another criticism that arises in the literature is that by Osmani who highlights that 
problems exist with trying to formulate the right to development as the right to a 
process of development. He says that Sengupta bases his argument on the 
consideration that different processes would lead to different outcomes of the 
magnitude and the distribution of development, and as the RTD aims at the equitable 
enjoyment of the benefits of development by all, then only the process that leads to 
this outcome will be acceptable. He also notes that another consideration on which 
Sengupta basis his argument, is that some processes may lead to the desired economic 
rights but only by violating other civil and political rights, so again only a process 
that ensures all rights are fulfilled is plausible in the rights approach to 
development.81 Osmani, in his critique, not only raises our attention to this concern 
but also responds in a way that removes the problematic aspect from Sengupta's 
81 Osmani, S. 'Some Thoughts on the Right to Development' in The Right to Development: 
Reflections on the First Four Reports of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development Edited 
by Franciscans International (Geneva, Franciscans International, 2003) pp.34-45, pp.35-36 
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proposal, without diminishing the importance of equitable outcomes, and the 
enjoyment of al 11 rights in the process of development. He says that, with regm:ds to 
Sengupta's first consideration, the process is onl~ instrumentally valuable. He 
recognises that what is important for Sengupta is equity and sustainability, but these 
are the outcome to which the process leads. Therefore we could define the right to 
development as to include equity and sustainability in the space of outcomes but not 
processes. 82 With reference to the second consideration, Osmani argues that again it 
is adequate to define the right to development in the space of outcomes, by saying 
that ,political and civil rights are as much a part of the outcome as socio-economic 
rights.83 He argues that ' ... since disagreements are almost bound to occur in the 
choice in the process leading to an agreed outcome, it would be a mistake ... to 
proclaim the right to a process that is of purely instrumental value. ' 84 
Although alternative approaches aimed at rectifying the problems in Sengupta's 
argument may be useful for states wishing to find an effective policy for 
implementing the right to development, there is the concern that the proliferation of 
ideas could potentially intensify the problem that each state may have a different 
understanding of what the right to development actually entails. as As Sfeir-Younis 
recognises, too many interpretations concerning how best to implement the right to 
development limits that ability to reach a wider and politically stronger consensus. 86 
82 Osmani, 'Some Thoughts on the Right to E>evelopment' p.36 
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as Another critique of Sengupta's work comes from Sfeir-Younis, who attempts to put greater 
emphasis back on the importance of the economic elements of development. He makes some useful 
and interesting points which suggest that Sengupta has overlooked the extent to which his proposals 
require fundamental changes to,existing power structures and value systems. These, Sfeir-Younis 
argues are things that will take generations to change, thus he concludes that Sengupta's proposals, if 
implemented, would be less effective,than policy based on economic and financial considerations. 
This argumentresorts to,a more traditional approach to development. Although this article does raise 
some important critical points with regards to Sengupta's, we must take into account the factthat Sfeir-
Younis is responding on behalf of the World Bank and therefore his argument is tainted by a very 
sr:ific and political agenda. 
8 Sfeir-Younis, A. 'The Right to Development: The Political Economy oflmplementation' in The 
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However, the majority of writers do converge on some central recommendations, and 
recognise them as being essential in the development pt:ocess, such as overcoming 
technological dependence, fighting corruption, and removing obstacles to 
democracy. 87 . Given the consensus around these principles it will also be useful to 
bear these in mind, again in chapters three and four especially, to see how DFID is 
incorpot:ating the central ideas into their development work. It will also be necessary 
however, to consider the extent to which principles such as these were already present 
in British development projects, in order to truly assess the change that has occurred 
with regards to development thinking and policy responses. 
Evolving State Practice 
Despite the theoretical challenges that the right to development faces, and the 
concerns noted with regards to the United Nations recommendations writers such as 
Marks have noted that in recent years both national and international agencies have 
increased their support of making human rights a genuine component of development 
and within states, RTD-friendly programmes have begun to emerge. For example, he 
says, in 2000 a project was presented by a UK delegation and a representative of 
Rwanda that was close to Sengupta's notion of a development compact88 This 
particular project is a manifestation of the move towards partnership methods which 
incorporate many of the central ideas of the right to .development, a method which 
will be discussed further in chapter three. Evidence given in the litet:ature such as this 
suggests that not only have workable ideas been found for the right to development to 
be incorporated in development policy, but also that these ideas have been accepted 
and are beginning to be implemented in Britain. Marks also argues however that 
there is a distinct absence of policies at both the national and international level that 
suggests anything more than simply a rhetorical commitment to the idea. 'World 
summits and conferences' he says, 'tend to make a single mention of the RTD in the 
87 See for example Udombana, and.Sano 
88 Marks, Obstacles To The Right To Development p.5 
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declaration, but neglect it in the plan of action. ' 89 
In order to both assess how true claims such as this ~e, and to gain some indication 
of what changes we might expect to see in British policy and how these changes may 
have affected the countries to which the policy is directed, it is also useful to look 
further at the literature on other states' experiences of implementing the RTD. The 
evidence provided in this area of the literature will also help us to consider whether 
the emerging theory on the right to development has been successfully translated into 
the policy of states, and therefore whether we should expect to see changes in the 
policy making and implementation under the New Labour government. It will also 
give some indication of whether concerns which expressed that c.ountries may have 
differing understandings of development are justified. 
Hamm says at the national level many countries have expressed willingness to 
implement policy formulated along the right to development guidelines. These 
countries have included Denmark, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom. 90 
Evidence provided in the literature confil'ms that this willingness is not purely 
rhetorical. The Danish government for example has begun to implement policies that 
reflect the recommendations given by the Independent Expert. A new initiative 
launched by the government, 'A Global Deal' was proposed as an agreement between 
developed and developing countries, and was based on mutual obligations in the 
process of development. 91 This strongly resembles the idea of 'development 
compacts' advocated by the Independent Expert. Similar evidence within the 
literature with regards to Australia also suggests that a human rights approach to 
development is being adopted (for example the Human Rights Council of Australia 
89 Marks, Obstacles To The Right To Development p.l3,15, 
90 Hamm, B.I. 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 23, No. 4 
(2001) pp.l005-1031, p.lOll 
91 Jensen, T. 'The Right to :Development: Escaping Poverty through Development and Education' in 
The Right to Development: Reflections on the First Four Reports of the Independent Expert on the 
Right to Development Edited by Franciscans International (Geneva, Franciscans International, 2003) 
pp.72-81, p;80 
36 
published in 1995 a document entitled The Rights Way to Development: Human 
Rights Approach to Development Assistance. 92 
Studies into the current development policy of the U.S. also provide us with some 
interesting facts. As has already been mentioned, the U.S. has consistently opposed 
the notion of a right to development; however analysis of recent U.S. programmes for 
funding development. incorporates the central ideas of the RTD, without 
acknowledging any connection with it. 93 Marks notes that in March 2002 President 
Bush introduced an idea that resembled both the concept of the RTD and the 
recommended development compact, before proposing a $5 billion annual increase in 
Overseas Development Assistance through a new Millennium Challenge account 
(MCA), to 'be given to governments who were committed to good governance, the 
health and education of their people, and social and economic policies that foster 
enterprise. 94 This may be indicative of the fact that the change in development theory 
has been successful in changing the policy approach of governments, and that the 
opposition of the U.S. to the RTD can be attributed to a stance against the 
Declaration rather than to the underlying ideas. However it should also be noted, 
Marks says, that: 
the concern for human rights and investment in the people does not appear to guide 
other U.S. programs to finance c(evelopment, whereas other countries apply 
international human rights standards to the full range of development-related 
decision-making ... 9S 
Looking at the approach of the U.S, due to the close relationship that it has with 
Britain, may be particularly indicative of the trends we might expect to see in British 
92 See Sano, H.O, 'Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human 
Rights and Development' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 22, No.3 (2000) pp.734-752, p.734 
93 Marks, 'The Human Right to Development ... ' p.l40 
94 Marks, 'The Human Right to Development .. .' p.156-157 
9S Marks, 'The Human Rightto Development .. .' p.166 
37 
development policy in recent years. For example, it may be the case that little 
mention of a right to development appears in policy papers, yet is incorporated into 
the projects themselves. This is a point that will be discussed throughout the rest of 
the thesis. Thus, by raising our attention to the processes and changes in other donor 
countries, the existing literature has provided points of examination for later 
discussions in the thesis. 
Even with a change to the development policy approach of the donor countries 
however, it must be noted that much of the success of development policy also relies 
on the actions of the receiving states. As Sen comments, when we analyse the fast 
economic progress of East Asian, and Southeast Asian economies it becomes clear 
that the openness of the economies was not the only factor that led to such rapid 
economic transition, but also the groundwork that was laid by positive social changes 
in health care and education. 96 The lack of social reform to accompany economic 
growth has been one of the factors that have led to the failure of development policies 
in India despite the promising articles of the Constitution that prioritise the provision 
of food, primary education, and primary health. 97 As Kurian says: 
On the basis of [the East-Asian] experience it can be safely concluded that India's 
failure to universalize literacy has been a major constraint in achieving widespread 
economic development even after deregulation and trade liberalization in the early 
nineties.98 
' 
Thus, the role that recipient governments play in the development process has also 
become an important issue in development projects. The extent to which this had 
96 Sen, J:)evelopment as Freedom.p.Z59 
97 See Kurian, N.J. 'The Relevance of the· Independent Expert's Reports on the Right to Development 
for India' in The Right to Development: Reflections on the First Four Reports of the Independent 
Expert on the Right to Development Edited by Franciscans International (Geneva, Franciscans 
International, 2003) pp.62-71, p.69 
98 Kurian, 'The Relevance of the Independent Expert's Reports .... ' p.67 
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been recognised and addressed by DFID will also be looked at in chapter three. As 
noted above, the development compact recommended by the independent expert 
creates a role for recipient governments to play, and has been incorporated into the 
partnership approach of DFID. The impact that this approach has had on the success 
of development projects will therefore be examined, and will give some indication of 
the difference that the right to development and its central principles have on 
development processes. 
However the case study literature also includes references to the experiences of 
development in Sri Lanka, where problems have occurred in the development process 
there despite the fact that many of the essential elements of the right to development 
such as access to health care, primary education, and adequate nutrition, underpinned 
by a democratic political system, had all been realised in the period following 
independence. 99 In this case the social progress that was achieved resulted in a rapid 
population growth which imposed an unbearable strain on an economy that was 
growing too slowly. As GunatiHeke highlights, the Sri Lanka study reinforces, as 
'does the study of India and China that social, political, economic and cultural rights 
are an indivisible whole, and no set of rights can be neglected in pursuit of others. 100 
The case studies demonstrate therefore, the difficult but absolute necessity of 
developing all rights simultaneously, in order to achieve the outcomes that the right 
to development seeks. The difficulties experienced reinforce the fact that cooperation 
is absolutely essential between donor states, and recipient countries, and between 
recipient governments and their citizens. They also prove though that the right to 
development can be translated into workable development programmes, and that 
these programmes have the potential to significantly improve the freedoms and 
capabilities of all. Thus the thesis wiltl examine the relationships that DFID has 
99 Gunatilleke, G. 'The Right to Development in Sri Lanka' in Sengupta, A. Negi, A. and Basu M 
Reflections on the Right to Development a...<>ndon, Sage Publications, 2005) pp.155-207, p.l55 
100 Gunatilleke, 'The Right to Development in Sri Lanka' p.156 
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managed to establish between themselves, recipient governments and citizens, and 
will evaluate the extent to which these relationships have improved the freedoms and 
capabilities of those at the centre of the development process. 
Conclusion 
As the literature has shown, there exist many theoretical positions and evidence of 
practice that can both support and challenge the notion of a right to development. 
Yet one final challenge not yet discussed is presented in the literature. Marks argues 
that a serious obstacle to the realisation of the right to development is ignorance that, 
. despite improvements in the conceptual understanding of the right, ensues from the 
lack of empirical knowledge of the actual and potential applications of RTD.101 It is 
clear therefore, that a gap exists and is recognised within the existing literature on the 
right to development. This thesis fits into the gap that has been highlighted, by taking 
as its focus a case study into the actual applications of the RTD within Britain's 
development policy. 
My examination of the existing literature on the changes in development theory raises 
questions such as: how successful has this change in theory been in terms of affecting 
the way in which state actors understand development? Has there been a similar shift 
in thinking in the Labour government? Is there any evidence in policy that the British 
Government has moved away from the traditional understanding of development in 
purely economic terms, to one which centres around the human being and 
fundamental freedoms? If state practice doesn't suggest a change what implications 
does this have for the theory? The evidence presented in these chapters will 
determine what effect I think the practice will have on the theory. If British policy 
does reflect the changing theory on development, then my thesis will contribute to the 
literature that already exists which confmns that practice of states supports the 
theory. If however the evidence suggests otherwise then my conclusion wiH address 
101 Marks, Obstacles To The Right To Development p.6 
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if and how this wiU impact on theory. The following chapters will therefore address 
these questions that arise out of a study of the existing literature. 
By comparing policy practice to proposed models of implementation that have been 
discussed in this chapter my thesis, through an examination of how useful the 
recommendations have been in directing British policy, will also be acting as a 
critique of the processes recommended and therefore add to the existing critiques I 
have located in the literature. 
My thesis will also add to the existing literature by taking broader issues such as the 
war on terror and assessing the impact of these situations on a much narrower issue; 
the right to development. This will not only show the wider impact that security 
policy has, but also highlight to what extent the right to development is valued and 
prioritised when national interests come into conflict with international obligations . 
• 
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Chapter2 
Historical Changes in British Development Policy and 
Their Relationship with Current Practice 
Chapter 1 raised many questions abo.ut the possible implications that a theory of a 
right to development may have on British development policy. This chapter will pick 
up on some of these questions and begin to examine the historical developments in 
the British aid programme, looking at changes in the way it has been administrated, 
and the underlying aims of policy makers with regards to overseas aid. Therefore, 
keeping in mind the following questions, which will continue to be addressed in later 
chapters, I will discuss the ways in which development policy has previously been 
discussed and constructed in Britain in order to assess whether there has been a shift 
in development thinking within Labour, and thus whether the change in theory at the 
international level has affected the making of policy at state level. Having looked at 
the historical position of development administration in Britain, and what these 
changes meant for development policy, it will be possible to assess whether the 
changes we see under New Labour are responses to changes in development theory, 
or whether established patterns of administration were being fol1lowed; patterns that 
have little effect on the policy approach itself. 
How successful has this change in theory been in terms of affecting the way in which 
state actors understand development? Has there been a similar shift in thinking in the 
Labour Government? Is there any evidence in policy that the British Government has 
moved away from the traditional understanding of development in purely economic 
terms, to one which centres on the human being and fundamental freedoms? 
Previous British Gover,nments: Their Policies and Practice 
When we compare the recent institutional and policy changes that have taken place 
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under the New Labour government, there seems to be a clear difference between their 
approach and that of the Conservative government which preceded it. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, New Labour has adopted an approach where aid 
policy is focused on poverty reduction, partnerships, and policy coherence, and is 
administrated from a ministry, the Department for International Development, 
dedicated solely to issues of international development. In cont:r:ast to this, 
development policy and aid administration under the Conservatives came within the 
remit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This, as Sutton says, had the 
effect of binding the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) more closely to 
the FCO in terms of policy, 1 and as Hewitt also says, implicit in the incorporation of 
the ODA into the FCO is an attempt to identify more closely development with 
foreign policy aims.2 However, the use of aid for foreign policy aims was not only 
suggested by the institutional arrangements. During their 1979-97 term .of office, 
Conservative Ministers also emphasised in ministerial statements, the intention to 
give greater priority to political, industrial and commercial considerations within the 
aid programme, alongside the programme's basic developmental objectives.3 
As well as using aid in the pursuit of self-interested goals, Hewitt also draws our 
attention to a significant and damaging change for the British aid programme that 
was implemented under the Conservative Government; the termination of the official 
Development Education Fund. The Fund had been set up in order to provide a source 
of education for the general public in relation to issues affecting the economic and 
social development of the world's least developed countries. With the ending of the 
Fund all public programmes of development education were abandoned despite the 
fact that a recent government survey had identified it as necessary, when taking into 
consideration public attitudes towards the Third World.4 A further indication of the 
1 Hewitt. A. and Sutton, M. 'Taking Stock: Three Years of Conservative Aid Policy' ODI Review No. 
1 (1982) pp.20-37. pp.24-25 
2 Hewitt. A. and. Sutton, M. 'British Aid: A Change of Direction' ODI Review No.1 (1980) pp.1-10. 
f·~utton, 'Taking Stock ... ' p,26 
4 Hewitt, 'British Aid: A change of direction' pp.7-8 
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extent to which the Conservati~e's approach affected development work is, as Barder 
notes, the reduction of British staff who were working on contract to developing 
countFies, from 116,000 in the mid-1960s to almost none in 1990.5 
Clarke illustrates the fact that, in being responsible for all stages of the aid 
programmes, the ODA geographical desks needed to be in close contact with the 
appropriate desks in the diplomatic wing. Considering this it can be seen that, from 
an organisational point of view, incorporating the ODA into the FCO was entirely 
logical. Clarke continues by arguing that the case for making the Overseas 
Development Ministry separate from the Foreign and Commonwealth office was a 
political one. Just as the arrangement under the Conservatives for dealing with 
development policy institutionalised the idea that foreign aid was an explicit 
instrument of foreign policy, the argument for a separate ministry emphasises the 
contrary notion, that this arrangement will increase the political profile of aid and 
thus attract more resources for aid programmes. 'It would also', he says, 
'institutionalise the notion that aid is primarily for the benefit of the recipient 
country.'6 
Thus, it was this latter notion of development that was the driving force behind the 
institutional changes that were implemented under Wilson's Labour government 
1964-70. In 1965 the first Overseas Development Ministry was created and the 
government produced the influential White Paper Overseas Development: The Work 
of the New Ministry. The themes in this Paper have continuously emerged in the 
development work of later Labour governments, and reflect to some extent those 
contained in the 1997 White Paper. The main aim of the government, as stated at the 
beginning of the 1965 White Paper, was to provide the people in developing 
countFies with the material opportunities to enable them to use their talents to 
5 Barder, 0. Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience Working Paper 
Number 70 (Center for Global Development, 2005) pp.l0-11 
6 Clarke, M. British External Policy Making Since the I990s (London, Macmillan Press, 199Z) p.83 
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transform their lives into full and happy ones. Thus the objective of the aid 
programme, the government stated, was to raise living standards through the 
promotion of social and economic development. The basis of the policies was 
therefore a moral one.7 
The government highlighted within the 1965 White Paper a recognition that problems 
arise when the responsibility and control over development policy rests within a 
number of different departments, hence the setting up of a new and separate ministry. 
It says: 
The concentration of responsibility in the hands of one Minister enables us to work 
out a coherent aid policy and to adapt the distribution of our aid to that 
philosophy ... Our aid programme must be administered in harmony with the policies 
of all the departments concerned with our economic and overseas affairs.8 
This is extremely similar to the pursuit of policy consistency by New Labour, which 
once in power, sought to create a more 'joined-up' government by which all 
department would work together with a consistency of policy aim across all 
departments. There was also a move in the 1965 Paper towards the untying of British 
aid. Although this practice was not abolished in these reforms, the Government 
expressed recognition that: 'The tying of aid often reduces its effective value to the 
recipient and the ideal solution would be a general untying by all donors. ' 9 Thus with 
this statement, we see the beginnings of the development practices that exist today 
under New Labour. 
Another aspect of this Paper, which we can recognise in the work of later 
7 Ministry of Overseas Development. Overseas Development: The Work of The New Ministry 
(London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1965) paras 1 and 2 
8 The Work of the New Ministry paras 70 and 74. 
9 The Work of the New Ministry para 67 
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governments, is the need for co-operation between different parties in the aid 
programme, especially with other donor countries and with the recipient countries.10 
This again mirrors the New Labour move towards building partnerships, which they 
set out in the 1997 White Paper. What we can see therefore, is that much of the 
grounding that underlies New Labour development policy had been set down by 
preceding Labour governments. As the examples above has shown, many of the 
essential elements of the 1997 White Paper can also be found at the core of previous 
White Papers on development. 
Although the development administration had reverted back to the control of the FCO 
under Heath's government (1970-1974), with a change of government in February 
1974 the Overseas Development Administration once again became a ministry 
separate from the FCO yet at the time, as Jones says, it was unclear what difference 
this institutional change would make to British aid policy. The 1974 Labour Party 
Manifesto had given no details on aid policy beyond a commitment of the -0.7% 
official development assistance target, however an earlier statement in 'Labour's 
Programme for Britain' 1973, had made detailed proposals which included increased 
aid to projects in countries which were geared to helping the poorest members of 
society, as well as an increase in aid to the poorest countries in general. 11 
Their major development policies were soon set out though, once back in o:ffice, in 
another important White Paper for development 'The Changing Emphasis of 
Britain's Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest.' As Barder says, the 
Government, in this paper, proposed significant changes to aid policy. Emphasis was 
placed on increasing bilateral aid to the poorest countries, and ensuring that 
programmes of development within these countries were orientated towards the 
poorest groups within those societies, just as the pre-election statements had 
suggested. As an overall guide, the driving principle was that aid should be allocated 
10 The Work of the New Ministry para 86 
11 Jones, D.B. 'Developments in British Aid' ODI Review No. 1 (1974) p.66 
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to have both a long term and the greatest effect possible on alleviating poverty.12 The 
emphasis that was placed on the poorest members in the poorest countries is 
something that New Labour policy also·continues. However, as will be noted in more 
detai1  below, the focus on the alleviation of poverty is diminished under New Labour 
in favour for policies that will have a longer effect, that is, the eradication of poverty. 
From this evidence it could generally be assumed that Labour governments were 
more committed than the Conservative party to using aid for the development of the 
poorest countries. They had explicitly stated this as their aim, and had made 
appropriate institutional changes in order to fulfil it. Yet critics have maintained that 
the institutional changes carried out under the two Labour governments made very 
little difference to British aid policy. As White argues: 
... a closer examination of the historical record [on British aid policy] ... shows that, 
rhetoric aside, there has been far more continuity than change in British aid 
throughout the years, regardless of which party has held the reins of power. A 
central element in this continuity has been the important role political, economic and 
commercial considerations have played in constraining the aid programme. 13 
One reason for this continuity may be, as Sutton notes, that the Conservatives were 
limited in which new policies they could introduce. The extent of this limitation is 
realised when we take into account the obligation placed on the Conservative 
government to preserve the existing commitments to place greater emphasis on the 
poorest countries and on the poorest people in development aid, obligations that had 
been introduced by their predecessors, as well as continuing their inherited long-term 
international pledges. 14 However, policy continuity cannot be attributed purely to the 
12 In Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.S 
13 White, H. 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development: Dressing a Wolf in 
Sheep's Clothing in the Emperor's New Clothes?' Journal of International Development Vol, 10, No. 
2 (1998) pp.151-166. p.152 
14 Hewitt and Sutton, 'Taking Stock: Three Years of Conservative Aid Policy' p.28 
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constraints on the Conservative Government. Rather, we must recognise that in 
many respects, Labour actively pursued policies that were extremely similar to those 
of the Conservatives. These were generally policies aimed at the benefit of Britain 
above the developmental purposes of the aid programme. As White explains, even 
under Wilson's government aid was disproportionately affected by expenditure cuts 
in 1965, and in 1972 Seers and Streeten, who had headed the Economic Planning 
Staff at ODM, stated that the poor performance of aid had been due to Labour's 
political priorities rather than economic difficulties. Additionally, in 1968 it was 
proposed, although not implemented by a cabinet committee (which included Wilson 
himself), that all aid should be tied to the purchase of British goods. A similar policy 
resurfaced under Labour again in 1977, with the creation of the Aid and Trade 
Provision (A TP), through which aid was linked to non-concessional export credits 
and tied to the procurement of British goods and services.15 ATP, White says, 
highlights the Labour government's willingness to use aid as a tool in their relations 
with the UK business community.16 This policy, although introduced by the Labour, 
was also used by the Conservatives who, on their return to government, removed the 
5% upper limit on ATP.17 
However, with regards to the future direction of the British aid programme; one of the 
most significant and more positive developments was in 1973, Jones argues, with the 
establishment of the House of Commons Select Committee on Overseas 
Development, which was to consider and report on UK assistance for overseas 
development. In its reports the committee made recommendations that highlighted a 
more generous approach to UK aid than even the new government might be ready to 
accept. There was however no binding element to Committee recommendations in 
order to make the govetnment follow the advice.18 
15 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on. International Development pp.l53-154 
16 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development pp.l54-155 
17 Hewitt, 'British Aid: A change of direction' p.5 
18 Jones, 'Developments in British Aid' pp.67-69 
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A New Approach for New Labour? 
It is concerning that many argue that very little difference was made to the way UK 
aid policy was implemented under the two different governments when we begin to 
consider both the similarities in the White Papers on development and statements, 
such as those noted by Jones, made by the Labour party before their 1974 victory and 
those made by New Labour in the run up to the 1997 election. The 1997 manifesto 
promised that a higher priority will be given to combating global poverty and 
underdevelopment, with a shift in aid resources to help the poorest people in the 
poorest countries, a promise that, as noted above, was also made by both Wilson's 
and Callaghan's Labour governments. 
The 1997 White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 2F' Century 
addressed New Labour's main policy changes in four sections. The first of these 
sections highlighted the refocusing of development policy towards the aim of the 
elimination of poverty. The second focused on the new concept of partnerships, that 
is, working with other actors in development in order to achieve the eradication of 
poverty. The third section of the White Paper highlighted an aim to ensure the 
consistency of policies. As Barder explains, this aspect of the agenda was based on 
the idea of a 'joined-up' government, which had developed from New Labour's 
realisation that many social problems, such as drug addiction and crime, could not be 
resolved by any one department on its own.19 Instead all departments would have to 
work together. In the White Paper the Government applied this theory to 
development also, thus tackling the problem that has been experienced by previous 
governments whose different ministries had competing aims. The final section stated 
the aim to increase public understanding of the need for international development, 
returning to a policy that had been pursued' by Labour in the past but abandoned 
under the Conservatives. 
19 Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.ll 
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Having recognised the similarities between the recent reforms and those of past 
governments it should be asked whether the changes that we see occurring under 
New Labour are really that different from the promises and reforms already witnessed 
under previous Labour governments. Blair argued at the beginning of the 1997 
Manifesto that New Labour policy is different from 'that of earlier Labour 
governments: 
In each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that 
differs both from the solutions of the old left and those of the Conservative right ... We 
recognise that the policies of 1997 cannot be those of 1947 or 1967.20 
The insistence by Blair that their approach is unique may indeed be accurate. As 
Slater and Bell argue, it appears that the New Labour approach is neither a product of 
previous Labour or Conservative positions but, rather, a combination of the changing 
official development discourse and ideas that have grown out of 'Third Way politics', 
that is, a position between state interventionism, and the minimalist state (two 
extremes that have both been deemed ineffective when it comes to tackling 
poverty.)21 Yet critics have been hard in their assessment of New Labour's 1997 
White Paper. It is argued that the three main objectives of the paper; poverty 
reduction, partnerships, and policy consistency have all been tried before and have 
each, to a great extent, failed.22 One reason for this failure by previous Labour 
governments, Lambe argues, stems from the fact that the 1965 White Paper laid down 
broad objectives and motives behind British aid, yet failed to specify how this was to 
be achieved.23 Although it could be argued that New Labour is in a position to 
examine the previous attempts a~ these policies and learn from the failures ·Of their 
20 Blair, T. New Labour, Because Britain Deserves /Jetter. 'The 1997 Party Manifesto. Available at: 
ht1p://www .psr .keele.ac.uk/area/uk/manllab97 .htm 
21 Slater ,D. and Bell, M. 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial: Critical Reflections on New 
Labour's·Overseas Development Strategy' in Development and Change Vol. 33, No.2 (2002) pp. 335-
360,p343 
22 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development p.l61 
23 Lambe, J. 'British Development'Policies' ODI Review No.3 (1969) pp:40-55. p.49 
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predecessors, a major concern rests on the fact that the 1'997 White Paper also lacks 
sufficient detail on how the policy objectives are going to be implemented. ' ... the 
White paper is at the level of broad policy statements, rather than on detail on the 
implications for the implementation of the British aid programme of these new 
policies. '24 Burnell also comments on the vagueness of the White Paper saying that it 
focuses on 'sustainable development', but within the text this term is used with .a 
variety of meanings.Z5 · He continues by saying that the same is true of the White 
Paper's section OI1 partnerships, which argues that aid recipients need to take 
ownership.of aid programmes: 
.. . just like sustainable development, our understanding of what ownership means, of 
precisely who or what should be the owners; and how best to operationalise the goal 
in practice are relatively underdeveloped and are contested.26 
However, as Labour MP; Tony Worthington contended, the establishment of DFJiD 
has so far had the effect of making aid and development policy more principled and 
focused.27 
Surprisingly, scepticism of what one might consider to be the more promising aspects 
of the proposed policies also exists. As White says with regards to the recommended 
'partnerships': 
... the aid community has long been prone to political correctness .in its terminology 
and previous attempts to re-label the donor-recipient relationship (e.g. the renaming 
24 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development p.164 
25 Bumell, P. 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid? Eliminating World Poverty: 
A Challenge for the 2'1"1 Century' Third World Quarterly Vol.19, No.4 (1998) pp.787-802. p.788 
26 Bumell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid?' p.790 
27 The United Kingdom Parliament,,Debate lOth 'December 2003, pt 23 (House of Commons Hansard 
Debates) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrdlvo03Ul0/debtext/312} 0-
23.htm 
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of DACs annual report from Development Assistance to Development Co-operation) 
have done nothing to change the inherently one-sided nature of the aid relationship.28 
Burnell takes further contention with the list of potential partners that the White 
Paper provides. He argues that such an extensive list, which includes recipient states, 
civil societies, other donor governments, NGOs, multilateral financial institutions, as 
well as British businesses, succeeds only in devaluing the concept of partnerships, for 
it merely suggests that every entity has the potential to become a partner. 29 
In response to these concerns we can turn to evidence that suggests, to the contrary, 
that New Labour's approach towards development policy is not only different from 
its predecessors, but has also been successful. One such example is the passing of the 
2002 International Development Act. The Act states that every development 
assistance project/ programme must by law further sustainable development, or 
promote the welfare of the people and be likely to contribute to the reduction of 
poverty; this should be the single aim of all aid spending. The Act therefore also 
made it illegal for UK aid to be tied to the use of British goods and services. 30 
Binding these ideas within the law is a significant development for this area ofpolicy. 
As we have seen, the previous Labour governments promised such approaches yet, 
without being bound to them by law, could and did continue to follow traditional aid 
. . 
programmes that furthered national interests rather than promoting the development 
of the poorer nations. 
The setting up of DFID has also been successful in contrast to previous attempts by 
Labour governments to place development work in the hands of a separate ministry. 
Past faiiures can be attributed to conflicts of interests between departments. As 
Lambe notes, the 1964 Ministry of Overseas Development had to battle against 
28 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development p.l60 
29 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid?' p.790 
30 Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.17 
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attempts by the FCO and the Board of Trade t9 distort the central objective of aid, 
that is, to promote social and economic development.31 Evidence suggests though, 
that New Labour has been successful with its policy of producing a 'joined-up' 
government, and therefore DFID should be free from pressures from other 
departments. For example the cooperation of departments can be seen in the 
establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, and the Africa Conflict 
Prevention Pool, both of which drew upon the resources and expertise of the Ministry 
of Defence, the Foreign Office; and the Department for International Development. 32 
The Secretary of State has also insisted that the White Paper is a government 
document which reflects an agreement between all ministries.33 However, many are 
sceptical at how long this co-operation between departments will last. Burnell for 
example argues: 
DFID's ability to punch above its weight within the government will partly depend on 
the extent to which its concerns are shared by the FCO and coincide with its stated 
commitment to a 'more ethical foreign policy', and also on how far ministers .. .in 
other departments ... can pursue complementary objectives in such international and 
multilateral forums such as the EU ... without knowingly jeopardising their own policy 
goals. 34 
Considering this, we may yet see a return to inter-departmental disputes, whose 
resolutions may be at the expense of the new development approach. 
As Lambe highlights though, the influence that DFID has within government will 
depend a great deal on the leadership within it, and on the position of other senior 
ministers towards development policy. 
31 Lambe, J. 'The Future ,of the overseas Development Ministry' ODI Review No. 3 (1969) pp.56-62. 
f..56 
~ Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.l6 
33 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid?' p.791 
34 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid? ' p.792 
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There is only one factor which is common to all countries in which the aid 
administration is working in a favourable environment ..• a strong governmental 
leadership, and a political commitment, at the highest level, to the developmental 
objectives of aid. 35 
Lambe believes therefore that dle failure of previous Labour reforms with regards to 
aid policy was not due to political or public opinion, neither, he says, was it due to a 
flaw in the new structures for aid administration. Rather the failures came down to 
the priorities of the political leaders of both the Government and opposition. 36 Clare 
Short certainly provided strong leadership. Writers such as Hewitt believe that, due 
to Short's leadership and the example she has set for other foreign leaders, 
international development is now a major concern for presidents and government 
leaders, in a way that it has never been before. 37 
However, as Burnell notes, the first Minister of Overseas Development, Barbara 
Castle, was also a strong leader, yet after her departure the influence of the new 
ministry quickly declined and by 1967 the cabinet seat was removed by the Labour 
government itself. 38 However, as a 2005 study for the Canadian Government 
concluded: 'Ten years ago, DFID was considered a middle-of-the-pack development 
agency. Today it is considered the best in the wodd.' 39 With such a renowned 
international reputation it is unlikely that even a change in the leadership at DFID 
will lead to a decline in the ministry's influence and respect within the Government. 
Burnell argues that the change in vocabulary used at the level of policy, as is seen in 
the 1997 White Paper, will also make a positive difference. He says that moving 
away from terms such as aid, and assistance, makes the new approach less 
patronising and will therefore make for more productive dialogue between Britain 
35 Lambe, The Future ofthe Overseas Development Ministry pp. 58-59 
36 Lambe, The Future of the Overseas Development Ministry p.59 
37 Hewitt, Beyond Poverty p.29,1 
38 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid?' p.792 
39 In Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.3 
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and the recipient countries. The idea of 'partnerships' is thus also likely to be more 
successful.40 However, changes in vocabulary will have little difference unless 
traditional approaches to development are challenged at a deeper, more fundamental 
level. Slater and Bell argue that 'both White Papers endorse the prevailing view 
concerning the centrality of economic growth and foreign investment in the 
elimination of world poverty.' Thus, they say, the focus. on economic liberalism as a 
means of taclcling poverty remains both central and unchallenged, and New Labour, 
in making neo-liberal globalisation and the reduction of poverty seemingly 
·compatible, dismisses the very fact that the two are in conflict and pose serious 
challenges for development.41 
We should also acknowledge that, despite the positive changes and strengths already 
noted, the new approach taken by New Labour does not reflect an entirely selfless 
position on development. As Barder says, one motivation for the establishment of a 
separate department was to increase the attention that is paid to the UK's long term 
strategic interests, and ensure that these were not side-lined by short tenn pressures. 
In particular it was and, with the emergence of international issues such as 
transnational terrorism, continues to be recognised that the UK's security interests are 
related to the reduction in poverty and inequality, and the improvement of governance 
in developing countries. 4~ Yet as Burnell highlights, the White Paper's commitment 
to grants and the cancellation of debts owed to the UK; as well as the urge it gives to 
other donor countries for multilateral debt relief for the most heavily indebted poor 
countries, does highlight the government's commitment to development even when it 
comes with a real financial cost to Britain.43 
40 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid?' p.789 
41 Slater and Bell, 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial ... ' pp.352-354 
42 Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.23 
43 Burnell, 'Britain's New Government, New White Paper, New Aid? ' p.791 
55 
New Labour: Raising the Status of Development Polley 
It can be concluded at this point that New Labour has implemented a more successful 
development policy than previous Labour governments. Although the fundamental 
ideas behind the policies can be seen as a progression of the work begun by earlier 
ministers, such as the commitment to helping the world's poorest in the poorest 
countries, New Labour has, with strong leadership and commitment to its values, 
raised the status of development policy, not only within the British Parliament, but in 
development administrations around the world. 
However, we need to look further, beyond leadership and drive, at why New Labour 
in particular has been more successful than other Labour Governments despite the 
similarities that were commented on above. 
Hamm argues that one fundamental change in the development approach by New 
Labour is that it exists within a human rights framewot:k. This approach to 
development, he says, does not guarantee more success but it does cause significant 
changes in development policy and administration to occur.44 Hamm says that, if 
taking human rights as the framework for development policy, the whole perspective 
of the programme changes from a moral commitment into the realm of legal claims. 
Aspects of development such as the provision of adequate food, education and health 
care can no longer be seen as acts of charity but as the right of each individual to have 
his/her basic needs met. This approach helps development policy to move away from 
the interests of both the donor country and the ruling class of the receiving country 
because human rights are in principle beyond such interests.4s This may be the 
reason for the discontinuation of certain development policies that promoted national 
interests, such as the tying of aid. A human rights framework, Hamm notes, also 
changes the policy dialogue between the donors and recipient state. 46 It causes both 
participants to have obligations in the aid giving process, and the recipients to 
44 Hamm, B.I. 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 23, No.4 
(2001) pp.1005·1031, pp.1011-1012 
4s Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.l014 
46 Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.l012 
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become more invol¥ed and thus more likely to take control ofthe programmes within 
their country. However; as Piron says, DFID frequently neglects to use the language 
of human rights in its policy, and when it does human rights are viewed as being 
purely instrumental, that is, they are a means to achieving development rather than 
the end process of development. The focus continues to be placed on the eradication 
of poverty rather than on the securing of human rights.47 
The adoption of a human rights approach to development, although influenced by an 
internationally changing notion of development, does not indicate that the changes 
are related to the right to development. Hamm argues that the right to development is 
different from and cannot replace a human rights approach to development because of 
the vagueness that surrounds the notion, the lack of consensus that the right has, and 
because of the lack of a legal obligation in the international treaty.48 Has there been 
therefore any effect on New Labour development policy that can be attributed to the 
idea of a right to development? 
Marks argues that reference to a right to development is notably lacking in the policy 
) 
and practice of states at both the national and international level, despite the presence 
of many of the RID's fundamental principles such as participation, transparency, 
non-discrimination and accountability; and this is true ofNew Labour's approach to 
development. 49 As Piron highlights, certain policies, such as the 'partnership 
approach' to development, that are emphasised in the White Paper, although 
consistent with the cut:rent interpretation of the Right to Development, do not 
specifically place human rights at the centre of the development process. 5° DFID has 
not built its new approach upon the ideas contained in the RTD, Piron remarks, and 
47 Piron, L.H. The Right to Development: A Review of the Cu"ent State of the Debate for the 
Department for International Development (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2002) 
~39http://www.odi.uk/rights/publications/right to dev.pdf 
Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.lOIO 
49 Marks,.S. 'The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality' Harvard Human 
Rights Journal Vol. 17 (2004) pp.l37-168, p.152 
so Piron, The Right to Development p.5 
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any mention of a right to development is notably missing from the two White Papers 
that they have produced.51 Instead, DFID bases its approach to development on two 
premises: (i) a moral duty to al1leviate poverty, and (ii) self-interest that comes from 
the recognition of the interdependence of the world.52 For example, as noted above, 
after the recent terrorist attacks the Government realises that it is in our national 
interest to help eradicate poverty which is seen as one cause of the proliferation of 
terrorist movements, a point which will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
Despite the fact that DFID does not base its policy on a right to development, Piron 
maintains that current DFID policy and practice, because of the emphasis within it 
that is placed on poverty eradication, aid-effectiveness, and partnerships, could act as 
an example for other nations where disagreements over the right to development still 
exist in the international forum.53 This potential role for DFID is especially likely 
when we consider, as Piron does, they way in which British development policy is 
evolving. In policy papers, such as the Country Strategy Papers, there is an increased 
use of the language of human rights. Also, the DFID office in Peru is funding a pilot 
project on the RTD with the Independent Expert on the Right to Development. 54 
As Killick says, thinking on development has changed in many ways, and these 
changes have had an effect on the way aid policies are now constructed. For example 
the view of development on which policy is based is more multi-dimensional than it 
has previously been. Social aspects, governance, and quality-of-life are all seen as a 
central part of development alongside the more traditional economic focus.55 New 
Labour has certainly been influenced by these changes in development thinking as its 
broader approach to development highlights. 
51 Piron, The Right to Development p.34 
52 Piron, The Right to Development p.35 
s~ Piron, The Right to Development pp.35~36 
S4 Piron, The Right to Development pp.39-40 
ss Killick, T. 'Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa' Development Policy Review 
Vol. 23, No, 6 (2005) pp.665-6!H. p.697 
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It appears that, while to some extent the changes in British development policy are 
due to the Government building upon the work of previous governments and learning 
from their failures, a change in theory at the international level has also had an affect 
on the policy process in Britain. State actors now have a broader understanding of 
what development entails, an understanding such as that developed by Sen, and have 
demonstrated in recent policy outlines, such as in the White Papers, that they have 
moved away firom a purely economic understanding of development to one that takes 
into account human rights and fundamental freedoms. As Barder says: 
As with most successful revolutions, the changes [made by New Labour] succeeded 
in part because they found resonance in a long evolution of thinking and in part 
because they ... were in line with a new international mood that while increases in aid 
were an important part of the development agenda, it was essential also to pay 
attention to the broader set of policies that affect developing countries. 56 
Also, as we have seen, there is some indication that human rights are taking a more 
prominent role within development policy. To what extent human rights theory has 
actually impacted on development programmes will have to be studied through the 
implementation of policies, for as some critics suggest, many governments, although 
committed to rights, avoid specific reference to it in their policies in order to avoid 
legal obligations being placed upon themselves.5r1 Thus in order to address the 
questions raised in chapter 1 further, the following chapters will tum to look at the 
implementation of UK development policy. 
s6 Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.30 
s? e.g. see Piron, The Right to Development 
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Chapter3 
F.rom Conditionality to Partnerships: A New Approach for 
Ensuring Effective. Aid 
The New Labour approach to development is one which, as Chapter 2 highlighted, 
focuses on the elimination of poverty and seeks therefore to make aid more effective. 
What New Labour recognised, having learnt from the experience of previous 
administrations,. is that tied aid is ineffective, and that a human rights approach to 
development cannot focus on the interests of the donor but must be geared towards 
the needs of the recipient country. Thus it would appear that the traditional approach 
of making aid conditional to meet the needs and interests of the donor has been 
abandoned. Conditions do stiH exist in bilateral development relationships however, 
although phrased within the mutual responsibilities of development partnerships, and 
the Independent Expert's recommendations for development 'compacts'. 
Chapter 3 therefore, will focus on the issue of conditionality, considering this aspect 
of aid policy that has been both historically used by states in their intemational 
development practice, and has been examined by the Independent Expert on the Right 
to Develepment who sees it as having a continued role within a right to development 
approach to aid. The chapter will firstly examine conditionality and the notion of 
partnerships in a general context, highlighting theoretical and practical challenges 
that partnerships face, and principles that are central to the idea. It will then tum to 
look more specifically at the approach of New Labour. When considering the issue 
of conditionality and the part that it plays in New Labour's development policy some 
questions that I will bear in mind are: is aid given to the poorest countries which are 
most in need of development regardless of the governmental system within the 
country? Has Britain's new policy approach been to reward good' governments with 
aid, and to punish bad governments by withholding assistance? How does this fit 
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with their human rights approach to development? To what extent are British 
interests still promoted through bilateral relationships? Has a system been found to 
ensure that the mutual obligations in the development process are carried out? By 
looking at how conditionality now operates in development relationships the 
questions raised in chapter 1 and 2 will continue to underlie the discussion. 
Conditionality Within a Rights Based Aporoach 
It was argued in the previous chapter that a human rights approach to development, 
which many governments are now claiming to be folloWing, should ensure that 
development policy is no longer based on the specific interests of the donor countries 
or of the ruling class in the recipient state.1 However, as Sengupta says, donors should 
still have a legitimate concern over the effectiveness of the aid they are providing to 
developing nations in furtheting the objectives of developmentl and, as chapter two 
also suggested, governments that pursue a human rights approach to development 
don't necessarily adopt a selfless position within development relationships but 
continue also to secure their own interests. It could be argued that, a factor which 
contributes to this control that donor governments attempt to wield over their 
development aid is the extent to which foreign aid is needed and depended on by 
recipient countries for their development process. As Sengupta notes, official 
development assistance (ODA) can be used to finance projects that have a high social 
return, such as health and education development, and can be used at the discretion of 
the public authorities without being constrained by market returns. From this aspect 
he believes that it would be beneficial if the amount of development assistance and 
foreign aid should increase, yet Sengupta also recognises that this means that flows of 
ODA will continue to depend on the motivations of the donor govemments.3 Thus, 
the issue of conditionality will remain a concern in the development process, 
1 Hanun, B. I. 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' Human Rights Quarterly 'Vol. 23, No.4 
(2001) pp.1005-1031, p.l014 
2 Sengupta, A. •on the theory and Practice of the Right to Pevelopment' Human Rights Quarterly 
Vol. 24, No.4 (2002) pp.837-889, p.880 -
3 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' pp.879-880 
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especially if the amount of aid provided by donor countries is to grow. However, 
Sengupta does see a place for the continued use of conditionality within a rights 
approach to development, one which ensures that both the interests of donors, and the 
need to create a more balanced donor/recipient relationship are addressed, whilst 
remaining in keeping with the 'spirit' of a rights based approach. 
When imposed without the willing consent of the recipient, conditionalities go 
against the spirit of the rights approach to development. But if they fonn part of an 
understanding and are perceived as a 'compact' based on the mutual commitment to 
fulfilling conditions for implementing programmes, they can become an effective 
instrument for realising the right to development. '4 
Piron notes that many countries are not comfortable with the concept of development 
compacts as they believe that it merely duplicates and even undermines existing 
partnerships in current international development cooperation.~ However, Sengupta, 
in his fifth Report as Independent expert, actually compares the idea of development 
compacts to existing arrangements, highlighting that his aim is to use the cummt 
approaches to development relationships while moving the focus onto human rights 
and creating a stronger position for monitoring mechanisms within the process.6 As 
well as improving current relationships in these two respects, Sengupta argues that 
the use of development compacts can also overcome the problems with conditionality 
that were highlighted in the previous chapter, problems which New Labour, among 
many governments, have come to recognise. These problems are predominantly 
associated with the failure of development programmes that were imposed with 
conditions because of the lack of commitment to, and ownership, of the programme 
4 Sengupta, A. 'Realizing the Right to Development' Development.and Change Vol. 31, No. 3 (2000) 
pp.553-578, p.572 
Piron, L.H. 'Are ''Development Compacts" Required to Realise the Right to Bevelopment?' in The 
Right to Development: Reflections on the First Four Reports of the Independent Expert on the Right 
to Development Edited by Franciscans International (Geneva,. Franciscans International, 2003) pp.46-
61, p.46 
6 In Piron, 'Are ''Development Compacts" Required ... ' p.47 
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by the recipient government/ 
Yet, as already noted, Sengupta does not move away from the idea of conditionality 
but incorporates the concept into his recommendations for development compacts, 
and does so in a manner which could potentially lead to significant conditions being 
placed on recipient governments. He conceives a human rights approach to 
development as including participation, transparency and accountability, aspects 
which tend to be linked, as we will see, to specific forms of political organisation . 
.. . proponents of the right to development also must take a serious note of the 
implication of the human rights approach to development ... [ such an approach] 
would imply ... effective participation of all individuals in the decision-making and the 
execution of the process of development, which would necessarily require 
transparency and accountability of all activities ... 8 
lmoosing Requirements of Good Governance 
Sengupta himself recognises that in order for such participation by individuals in the 
development process to be possible, and to ensure that government decisions have 
been based on the genuine choice of the public, programmes must be developed 
either in the context of a participatory process of consultation with beneficiaries, or 
within the democratic forum of the state.9 
Although we should recognise that this participatory method of development is also 
helping individuals to overcome poverty in the broadest sense, as was discussed by 
Sen, and as Sengupta himself highlights in his recommendations, Sengupta has 
7 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right.to Development' pp.881 
8 Sengupta, A. The Right to Development as a Human Right. Available at 
http://www ;hsph.harvard.edulfxbcenter/FXBC WP7 --sengupta.pdf p.l2 
9 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Rightto Development' p.867 
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departed from Sen's work quite dramatically, and those theories which initially 
broadened our understanding of development. He notes that Sen describes poverty as 
being more than a low level of income; it is also the deprivation of basic capabilities 
that give individuals an expanded choice or freedom to be/do that which they value. 10 
Thus, by ensuring that individuals can exercise choice in the development process it 
can be argued that their freedom to choose the sort of life they want to live is being 
upheld. However, it was argued by Sen, as discussed in chapter one, that 'capability 
reflects a freedom to choose between alternative lives ... and its value need not be 
derived from one particular 'comprehensive doctrine' demanding one specific way of 
living.'11 
As Piron also argues, Sengupta's model for development does not consider what 
should be done in poor policy environments or in countries where the human rights of 
its citizens are not respected. Piron also highlights what c.o.uld be seen as a na'ive 
aspect of the Independent Expert's recommendations. She contends that international 
development assistance continues to be related to the foreign policy of developed 
countries, as weH as their historical relations. 'Politics', she says, 'cannot be simply 
"wished away".' 12 As the previous chapter argues though, the politics of 
development is changing, among both state governments and theorists alike. Both 
have also begun to question the effectiveness of conditionality. 
The idea of development 'compacts', which Sengupta emphasises the need for in his 
recommendations, is not a new concept, showing that development relationships have 
already been evolving. The concept is one that has been developing since the 1980s, 
beginning with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Stoltenberg, and followed quickly 
by development economists and the UNDP's Human Development Reports. Like 
Sengupta, other theorists and government leaders intended that the proposed 
10 Sengupta, 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' pp.885 
11 Quoted in Crocker, D.A. 'Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's 
Development Ethic' in Political Theory, Vol. 20, No.4 (November, 1,992), pp. 584-612, p.597 
12 Piron, 'Are ''Development Compacts" Required ... ' p.57 
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development programmes of developing countries and their efforts should be 
supported by donors through a clear commitment to providing the necessary 
assistance. Thus it is later suggested by OECD governments that a Development 
Commission should be formed in order that continued dialogue between donors and 
recipients would be possible. 13 Another factor which contributed dramatically to the 
change in attitude towards conditionality was the publishing in 1998, by the World 
Bank, of the influential report 'Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why'. 
This report agreed that development aid could reduce poverty and encourage 
economic growth, however it also argued that this was only possible within 
developing countries that had a system of ',good governance', as the World Bank 
understood this, countries with 'good' economic policies and strong institutions. 14 
As Hermes and Lensink note, this report sent out a strong message to policy makers 
around the world when it concluded that development aid should be allocated by 
selecting recipient countries according to their policy environment, 15 and this message 
seems to have taken root. As donor governments stated in a 1994 OECD-DAC 
document DAC Orientations on Development and Good Governance: 
It has become increasingly apparent that there is a vital connection between open, 
democratic and accountable systems of governance and respect for human rights, 
and the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development ... This 
connection is so fundamental that participatory dev(!lopment and good governance 
must be central concerns in the allocation and design of development assistance. 16 
Killick and Healey believe that donors, through the aid that they give, do have the 
ability to improve domestic institutions within the recipient countries, and help to 
13 Sengupta, 'Realizing the Right to Development' p.572 
14 Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm?' in 
Hennes, N. and Lensink, R. (eds) Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm? 
(London, Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pp.1-16, p.1 
15 Hermes and Lensink, 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: ANew Paradigm?' p.4 
16 Quoted in Neumayer, E. The Panern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on 
Development Assistance (London and New York, Routledge, 2003) p.IO 
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reform the political system to make it more accountable and responsive to the needs 
of the poor within the countries.17 Yet as they also recognise, this level is impossible 
in countries where the government is hostile to reform, as will often be the case 
where those in power benefit from the existing system no matter how corrupt it is. 
Therefore, the implication, they argue, is for donor governments to use selectivity in 
their choice of governments to assist. 18 It is arguments such as these that suggest that 
the World Bank's promotion of the use of selectivity has been successful among 
many theorists, thus adding the incentive and pressure on donor governments to 
support and apply this model in their dealings with recipient countries. 
Ctitics of the report, such as Guillaumont and Chauvet, have argued that, although it 
may be useful to base aid on the success of recipient government policies and 
institutions, measurements of performance must take into account the impact of 
external and climatic factors on the policy outcomes.19 This is important to bear in 
mind when we come to examine the practical implications of this method as the main 
concern of this argument is that governments will be punished for .poor policy 
environments that are a product of situations that are out of their control. Yet what is 
also interesting is that these critics do not seem to be objecting to the actual concept 
of selectivity, their concern rests with the application of the theory. 
This perceived change in focus, from conditionality to selectivity, has not passed 
undisputed though. As Pronk argues, the consequence of imposing a requirement of 
good governance removes the incentive built into conditionality for countries to 
improve on their governance and, more worryingly, prevents countries from receiving 
development assistance that could be used in programmes that will improve the 
quality of governance. He rightly asks whether 'policy improvement and better 
governance should not be seen as pre-conditions for development and for 
17 Healey, and Killick, 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty', in Tarp. F. (ed) Foreign Aid and Development 
(London, New York, Routledge,2000) pp.223-246, pp.228-229 
18 Healey and Killick, 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty' p.243 
19 Hennes and Lensink, 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm?' p.7 
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development aid, but also as development objectives themselves.' 20 
Hennes and Lensink share a similar concern, and argue that development aid should 
be directed to those countries which demonstrate efforts to develop good policies, and 
not those who have already succeeded in achieving such policies. They conclude 
therefore that aid should be given to those who show willingness for refonn but lack 
capacity.21 As Hamm has also noted, a human rights approach to development should 
imply that ODA will be given primarily to those countries where basic rights are most 
endangered in order to support institution-building that wiH make governments 
accountable and enforce the rule of law. 22 This argument suggests that governments 
that claim to follow a human rights approach to development cannot also support a 
method of selectivity as, generally speaking, those countries with good governance in 
place, and which express commitment to development goals will rarely be the 
countries in which systematic and wide spread abuse of citizens rights are occurring. 
It must therefore be asked whether these two positions, both of which have found 
support in the practice of donor governments, can be reconciled. One attelllpt to do 
just this is offered by Killick and Healey who argue that working with the recipient 
government is not the only possibility to ensure 'local ownership' and the successful 
implementation of development programmes. They suggest that, depending on the 
political environment within the country, donors should also be able to work with 
different areas of civil society, local government agencies who may be closer to the 
needs of the poor, and charities and NGOs, who are likely to use a participatory 
approach in the execution of their programmes (an approach that will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter). 23 
A second concem, which is highlighted by Doombos, returns us to the problem of 
universality. As with the arguments against development as a human right which, as 
20 In Hout, W. 'Aid as,a Catalyst: Comments and Debate (IT), Good Governance and Aid: Selectivity 
Criteria in Development Assistance' Development and Change Vol. 33, No. 3 (2000) pp.51l-527, 
~p.511-512 . 
1 Hennes and Lensink, 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm?' p.14 
22 Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.1031 
23 Healey and Killick, 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty' pp.231-232 
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discussed in chapter one, criticised the notion because of the lack of an established set 
·Of universal rights and values, many have argued that the notion of 'good 
governance' that is being applied as a selection criteria is far from having universal 
acceptance.24 As Doornbos says: 
... standards of 'good governance' in principle are conceivable within different socio-
cultural and political contexts ... Rather, donor standards are likely to be derived from 
the way donors are used to perceive and handle the world around them, that is, from 
their own particular- and cultural- perspective, even though this may be presented as 
having 'universal' value. :zs 
The argument, he says, therefore becomes about the form of government instead of 
focusing on the important aspects of substance and practice. Many governments in 
developing countries have ar.gued this point. For example Uganda, which struggled 
to gain recognition for an alternative to multi-party systems, argued that this form of 
political organisation bad evolved in Western experience and was not the only form 
of 'good governance' or the only route towards a democratic political process.26 
It should also be noted that even among Western governments and scholars there has 
not been agreement on what constitutes good govemance. For example, the UNDP 
sees good governance as participatory, equitable, and promoting the rule of law,27 
where as theorists such as Neumayer conceive good governance as being a 
democratic system that respects human rights, keeps to a non-excessive military 
expenditure, and has efficient public sector management.28 It should be questioned 
24 Doornbos, M. "Good Governance': The Rise and Decline. of policy Metaphor?' in Hermes, N. and 
Lensink, R. (eds) Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm? (London, 
Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pp.93-108, p.99 
:zs Doornbos, ''Good Governance' ... ' p:99 
26 Doornbos, "Gopd Governance' .. .' pp.1Q0-101 
27 Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.1021 
28 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving ... p.1 
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therefore whether good governance can really be applied as a selection criteria if no 
accepted and universal definition can be found. Concerns surrounding this increase 
when we consider that many academics list good govemance as an essential element 
of a rights based approach to development. Hamm for example stresses that the 
fundamental characteristics are non-discrimination, participation and good 
governance, especially the rule of law. 29 As Neumayer says though, development 
debates have focused on good governance regardless of the problems with definition 
for two reasons. Firstly, as already noted, good governance has an instrumental value 
in that the effectiveness of aid is dependent on it, and secondly because good 
governance is a goal that is worthy to achieve in and of itself, for example it ensures 
that citizens have their rights protected, protection from the law and good public 
services. 30 As the UN Economic and Social Council report says, looking at the 
definitions given with regards to good governance there is a concern among both 
academics and governments that donor expectations may be too excessive, especially 
in relation to how quickly they expect national systems to be reformed. It is argued 
therefore that ''good enough' governance may be a more appropriate objective.' 31 
Discrepancies over the meaning of good governance may be irrelevant though, as 
some academics such as Doornbos argue that, although the notion of good 
governance may be seen by some donors as a criterion for selection of aid recipients, 
the term is little more than a figure of speech that will not have a significant practical 
consequence. 32 This argument can be supponed by the work of Alesina and Dollar 
who investigate what factors influence the choice of donor governments when 
deciding which countries to give aid to. They conclude that: 
29 HaOun, 'AHuman Rights Approach,to Development' p.l030 
30 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving ... p.8 
31 United Nations Economic and Social Council. The Right to Development: Study on Existing 
Bilateral and Multilateral Programmes and Policies for Development Partnership (2004) 
FJCN.4/Sub.212004l15 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/156/36/PFD/G0415636.pdf?OpenEiement p.l 0 
32 Doornbos, "Good Governance' .. .' p.107 
70 
Factors such as colonial past and voting patterns in the United Nations explain more 
of the distribution of aid than the political institutions or economic policy of the 
recipients ... a non-democratic former colony gets about twice as much aid as the 
democratic non-colony. 33 
However, different stances are taken by different recipient countries in relation to 
good governance. Their findings show that the Nordic donors especially, respond to 
good institutions of the receiving government and openness whereas other donors, 
mainly France, give to former colonies and countries of political alliance with little 
regard for poverty levels or political and economic factors.34 
However, Doornbos' argument is unconvincing when we see that the selectivity 
model has been applied with dramatic consequences. In 1998 the coalition 
government of the Netherlands decided to select those countries to be allocated 
development aid on the basis of 'good governance' and 'good policy.' Twenty four 
countries that at the time were receiving aid from the Netherlands did not fulfil the 
criteria set down by the government, and therefore aid to these countries was filtered 
out. 3' Yet, as Hout notes, those countries that were selected for Dutch development 
assistance tended to have more collllption than those that were not selected. 
However, the lack of transparency attached to the selection process has meant that it 
is not clear by what standards the recipient countries were selected. It has therefore 
been surmised by critics such as van Hulten that the selection procedure was not 
immune from opportunism. 36 Thus, from the above experience it may appear that the 
selectivity model if invoked but without transparency, merely masks arbitrary 
decisions by donor countries in their selection of recipient governments. Also, as 
Hamm says, this model can be viewed as another means for the imposition of certain 
33 Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000) pp.33~63, p.55 
34 Alesina and Dollar, 'Who·Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' .p.34 
3
' Hout, 'Aid as.a Catalyst: Comments and Debate (II) ... ' pp.513 and 515 
36 Hout, 'Aid as a Catalyst: Comments and Debate (II) ... ' :PP· 521 and 524 
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political and economic models, on recipient countries, by governments of the 
developed world.37 Yet as Hamm also recognises 'one can imagine various forms of 
participation that that do not necessarily coincide with a democratic socio-political 
structure. However, democratic institutions best guarantee stable and continuous 
participation and the growth of civil society ... ' 38 
' ... selectivity means imposing specific conditions on countries regarding their past 
policy performance and past policy environment to decide whether they become 
eligible for aid disbursements in the future ... ln other words the good governance 
criterion for distributing aid is in fact introducing conditionality in disguise. '39 
Thus, it can be said that both the model of partnerships and compacts, and the process 
of selectivity continue to·employ, in some way, a notion of conditionality. 
The Policy and Practice of New Labour 
An examination of the results from research, such as that conducted by Dollar and 
Alesina, leave open to debate the effect that the changing theory on conditionality has 
had on state practice. As mentioned above, it has been shown that many states have 
employed the new models in their bilateral relationships, whereas others are still 
driven by historical ties and political alliances. What will now be discussed 
therefore, is the position that New Labour has taken following the changes that both 
theorists and other states have made. The evidence that was presented in chapter two 
suggests that New Labour's approach towards conditionality has changed. Firstly, 
this seems to· be the case, because of a renewed focus on the elimination of poverty 
through aid, rather than the promotion of British interests, and secondly, due to the 
government's introduction of the concept of partnerships in their 1997 White Paper. 
37 Hanun, 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' p.1020 
38 Hamm, 'A Human Rights Approach to. Development' p.l 020 
39 Hennes, and Lensink, 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm?' ·p.14 
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As Piron highlights, the initial approach taken by New Labour reflects the 
'selectivity' model advocated by the World Bank. DFID's Target Strategy Paper 
(2000) Realising Human Rights for Poor People states the government's intention to 
make development assistance conditional on the degree of commitment of recipient 
govemments.40 
Development ... requires that national governments ensure that their efforts are 
effectively focused on actions which accelerate the elimination of poverty. The Right 
to Development sets out the obligations of national governments to support the 
institutions and processes to ensure that this will happen. (para 3.9 of the Target 
Strategy Paper 2000t1 
Use of selectivity in the government's choice of recipients is apparent in this 
statement, not only from the requirement that governments are focused on the 
elimination of poverty (which instantly suggests that New Labour aims to work with 
those committed to the same goals), but also in the obligation put on developing 
nations to 'support the institutions' that will be capable of cauying out poverty 
reduction. As argued above, this generally refers to democratic institutions, thus 
suggesting that New Labour will offer support to those countries that are willing to 
democratise. This is apparent in both the White Paper and from studies of past and 
recent trends in UK aid, such as Svensson ( 1:999) who argued that respect for political 
and civil rights impacts upon whether a country will receive aid from the UK, and 
Neumayer (2003~ whose study also maintained that the UK provides more aid to 
those countries which respect personal rights and have democratic regimes.42 
40 Piron, L.H. The Right to Development: A Review of the Current State of the Debate for the 
Department for International Development (2002) Available at 
http://www.odi.uk/rights/publications/ri~:ht to dev.pdf p.34 
41 Quoted inPiron, The Right to Development ... p.34 
42 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving ... pp.30-31 
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Those [countries] most likely to succeed will have effective government, enlightened 
legislation, prudent budgeting and an efficient administration that responds to the 
needs ofpoorpeople.43 
The government commits itself therefore to 'pursue [the International Development] 
targets in partnership with poorer countries who are also committed to them. '44 Yet it 
appears that, while focusing on countries that are committed to poverty reduction, 
New Labour recognises also that this entails responsibility and commitment on their 
part. Slater and Bell, using both statements gi¥en by DFID and the two government 
White Papers, say that: 
New Labour gives considerable weight to the idea of genuine partnership, where 
there is a political commitment to tackle poverty elimination on both sides, so that the 
old conditionalities of development assistance can be transcended. 45 
As Baehr notes though, donor countries are accountable to their citizens, as well as 
being aware that they must avoid the charge of complicity with corrupt and repressive 
regimes. It may seem therefore that aid cannot be given to countries that have such 
govemments.46 This is problematic when we consider, as the UN Economic and 
Social Council has done so, that between 500 million and one billion people live in 
such countries, where govemance is weak and shared values and commitments 
simply do not exist. The selectivity approach therefore, the Council recognises, poses 
a threat to the reduction of global poverty.47 As Randel says, for an anti'-poverty 
development approach to be effective, it demands that poverty be addressed even in 
43 White Paper on International Development. Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21" 
Century (1997) http://www .dfid. gov .uk/pubs/files/whitepaper 1997 .pdf p.22 
44 Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21" Century p.22 
45 Slater, and Bell, 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial .. .' p.349 
46 Baehr, P.R. The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy 21111 Edition (London, Macmillan Press, 
1996) p.35 
47 EICN.4/Sub.212004/15 p.12 
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the most difficult situations. 48 New Labour recognises the need to maintain 
accountability to both Parliament and the public, and to ensure that aid is used 
effectively; however, their policy paper does also address the aforementioned 
concern. 49 The government, in its paper Partnerships for Poverty Reduction, 
recognises that in many countries the shared commitments necessary for a successful 
partnership are not in place. However, it is stressed that this does not entail that 
development work within these countries cannot be carried out. The government 
offers a commitment therefore to work through other means, such as NGOs, in order 
that aid reaches those in need. 
Poor political govemance ... can hasten a country's decline towards instability. 
Instead of withdrawing from these countries, the UK is committed to finding ways of 
delivering targeted, selective aid focusing on improving govemance~ .. In countries 
where the government is weak or uninterested in development, we will closely 
monitor the situation to identify opportunities for political dialogue.' 50 
White says that the term 'selectivity', reflects a position that ensures channels still 
exist for aid to reach the poor even in countries where bad governments are in power. 
This, he argues, is the stance that DFID takes, a stance which maintains a 
commitment to the poor and follows a traditional approach which ensured that British 
aid continued to flow to South Africa under apartheid~ and to Ethiopia under 
Mengistu through the use of NGOs.51 Thus when such channels eXcist, the British 
government can both make a genuine commitment to tackle poverty while ensuring 
that money reaches its intended destinations, and .thus accountability to the 
Parliament and British citizens is maintained. 
48 German, T and Randel, J. 'Trends Towards the New Millennium', in Randel, J. German, T. and 
Ewing, D (eds) The Reality of Aid 2000: An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction· and 
Development Assistance (London, Earthscan Publications, 2000) pp.14-26, p.22 
49 Department for International Development. Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking 
Conditionality (2005) http://www .dfid.gov .uk/pubslfiles/conditionality p.ll 
50 DFID. Partnerships for Poverty Reduction ... p.17 
51 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development. .. ' p.l62 
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As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, the Independent Expert's 
recommendations did not elaborate on what could be done in poor policy 
environments. Thus New Labour seems to have achieved a significant improvement 
upon the recommendations of the Independent Expert, and in doing so has also 
managed to address the concerns, such as those raised by Pronk, regarding the states 
that may desire aid but do not fulfil the criteria under the selectivity model. Despite 
this statement ·of commitment though, there will remain the concern that the 
government may act only when the poverty, and therefore instability, are close to 
home and to our own interests, as was witnessed with the action taken in Yugoslavia 
compared to that in Rwanda.52 However, as will be discussed in later chapters, 
global,isation and the increasing interconnectedness of states means that there will be 
very few situations in which threats to peace and security in other states will not 
impact upon us. Therefore, the changing dynamic of the world Will ·ensure that 
donors can no longer ignore such atrocities that occur in what was once considered to 
be physically distant and culturally different places. DFID has begun to recognise the 
potential threats that poor policy environments pose to us, as well as acknowledging 
the effect that such environments have on the citizens of fragile states. Thus, despite 
the costs and risks that, as DFID notes, come from working in such countries, the 
department has made significant progress in enabling development programmes to 
occur in states that, under the selectivity approach, would be excluded. 53 
Their main statement of policy with regards to poor policy environments is the 2005 
52 German and Randel, 'Trends Towards the New Millennium' p25 It should be noted at this point 
however that, despite the lack of action on the part of the international community with regards ,to the 
genocide in Rwanda, the UK has since taken steps to affrrmthe partnership and, thus the commitment 
that the UK Government has both to and with the Govel'lliDent of the Republic of Rwanda. This is 
expressed in the Memorandum of Understanding 2006, a document which highlights what appears to 
be'both a genuine partnership where commitments are expres~ed by the two governments in an 
accountable and transparent framework, and which, in .promoting good governance and respect for: 
human rights, is a partnership that the liK.government has entered into despite the recent unrest and 
conflict within the country. 
53 Department for International Development. Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile 
States (2005) httj?://www .dfid. gov. uk/Pubs/files/fragilestates-paper .pdf p. 5 
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paper Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States. DFID seems willing 
to bear the costs and risks because it recognises that 'development and stability can 
be achieved with very different governance arrangements, as demonstrated by the 
experience of countries as diverse as Botswana, China, Chile, Mozambique and 
Vietnam.' Increases in aid, DFID says, will thus reduce poverty even in fragile states 
and poor policy and institutional environments. 54 What is important though, DFID 
notes, is that donors realise that fragile states cannot respond to conditional aid 
because they lack the mechanisms for setting national priorities.55 Therefore the trend 
of setting more demanding conditions for weaker states is counterproductive. DFID 
moves away from this trend and adopts the attitude that was recommended, that 
'good enough' governance should be the aim in development, that is, ensuring that 
the state can maintain basic functions such as protecting its citizens from harm. 56 
However, the department also notes that, while slightly lowering expectations, it 
remains imperative to both study the reasons for state failure, and understand local 
factors which will affect change within society.57 This need has also been emphasised 
by academics: ' ... .if ownership and partnership are really to be taken seriously, then 
donors have to accept that in the future, programmes need to be more country 
specific. ' 58 Again DFID seems to respond effectively to this need though, as can be 
seen in the establishment of Drivers of Change, a programme which works in close 
collaboration with country offices in order to promote an understanding of underlying 
political structures, and formal/ informal institutions in the developing nations with 
which DFID hopes to work.59 Yet DFID also realises that human rights monitoring 
and security guarantees are equally important in the support for fragile states.60 This 
again highlights the emphasis that has begun to be placed on human rights, and those 
54 DFID Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States p.20 
ss DFID Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States p.12 
56 DFID Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States pp.2e & 16 
57 DFID Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States pp.15 & 26 
58 Hermes and Lensink, 'Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm?' p.14 
59 See DFID. Drivers of Change (2004) http:Ul39.184.l94.47/go/topic-guides/drivers-of-change 
60 DFID Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States p.16 
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institutions that can ensure their protection. 
The New Labour government clearly states in policy papers that its aims, with regards 
to partnerships, are to agree on benchmarks rather than impose conditions; to promote 
a shared commitment to human rights; and to highlight the importance of good 
governance, good economic and social policies, transparency and accountability, 
policies that are extremely close to those set down by the Independent Expert for 
constructing a right to development based process. 61 As Ludlam and Smith say, the 
decision by the Foreign office and DFID to publish annual reports which detail the 
government's record on human rights gives credence to the claim that New Labour 
aims to make its policy processes more transparent.62 This credibility has been 
furthered by publishing, for the first time, Country Assistance Plans, as well as 
making most other project documents available via the internet. 63 This gives grounds 
for hope that when it comes to the selection of countries to receive development aid, 
we in Britain wm not be faced with a situation like that of the Dutch, that is, a lack of 
explanation for the significant changes to development policy, and the suspicion that 
choices were made on arbitrary decisions. As Slater and Bell also argue: 
The strong stance taken in favour of anti-corruption strategies and the willingness to 
'put our own house in order' through legislation aimed at giving UK courts 
jurisdiction over UK nationals who commit offences of corruption abroad, is clearly 
a positive step ... Rather than assume ... that corruption is essentially a third world 
phenomenon, there is an attempt to broaden the debate and take seriously the 
existence of corrupt practices ... within Western countries. 64 
61 See Chapter 1. Sengupta, 'The Human Right to Development' p.181 
62 Buller, J. 'Foreign and European Policy' in Ludlam, S. and Smith, M.J. (eds) Governing as New 
lAbour: Policy and Politics Under Blair (Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 
ff·193-210, p.203 
Barder, Reforming Development Assistance p.27 
64 Slater and Bell, 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial ... ' p.356 
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Acts by the government, such as these, give considerable reassurance of their own 
commitment to those values and systems which they are promoting in the developing 
world. 
However, as Piron notes, although in some cases where there has been a gross 
violation of human rights British support to that country had been suspended in order 
to maintain accountability and pressure the government into respecting human rights, 
for example to Nigeria under Abacha and to Burma, this has not been consistently 
applied. DFID continues to provide budget support to Vietnam, without entering into 
discussions concerning human rights with the government.65 As White argues, 
'Double standards in the application of political conditionality is just one of the 
problems confronting this use of aid funds which needs to be settled if the concept of 
partnership is to be pursued. ' 66 
Another concern which has arisen from the governments approach stems from the 
fact that traditional uses of conditionality have not completely disappeared from New 
Labour's agenda, there have been recent attempts by the government to place 
conditions on development aid in order to further their own interests. As Harder 
notes for example, in May 2002 the Home Office introduced proposals that aimed at 
reducing the number of asylum seekers that were entering the UK. Included within 
these was the proposition that aid to countries such as Somalia, Sri Lanka and Turkey 
should be tied to the condition that these countries would accept the return of asylum 
seekers. This proposal was opposed by Clare Short who argued that this action 
constituted little more than the blackmailing of foreign governments, and was later 
dropped by the government.67 However, the wishes of those in DFID had not been so 
successful in December 2001 when they opposed arms export application from 
British Aerospace for a £28m military radar system was allowed by the government, 
regardless of the fact .that it would breach the terms of Tanzania's debt relief.68 The 
65 Piron, The Right to Development ... p.40 
66 White, 'British Aid and the White Paper on International Development ... ' p.l63 
67 Barder,Reforming Development Assistance ... p.21 
68 Barder, Reforming Development Assistance ... p.22 
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same is true when we consider the continued sale of Hawk training jets by Pritain to 
Indonesia, even though they were being deployed against the Independent Movement 
in East Timor.69 These examples highlight, not only that commercial interests can still 
potentially be placed above development interests despite the changing attitudes 
towards development assistance, but also calls into question the promises of New 
Labour to produce a 'joined..,up' government, as discussed in the previous chapter. It 
also highlights a fundamental contradiction in the governments approach, on the one 
hand promoting the belief that the priorities for developing countries should be based 
on the elimination of poverty, while on the other hand supporting the military growth 
and aims of such countries. 
Even when we have taken into account the government's lapses into a more 
traditional, self-interested mode of giving development aid, there remains much 
evidence to suggest that their approach has significantly changed direction to one that 
attempts to incorporate,. where possible, genuine partnerships, and when not possible, 
looks to other means by which to provide assistance to the world's poor. 
Facing the Challenges: Hopes for Advancing the Right to Development 
Yet many critics remain sceptical of even this new approach. Fowler argues that the 
partnership approach is simply another method by which developed countries 
penetrate those in the South, inducing them into accepting what can essentially be 
regarded as a 'North-driven agenda' that doesn't allow for alternative visions.70 
Slater and BeU also comment on this by highlighting that New Labour's White Paper 
(200()) talks of both the 'diffusion of knowledge and technology to developing 
countries' and the 'diffusion of global norms and values.' 71 They argue that 
statements such as these reflect an attitude that sees the development process as a 
one-way flow iri which the poor wait for benefits of knowledge and technology to 
69 Buller, 'Foreign and European Policy' p.203 
70 Quoted in.Slater and Bell, 'Aid. and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial .. .' p.350 
71 Quoted in Slater and Bell, 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial ... ' p.350 
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come to them from the developed world as though this were a positive process, and 
without considering that developing countries may have their own sources of 
knowledge that could potentially benefit, not only their own societies and cultures, 
but the whole world. For partnership to be genuine, it is argued, the donors have to 
recognise this fact and accept that the vision and political priorities of the recipient 
countries may be considerably different from those of the Western community.72 
However, despite these challenges, the UN Economic and Social Council believe that 
an area of complementarity, between the attitude of the development community and 
that of human rights advocates, can be found in this notion of partnerships, a 
consensus that could .potentially create ways for the right to development to be 
promoted. As they too note, the close connection that this approach has to the 
Declaration on the Right to Development comes frem the fact that the Declaration 
recognises shared responsibilities and the need for cooperation at both the domestic 
and international level's, and the partnership approaches ensures that these 
responsibilities are both recognised and implemented in current development 
practice. 73 Yet they also note that such an approach must place human rights at the 
centre of the process, and not merely refer to them when they become of instrumental 
value, that is, when the use of human rights will further poverty reduction strategies. 
For example, the council notes that the R.TD can contribute to the way in which 
certain development process are to be understood through the people-centred stance 
that it promotes, as well as the primary role it gives to the formation of appropriate 
policies and legislation by national governments. However, they note that while 
mutually reinforcing, human rights and poverty reduction constitute fundamentally 
different frameworks. 74 Therefore, while acknowledging the benefit that human 
rights may hold for poverty reduction strategies it is a human rights framework that 
they seek, which focuses upon international human rights, such as those enshrined in 
the Declaration on the Right to Development. 
12 Slater and Bell, 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial ... ' pp.35·1 and 353 
73 EICN.4/Sub.2/2004115 pp.S-6 
74 EICN.4/Sub.2/2004115 p.l9 
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.. . development partnerships can make a contribution to the realisation of the right to 
development if they are grounded in human rights. Human rights principles may be 
useful for such processes, but the international human rights framework also needs 
to be kept in mind, as well as key aspects of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development. A key criterion is whether both recipient and donor governments are 
recognising and making efforts to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. 7s 
As the evidence above shows, there have been many occasiens in the recent past 
where New Labour has not respected human rights within its workings with 
developing nations. The lack of explicit reference to a right to development in 
DFID's policy statements, and often to human rights in general, also suggests that the 
consensus that the UN had hoped would form around the idea of partnerships has not 
yet materialised. 
Piron argues however, that although DFID has displayed an instrumentalist approach 
to human righ.ts, its practice is evolving. For example, she says, as noted in chapter 
two, there is a growing reference to human rights in DFID policy papers, in particular 
their County Strategy Papers, and the DFID base in Peru is working on a rights based 
project in conjunction with the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, 
evidence which is promising for a human rights approach in general and especially so 
fer the RTD which, as we have seen, has had little mention in development work to 
date. Thus, says Piron, with few areas of conflict between DFID's approach and the 
RTD, DFID's work is extremely progressi:ve by way of current human rights and 
development practice. 76 The change in stance, from art instrumentalist one, to that 
which centres on human rights, is already becoming apparent in DFID's attitude. 
7s FJCN.4/Sub.212004/15 p.24 
76 Piron, The Right to Development ... pp.39-40 
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Academics have warned that we need to be cautious when examining the partnership 
approach to development in order to look beyond the rhetoric of projects and assess 
whether recipient governments really are being given the opportunity to take 
ownership of their country's development for, as Randel says, if we ignore the gap 
between rhetoric and reality, there is the danger that government ownership will be 
cast as a failed development strategy without having ever really been tried. 77 As we 
have seen though, DFID's .actions have gone far beyond rhetoric on many occasions 
through the implementation of successful· partnership schemes, and in finding a way 
to work with the failed states that other donor nations have rejected in their own 
approaches. 
Yet, despite the progress that has been made with regards to .genuine partnerships, we 
must continue to be aware of an underlying question of how far donor agencies will 
let this relationship progress. As has already been mentioned, many critics believe 
that partnerships are just a case of new terminology that masks old development 
relationships in which donors are in control. As Doornbos argues though, if changes 
are occurring in these relationships a later progression may be a complete reversal in 
roles, that is, donors would no longer be 'in command' but 'on demand' where 
recipient countries take the initiative, design development programmes and then 
approach donors for funds. 78 We must ask then, whether donors will be willing to let 
these changes run this potential course, or attempt to remain in the driving seat of 
development projects, and prevent the resurrection of those fears that were born out 
of the right to development discussions, that is, the concern that developing countries 
may use their new found rights to create a new economic order, As Killick notes, 
assessing these changes will be chal,lenging as it has already proven ' ... difficult to 
draw and maintain the line between a relationship based on conditionality and one 
rooted in ownership and partnershipP9 In assessing the current practice and attitudes 
77 Randel 'The Reality of Aid .. .' p.19 
78 Doornbos, "Good Governance' ... ' p.106 
79 Killick, T. 'Policy Autonomy and the History ofBritish Aid to Africa' Development Policy Review 
Vol. 23, No.6 (2005) pp.665-68, p.672 
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though, DFID's approach has, as Piron noted, not only been promising for a genuine 
and successful partnership approach, it has also been progressive in terms of 
advancing the RTD agenda. Whether this was DFID's intention is unclear, for as 
already mentioned, their human rights approach has not often been supported by the 
language of rights. However, it demonstrates the beginnings of a workable approach 
for implementing the RTD, and this can be seen a major and positive advance for 
advocates of a right to development. 
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Chapter4 
Participatory Methods: Furthering the Right to 
Development Project 
As the previous two chapters emphasised, the New Labour approach to development 
focuses on the aims of poverty reduction and effective aid. Chapter three discussed 
how New Labour attempted to fulfil these aims through the use of development 
partnerships, a method which was deemed consistent with a right to development 
approach. This chapter will continue to look at how New Labour is pursuing their 
goals by incorporating into their work participatory methods of development, 
highlighting the extent to which this method too helps to further the right to 
development project. Some questions that will be central to this discussion are: Has 
New Labour followed trends of participatory development set down by other 
institutions such as the World Bank, as with partnerships and failed states (discussed 
in chapter 3), and has New Labour tried to improve upon models that are already 
practiced in order to ensure wider participation for all within the development 
process? Does New Labour frame participatory development in terms of human 
rights, or within recognition of the right to development, or is this method of 
development used for another reason, for example, to increase the success of the 
development project? If the traditional approaches to development that promoted 
British interests have been replaced by such approaches, how is New Labour 
reconciling their need to be accountable to parliament and British citizens with 
respect to the handing over of projects to primary stakeholders in developing 
countries? Can the two be reconciled? 
Once again, the questions raised in chapters 1 and 2 will also continue to underlie the 
discussion; do the current policy models differ significantly from the way in which 
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development policy is traditionally constructed and implemented? Should we expect 
to see an obvious difference in the case studies? Have the changes in development 
policy been at the theoretical. level only? Have traditional means of development 
practice been insufficient, and has a more successful way been found that can 
incorporate the RTD? 
Participation: It's Place in Development Theon 
It is now recognised by academics and practitioners alike that participation of the 
poor is, as Long says, 'an imperative of development.' Andrew Norton from DFID 
highlights the appearance of this new approach to development: 
There is .a new agenda emerging. Participation is not just seen as an option to 
improve effectiveness, but is seen in a new context where it is linked to governance, 
human rights, and strengthening accountability, policy and institutional systems ... so 
that [governments] can respond better to the needs of society and the poor and the 
excluded in particular. 1 
While acknowledging that the theories of participatory approaches to development 
that are emerging exist in, and of, themselves, we should also recognise that 
participation is an important aspect of the wider understanding of development and 
the work of those academics and development economists who were highlighted in 
chapter one. Thus, in order to assess the importance of participation in development 
it is necessary first of all to re-examine the place of participation within the wider 
development theories that underpin the Declaration on the Right to Development. 
Chapter one noted that, according to Sen, to get a true idea of the well being of a 
person, one has to look at the functionings of the person; what that person manages to 
1 In Long, C. Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives: Taking their Rightful Place 
(London, Sterling, VA, Earthscan Publications, 2001) pp.171-172 
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do I be with the commodities and characteristics at her/his command. 2 Sen 
emphasises, as also discussed in chapter one, that the quality of life that a person 
enjoys does not come down only to what she/he manages to achieve, but that it also 
has to entail a consideration of the options that she/he has had the opportunity of 
choosing from. To hold this view, Sen says, is to believe that the 'good life' is partly 
a life of genuine choice. 3 Thus we saw a very different approach to development 
being advocated, one which broadens our understanding of related concepts such as 
poverty. As also already noted, Sen argues that: 
What the capability perspective does in poverty analysis is to enhance the 
understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting 
primary attention away from means (and one particular means that is usually given 
exclusive attention, viz., income) to ends that people have reason to pursue, and, 
correspondingly to the freedoms to be able to satisfy the$e ends ... deprivations are 
seen at a morefundamentalleveZ:4 
As we have seen, Sen's theory as a whole has made a profound contribution to the 
refocusing of development thinking, and is embedded in the foundations of recent 
declarations by the international community, and underpins the work of development 
agencies worldwide. Yet what can also be grasped from these statements, that direct 
us to more specific models of development, is the importance of individual 
participation. Sen, in focusing on the value of individual choice in deciding how to 
live one's life, shows to us that, where development policies aim at improving the 
lives of individuals within the community, it must be those whose lives are being 
improved who decide what is valuable to them. Sen highlights this himself in 
believing in the importance ofsubstantive freedom is crucial, which he argues is: 
2 Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities (North-Holland, Amsterdam: New York: Oxford, Elsevier 
Science Publishers B.V, 198) p.IO 
3 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, p.69,70 
4 Sen, A. Development as Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) p.90 
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... a principle determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. Greater 
freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the 
world, and these matters are central to the process of development. s 
It was noted in chapter one that, in recognising that freedom enhances the ability for 
people to help themselves, Sen can address the question of responsibility in response 
to those critics who view development as both ethically problematic and defeatist. 
He too admits there is no substitute for individual responsibility, yet his theory shows 
that exercising responsibility is contingent on other factors such as personal, 
environmental and social circumstances. His central message in response to these 
criticisms is that responsibility requires freedom. Development that increases the 
freedom of people is therefore a means to ensure individual responsibility; it is not 
something that undermines it.6 It may be said that for participatory projects to be 
effective and beneficial, donor agencies now have to focus on ensuring that the 
personal, social and environmental circumstances conducive to participatory methods 
exist for individuals. As we will see, this, for example, could be to provide 
individuals with the information and knowledge required to make meaningful and 
valuable decisions in the planning of development policy. When seen in this way, I 
believe that participatory methods can be understood as an extension of the idea of 
ownership, as discussed in the previous chapter, beyond the boundaries of the 
government and ruling elites, to individuals in the communities of developing 
nations. 
As Sengupta notes, the expansion of substantial freedoms as discussed by Sen is thus 
depicted as having both a constitutive and an instrumental role; they are both the 
primary means and principle ends of development.7 This view has permeated the 
s Sen, Development as Freedom p.18 
6 Sen, .Development as Freedom ,pp.283-284 
7 Sengupta, A. 'On the theory and Practice of the right to development.' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 
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understanding of those whose wor:k focuses on participatory development, such as 
Healey who sees both the constitutive and instrumental role of participation. He says, 
'the participatory approach is also desirable for its own sake, contributing to the 
empowerment, self-confidence and useful experience of target groups.' 8 Sengupta 
also explains that such an approach is not just an end in itself, that is, realising the 
right to development. It must also be seen as a means of achieving this right, for, he 
says, country experiences have shown that an approach such as this improves the 
outcomes of the development projects.9 
The notion that participation improves project outcome is an idea that has been seized 
upon by many other academics, As Kannan argues: 
The vast heterogeneity in the local aspirations, perspectives, needs and responses, 
tends to render the management of the State responsibility much more difficult, if not 
impossible. It is here that the direct participation of the communities in ensuring and 
enhancing an enabling environment assumes significance. Since it is the l()cal 
communities that have the perfect information on the specific problems they face, the 
actual and the possible constraints they encounter, and the potential solutions to be 
explored, their direct participation in the design and implementation of the policies 
and programmes makes the enterprise fruitful. 10 
· Thus participatory development can be seen as a beneficial approach to development 
because of the ends it results in, that is, both successful project outcomes and the 
securing of the right to development, as well as those attributes that Healey says it 
24, No.4 (2002) pp.837-889, p.851 
8 Healey, J and Killick, T 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty' , in 'Farp. E (ed) Foreign Aid and 
Development (London, New York, Routledge, 2000) pp.223-246, p.242 
9 United Nations General Assembly. Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development. 
A/55/306 (1 ith August 2005) p.16. para 54 
1° Kannan, K.P and Vijayamohanan, P. 'Public Action as Participatory Development: The Kerala 
Experience Re-Interpreted' in Sengupta, A. Negi, A and Basu, M. (eds) Reflections on the Right to 
Development (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London, Sage Publications, 2005) pp.208-242, p.213 
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grants to participants involved in the process. 
As Sengupta says, changing the way we loolc at development to incorporate social 
and human development, as conceived by Sen, and thus to insist on the need for 
meaningful participation by the beneficiaries represents a paradigmatic shift in 
development thinking. 11 
This shift, as Kannan says, from a top-down to a bottom-up approach has sprung out 
of the dissatisfaction of other methods of development such as the 'triclcl.e-down' 
approach, 12 thus the incorporation of participatory methods into development projects 
is indicative ·Of a wider dissatisfaction with the traditional approaches to 
development. However, the reorientation of thinking which recognised the 
importance of participation in development should be noted, not only in theory, but in 
the practice of the international community as well. 
Since as early as 1944, marked by the Declaration of Philadelphia, states were 
beginning to highlight their belief that all humans had a right to pursue their material 
well-being and development within the context of freedom and equal opportunity. 
This belief was reaffirmed by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and· Protection of Minorities who emphasised the 
urgency of strengthening popular participation in politics and development, 13 and 
again in the Rio Declaration that was issued at the 1992 UN Conference of 
Environment and Development which highlights a recognition that effective 
participation requires access to information from donors, public authorities and, if 
needed, private companies.14 Thus, with just a few examples out of many, we can 
11 Sengupta, 'On the theory and Practice of the right to development.' p.850 
12 Kannan and Vijayamohanan, 'Public Action as Participatory Development. .. ' p.213 
13 Ginther, K. 'The Domestic Policy Function of a Right ofPeoples·to Development: Popular 
Participation a new Hope for Development and a Challenge for the Discipline' in Chowdhury, S. 
Denters, E. and Waart, P. (eds) The Right to Development in International Law (Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) pp.61-82, pp.63-65 
14 Feeney, P .. Accountable Aid: Local Participation in Major Projects(Oxford, Oxfam GB, 1998) 
p.lO 
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see that over the years the international community has also been developing a 
positive and encouraging stance with regards to participation in development, 
focusing on both its necessity and the means by which to make it effective. 
Participation, as Understood by the International Community 
As suggested in chapter 1 therefore, the formulation and understanding of 
development by the international community has continued to be influenced by the 
new and emerging economic development theories such as that of Sen, and, it 
appears, also by participatory approaches that are already established in international 
declarations and ·reports. This continued influence is evident in the UN's Declaration 
on the Right to Development. Article 1 states that: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by the virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in [and] contribute to ... 
The importance of participation is evident in the very fact that it is addressed in the 
opening of the first article of the declaration, and is continually promoted throughout 
the declaration in the subsequent articles. Article 2 emphasises that the human 
person, as the beneficiary of development, should too be an active participant within 
the process, supported by national development policies which ensure that individuals 
are able to participate in their development in both a free and meaningful manner. 
The obligation upon states to ensure the participation of all is furthered in Article 8 
which requires that 'effecti¥e measures should be undertaken to ensure that women 
have an active role in the development process.' The emphasis that is placed on 
participation by the 1986 Declaration is expanded upon by the Independent Expert in 
his reports on the right to development. He argues that any programme aimed at the 
realisation of the right to development must be implemented according to a human 
rights approach, with transparency, accountability, and in a non-discriminatory and 
participatory manner. This means, he says: 
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.. . with schemes formulated and implemented at the grass-roots level with the 
beneficiaries participating in the decision-making and implementation, as well as 
sharing equitably in the benefits ... [which] implies planning that empowers the 
beneficiaries.15 
In this understanding, participation is a critical component of a rights based approach 
to development thus we would expect to see participatory approaches being employed 
in those governments and development agencies who claim to adhere :to a rights 
based approach. 
':theoretical and Practical Challenges to the Notion of Participation 
However, the participatory approach to development is faced by many challenges, 
both practical and theoretical. For example, we can recall the fact that, for some 
critics, development projects will be seen as another form of Western imperialism. 
This line of argument falls within the major challenges discussed in chapter one 
surrounding the principle of universalism and human rights. In the previous chapter 
we noted Fowler's argument with regards to partnerships which, despite the fact that 
they are a response to the new patterns of development that call for the inclusion of 
receiving governments, he believes are simply another method by which developed 
countries penetrate those in the South, inducing them into accepting a 'North-driven 
agenda' that does not allow for alternative visions.16 As Barsh also argues, there can 
be no one model of development that is universally applicable to all cultures. He sees 
the answer to this challenge however as lying in the participatory methods that are 
beginning to take root in the work of development agencies. He says that, precisely 
because no universal model exists, development strategies must be determined by, 
15 Report ofthe Independent Expert on the Right to Development. pp.S-9 para 26(c) 
16 Quoted in Slater, D and Bell, M 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial: Critical Reflections 
on New Labour's Overseas Development Strategy' in Development and Change Vol. 33, No.2 (2002) 
pp. 335-360·p.350 
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and adapted to the specific conditions and needs of the beneficiaries themselves. 17 
Participatory approaches therefore may fare better against the criticism of Western 
imperialism as it allows for an approach to development that is decided upon by the 
local communities. However this critique becomes important once again when we 
consider how it is often hoped by donor agencies and international institutions that 
participation will lead to the evolution of democracy and decentralisation within the 
developing countries. 
Participation in development projects will often depend on what Kannan calls the 
enabling environment. In Kerala, for example, despite low levels of income, social 
development was made possible by developments in government policy such as 
welfare initiatives and land reform policy as well as committed public action that 
issued from strong cohesion at the grass-roots level. 18 It was agreed by participants at 
the IDS (Institute of Development Studies, UK) workshop that one such environment 
in which participatory approaches would be likely to spread is in the context of 
decentralisation.19 We have already noted in tlte previous chapter the emphasis that 
donor states have put on the importance of democratic institutions with regards to 
both development effectiveness and potential partnerships. Thus, in recognising the 
potentially positive environment that decentralisation can create for participation, the 
importance of developing democratic institutions is increased. Yet, the relationship 
between local democratic institutions and participatory approaches is not necessarily 
causal in one direction only, Kannan highlights this by describing participatory 
development as a 'progressive chain', with the gradual realisation of human rights 
following popular mobilisation, and resulting eventually in the establishment of a 
system of local government. 20 It therefore becomes equally important that donor 
17 Barsh, R.L. 'The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global Consultation' 
Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 3 (1991) pp.322-338, p.328 
18 Kannan and Vijayamohanan, 'Public Action as Participatory Development ... ' p.216-217 
19 IDS Workshop. 'Reflections and Recommendations on Scaling-up and Organizational Change' in 
Blackburn, J and Holland, J. Who Changes? lnstitutionalising Participation in Development (London, 
Intermediate Technology Publications, 1998) pp.135-144, p.135 
20 Kannan, and Vijayamohanan, 'Public Action as Participatory Development ... ' p.208 
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agencies focus on enabling local participation, not only for the success that it has 
been seen to bring to project outcomes, but also for the influence itcan have on the 
creation of democratic systems within a country, and hence the ways it can indirectly 
lead to the benefits of partnerships that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, caution must be taken before assuming that decentralisation wHI encourage 
true participation in development. Kannan does just this in argliing that local, 
decentralised bodies are both autonomous and therefore ideal for addressing 
development issues, and are a measure of the states' commitment to human 
development.21 It seems though that he has overlooked some critical issues that 
present another challenge for those wishing to incorporate participatory methods into 
their development projects. As was highlighted in the IDS workshop local 
authorities, having gained powers in the process of devolution, can chose to 
accumulate these powers rather then share them with those who live in the 
communities they represent. Often the attitude of those in central government will 
have a great influence on the success of using devolved bodies to incorp01:ate local 
communities in policy and projects, as they can encourage the use of participatory 
methodologies at the local level. 22 Barsh takes the argument so far as to say that the 
obligation placed on states to ensure 'active, free and meaningful participation' 'by the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, is a duty to democratise national 
institutions. He sees this as the only means by which active and genuine participation 
can occur, and how economic and political power will be distributed. 23 To assume 
that this is the only means by which participation can occur is a dangerous stance to 
take. As Feeney says, there is an obvious risk, that donor agencies, who do not fully 
understand the political forces existing at the local level, will 'entrench power in the 
hands of unrepresentative local elites and marginalise poor communities and 
vulnerable minorities still further. ' 24 As Long also argues a significant number of 
21 Kannan,,and Vijayamohanan, 'Public Action as Participatory Development ... ' p.214 
22 II>S Workshop. 'Reflections and Recommendations .. .' pp.l36,329 
23 Barsh, 'The Right .to Development as a Human Right ... ' p.326 
24 Feeney, Accountable Aid ... p.20 
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countries where participation of the poor has been successfully incorporated have 
been those where, at the time of change to participatory development, authoritarian 
governments were in power, for example the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and 
Kenya. This, she says, shows that dramatic change can occur despite repressive 
national rule if traditions, laws and policies are supportive of participatory 
development.25 This highlights that there are different ways by which participatory 
approaches can be incorporated into the development process which are especially 
important when we consider that, as discussed in chapter 3, many of the world's poor 
live in 'failed states' in which leaders are unwilling to cooperate and care little about 
the development of its citizens and the rights that they hold. 
As Killick argues, NGOs who are often closer to the problems have a proven record 
of working with communities and the poorest/ underrepresented groups of society, 
and are thus more likely to use participatory approaches in the design and 
implementation of their projects. They provide therefore an alternative to working 
with the government and enable don01~s to work in countries whose political 
environment is unsupportive.26 This reinforces that which was discussed in chapter 3, 
that NGOs can provide a point of contact for governments to work in those counties 
where the political environment is unsuppofti,ve. This is supported by Sengupta in 
his reports as Independent Expert when discussing the importance of involving all 
membeFs of society within participatory projects. He recommends the 
implementation of policies that encourage greater participation in the process of 
NGOs and groups that represent the vulnerable of society, such as the poor and the 
homeless, as well as representatives for women.27 However, while recognising the 
importance of the role that NGOs play it is important to remember that during 
disputes over development methods; between participants at the global Consultation 
on the right to development, those from the South prioritised participation and 
political transformation, as opposed to the 'basic needs' approach that participants 
25 Long, Particip(ltion of the Poor in Development lnitiatives ... p.l38 
26 Healey and Killick, 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty' p.232 
21 Report of the Independent Expert on the Right.to Development. p.l9. para 67 
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from the North were advocating. This gives hope that many governments will be 
open to a process of participatory development. 
Another challenge that has been presented by academics is directed at the concept of 
community. As Cleaver argues, in participatory development theory and practice 
there is an assumption that there is an identifiable community, an assumption which 
persists 'despite considerable evidence of the overlapping, shifting and subjective 
nature of 'communities' and the permeability of boundaries.' 28 Thus, Cleaver argues, 
donor agencies need to refocus their attentions away from the practicalities of 
implementation and towards a clearer understanding of the wider dynamics of 
society, institutions and community.29 Participants at the IDS workshop also 
commented upon what they termed 'taking community for granted.' They 
emphasised that within communities there will be, more often than not, dramatic 
differences in wealth, status, gender, ethnicity, race and education.30 Arguments such 
as these should not be overlooked by academics and development agencies. Different 
experiences at the local level will all have to be taken into consideration if 
participation is to improve project outcome in any meaningful way. It will also be 
important to factor in such differences when delegating aspects of project 
development to those within the local community. As Leurs says, using project 
facilitators who are 'young educated professionals [and] whose experience, language 
and values are quite different to those of the community members with whom they 
are working', will naturally lead to unsatisfactory results. However, if community 
based facilitation is to be the alternative method of policy planning and preparation 
then the differences noted above become challenges that must be addressed.31 
28 Cleaver, F. 'Paradoxes of Participation: Questioning Participatory Approaches to Development' in 
Journal oflnternational DevelopmentVol. 11, No.4 (1999) pp.597-612, p:603 
29 Cleaver, 'Paradoxes of Participation ... ' p.609 
30 IDS Workshop. 'Reflections and Recommendations ... ' p.138 
31 Leurs, R 'Current Challenges Facing Participatory Rural Appraisals' in Blackburn, J and Holland, 
J. Who Changes? Institutionalising Participation in Development a..<>ndon, Intermediate Technology 
Publications, 1998) pp.124-134, pp.125, 127 
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The Role of Participation in DFID's Projects 
Despite the criticisms and reservations that some academics have expressed however, 
the emer.ging theory on participation has taken effect in the practice of development 
organisations, DFID included. As Feeney says: 
..• 'participation' as a formula to remedy past failures has been enthusiastically 
endorsed by most of the world's governments, traditional international and financial 
institutions, and bilateral donor ag'encies as the most effective instrument for 
delivering development.32 
Yet it has been observed that Britain has long been incorporating participatory 
theories and methods into its development policy and implementation and so it would 
seem that DFID had the benefit of being able to learn from the experiences of the 
administration that had existed before it. From the beginning of the 1990s ODA staff 
worked to guidelines that encouraged participation, although as Feeney says these 
guidelines were not systematically applied in all projects. For example in 1995 
Britain approved a project in the Brazilian rainforest that was coordinated by the 
World Bank (the Natural Resources Policy Project). However, before approval was 
given for the project to proceed no consultation with community leaders had 
occurred, or stakeholder/ social assessment carried out. 33 Yet, as Feeney says, there 
is also evidence if we examine programmes such as the Western Ghats Forestry 
Project in India, that the ODA was making a genuine attempt to promote community 
participation, and focused especiaHy on the most vulnerable groups within that 
community.34 The ODA also demonstrated what I believe to be both foresight, and a 
deep understanding of participatory development at a time when these theories and 
methods were only just evolving and beginning to be practised by donor agencies 
around the world. Their .guidelines allowed for a flexible approach to project 
32 Feeney, Accountable Aid ... p.9 
33 Feeney, Accountable Aid ... pp.l7 -18 
34 Feeney, Accountable Aid ... p.59 
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development in order to incorporate further developments during implementation, 
and so project designs were not, as Feeney says, set in stone but were able to evolve 
as the programme proceeded. The ODA also recognised that participatory projects 
could not be rushed; time was needed when dealing with both the local communities 
and institutions. In addition to this most ODA programmes foc.used ftrstly on 
building up local capacity, a method which ensures that those involved can make a 
valuable and informed contribution through their participation.35 These are all 
aspects of participatory development that analysts, after studying many cases, are 
emphasising as essential for a successful outcome to the participatory project. 
Thus, with a good participatory approach to development already established in 
Britain it would appear ·that the new Department for International Development 
would have had a ftrm grounding on which to build successful practice of 
participatory development. A commitment by New Labour to continue in this 
direction of development policy was expressed in the DFID paper 'Realising Human 
Rights for Poor People'. This paper affirms the idea that 'the International 
Development Targets can only be achieved with the engagement of poor people in the 
decisions and processes which affect their lives', and recognises also that 
participation is central to realising all human rights. 36 Within the paper there is also 
an expressed recognition of the need for both access to information (although 
challenges facing this are also mentioned, such as illiteracy, social isolation, linguistic 
diversity, and physical remoteness), and an understanding of the country's social 
values and norms that are potentially discriminatory against for example, class, 
religion, age, disability, and ethnicity, in order to ensure that all are able to 
participate, and are included in the process of the project, as well as support for 
participatory monitoring and evaluation.37 It appears that DFID is therefore fulftHing 
the obligations set down in the Declaration on the Right to Development to ensure 
35 Feeney, Accountable Aid ... p.17 
36 Department for International Development. Realising Human Rights for Poor People (2000) 
hnp://www .dfid.gov .uk/pubs/filesltsphuman.pdf, p.5 
37 DFID Realising Human Rights for Poor People p.B 
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participation for all in the development process. 
However, from the paper alone it is not clear how exactly DFID wiU fulfil these 
promises of support; no real strategy is set out. There is some indication of the type 
of programmes DFID will instigate though, for it is said that work will be undertaken 
'towards the incorporation of these methods .. .into Participatory Poverty Assessments 
and poverty reduction strategies.' 38 These models are ,those used by the World Bank 
and which are set out in their own papers, such as Mainstreaming Participation in 
Development. The main features of World Bank programmes are essentially the same 
as those noted in DFID, that is, working with primary stakeholders at every stage of 
the project cycle, while also encouraging institutional reforms that are required in 
order for local governments to take control of development in their counties, in a 
transparent and accountable environment that is maintained through effective· 
monitoring mechanisms.39 The World Bank also highlights the many lessons that 
have been learnt in the implementation of such methods, and thus provides many 
pointers for improvements that departments such as DFID can draw upon when using 
similar techniques. For example, the report emphasises the dangers of setting strict 
time frames and fixed priorities, rigidity that is incompatible with participatory 
methods. The need for long term commitment and supportive attitudes by 
development statfs are also noted as being essential for the success of such 
programmes.40 Thus, in drawing upon these approaches, DFID inevitably affiliates 
itself with the work of the World Bank, a bond between the two which is further 
strengthened by the publication of The Participation Manual, a document that sets 
out the procedures for the joint World Bank and DFID Poor Rural Communities 
Development Project (PRCDP) in China.41 The potential problems and advantages 
that arise through adopting World Bank approaches will be discussed later in the 
chapter. It is important firstly to examine the success that DFID has managed to 
38 DFID Realising Human Rights for Poor People p.29 
39 Blackburn, J. Chambers, Rand Gaventa,J. Mainstreaming Participation in DevelopmentOFD 
Working Paper Series No.IO (Washington, The World Bank, 2000) pp.l-3, 15 
40 Blackburn, Chambers, and Gaventa, Mainstreaming Participation in Developmentpp.1-lO 
41 For more info see OFID publication http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/PRCDP en.pdf 
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achieve by way of participatory development through the implementation of such 
methods in its project work. 
Analysing the Work ofDFID 
Those at DFID have published their own case studies and feedback from recent 
projects which analyse the work that they are currently undertaking with the use of 
participatory approaches. The reports indicate success in the incorporation of 
participatory methods in different areas of development. For example the DFID-
funded rural livelihoods project in Namibia, they say, has become a model for 
addressing HIV/ AIDS because it encouraged communities to develop their own 
programmes which .address the impact of AIDS. . It also appears that this particular 
problem has been successful in the scaling-up process, a process which often poses 
significant problems and challenges, as DFJD notes that the Ministry of Health within 
Namibia has accepted this as a model for the whole country.42 
The Poor Rural Communities Development Project mentioned above has also been 
deemed a success as the project, which aims to ensure participation in a transparent 
and inclusive manner in the design phase of development planning as well as the 
other phases, has been successfully implemented in a region of China that is 
characterized by its large number of ethnic groups and high levels of poverty.43 
DFID has also recently published another report detailing their intentions for 
improving participation, Learning to Listen: DFID Action Plan on Children and 
Young People's Participation 2004-2005. This paper, it seems, is a recognition of 
the importance of young people's participation in the development process, as 
another potentially vulnerable group in society. Within the report DAD again reports 
upon its success in incorporating the opinions of children into its work so far, for 
42 Department for International Development. Reducing the Threat of HN and AIDS to Namibian 
livelihoods (2007)• http://www .dfid.gov.uk/casestudieslfiles/africa/namibia~hiv .asp 
43 Department for Jnternational Development. foor Rural CQmmunities Development Project 
(PRCDP): The Role of Community Participation during Project Design 
httn://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubslfiles/PRCDP-en.pdf 
100 
example in the Malawi Free Primary Education Programme.44 This report also 
remains rather vague on how improvements will be made, DFID merely promises to 
'engage in consultation with relevant NGOs to discuss how to incorporate children 
and young people's pa.nicipation across DFID's work ... [and to] investigate further 
training possibilities for DFID staff. ' 4' However, I believe that this is another 
promising indication of the success that DFID can have with regards to participatory 
development. As they themselves recognise in the report, current experiences of 
involving young people in the development process have seen these children grow in 
confidence. In my opinion this will have a great impact on the future of participatory 
development for, if listened to today, the adults of tomorrow will want to participate 
in policy making knowing that their voices will be heard. These reports highlight the 
success stories and ·model cases and thus show that DFID, it seems, it successfully 
in~orpc:n:ating pwtlcipa,tion ~nto it~ dev~lqpJ;llent work. Hqwev~r. to get ~ tru~ 
indication of its record we should look also to evaluations given by outside critics and 
experts. 
Healey and Killick, in evaluating the degree of participation incorporated into the 
projects of European donors, determined that over half displayed moderate to high 
levels of participation by the local community, although participation at the crucial 
design stage was weaker than during implementation of the proposals. They also 
note that, although gender differences were taken into consideration, this was often 
not thorough, and argue that in general, although some improvements have been 
made with regards to ensuring participation, good participatory approaches are an 
exception. 46 Thus, policy outcomes wiU be overshadowed by a concern that, despite 
displaying indications of participation, projects were not truly participatory, and input 
not entirely representative. Yet, being a study of all European donors we should ask 
how does DFID fare in their particular efforts? 
44 Department for International Development. Learning to Listen: DFID Action Plan on Children and 
Young People's Participation 2004-05 hnp://www .dfid.gov .uk/pubs/filesllearningtolisten.pdf p.3 
4
' DFID Learning to Listen ... p.12 
46 Healey and Killick, 'Using Aid to Reduce Poverty' pp.238, 241 
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The most comprehensive study of DFID's record with regards to participatory 
development has been The Participatory Approaches Learning Study conducted for 
DFID by INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre) in 1~998.The 
findings of this study highlighted the main shortfalls in DFID's work. Their main 
contentions rested on a number of points including the lack of consultation beyond 
secondary stakeholder, and senior civil servants at that, and the inflexible 
programmes that DFID employed in development projects, which INTRAC argued 
highlighted the fact that the development programmes used were still driven by 
DFID's internal needs, rather than by a commitment to participation. INTRAC also 
raised attention for the need for DFID to work closely with other development actors, 
and to develop a more in-depth knowledge of the beneficiary countries.47 Thus the 
r~port qpened the way for further improvement in DFID's approach to development 
and gives us some indication to the extent which the new theories surrounding 
development are impacting upon the government's understanding of aid practice. 
The report also highlights though, a certain commitment by the government to 
ensuring participation in development. As noted in the report, the commissioning of 
this evaluation by the government was an attempt to further their goal of making aid 
more effective by ensuring that participatory approaches were included, and 
successful in development programmes.48 This is a positive indication of the stance 
of New Labour towards participatory development and the changes in development 
thinking. 
Certain responses to the INTRAC repott highlight further analysis of DFID's 
performance with regards to participatory approaches. Pratt, for example argues that, 
although DFID does ensur~ participation at the identification stage of the process, this 
has a limited impact to the programme outcome. Pratt founds his conclusion on the 
47 INTRAC (International NGO Training.and Research Centre) The Participatory Approach 
Learning Study (PALS) For the Department oflntemational Development, UK (1999) 
http://www;dfid.gov .uk/pubs/files/sdd-intrac.pdf p.17 
48 INTRAC, The Participatory Approach Learning Study<p.19 
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basis that no evidence exists to suggest a cm:relation between participation at the 
design stage and the final impact, rather what studies show is that positive project 
outcomes are due to good monitoring and local involvement in the implementation 
process. Pratt's assessment continues by highlighting that even what is achieved in 
the earlier stages of the process are undermined by the time gap that exists between 
project design and implementation.49 This particular failure has been recognised by 
DFID themselves, for as one DFID staff member told INTRAC, 'If you start after a 
two year gap, regardless of the work carried out before, you are starting with a blank 
sheet.'so This suggests that New Labour's approach, while limiting participation to 
the earlier stages of development programmes, will continue to limit the extent to 
which they can achieve their goals of poverty reduction and effective aid. 
A further issue is addressed by Long who; in evaluating the progress that DFID has 
made, looks at the relations that DFID has with the recipient governments, an issue 
which the INTRAC report draws attention to. She notes that DFID conducts most of 
its work directly through recipient government institutions, apart from in the cases of 
unresponsive governments, yet has not paid attention to helping the agencies and 
their personnel realise the value of participatory approaches, or to providing the 
training needed to carry out participatory work, Thus, Long argues, without any 
effort to change the attitudes of government personnel participation will not become 
rooted in the country's approach to development.51 Pratt also highlights this 
inadequacy in saying that DFID's attempt to focus more on primary stakeholders has 
led them to neglect secondary stakeholders with whom they conduct most of their 
work. He continues by arguing that: 
Their [the secondary stakeholders] participation is crucial to the development of 
projects. Official agencies ignore them at their peril. .. If an official agency wishes to 
49 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p,67 
so In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.67 
51 Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.78 
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see improved primary stakeholder participation, this will most likely come through 
improved relationships with the local secondary stakeholders who still have 
responsibility for implementing programmes and ensuring their sustainability ... It is 
possible to have an excellent project but if these are not fully supported by the host 
institutions and mainstreamed into the whole ministry or department, they 
become .... 'islands of excellence in a sea of chaos.' 52 
Long also highlights a problem with the current DFID project cycle. DFID's standard 
procedure for project development, known as the 'Logical Framework', does not 
allow for the time and flexibility required for a participatory project. Long highlights 
the fact that this procedure limits the ability for changes once the project has begun, 
and thus impacts negatively on the projects effectiveness. Pratt argues that when 
using Logical Framework for the development procedure participation will be the 
first victim of the strict procedural guidelines that are required in such a results-based 
system. 53 The constraints on time are equally problematic as case studies have shown 
that changes to participatory projects can take as long as 20 years, as was the case in 
the Philippines.54 
It should be noted however, as INTRAC itself did in the report, that the evidence 
used in the evaluation predated the government White Paper on International 
Development in 1997, and thus did not take into account an¥ changes in approach 
since then.55 Thus DFID has responded to the report and commented that: 
... the White Paper on International Development has introduced a number of 
significant changes in our approach to and understanding of participation; The most 
important of these is our commitment to a rights-based approach. This means 
52 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.79 
53 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.79-80 
54 Long, Participation ofthe Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.147 
55 INTRAC, The Participatory Approach Learning Study·p.4 
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making people the central purpose of development. A rights-based approach is 
predicated on people's right to participate. 56 
DFID also stated that it has already learnt much by way of making participatory 
development a successful endeavour. It recognises the need to share all the relevant 
information regarding a project with all parties involved, and to do so as early in the 
process as possible, and in the appropriate languages. DFID has also expressed 
recognition of the need for a more flexible approach to project development, one that 
can incorporate changes throughout the various stages of the procedure, as well as the 
need to assist stakeholders in improving the skills needed to engage in participatory 
development.57 This is a positive response, as it is only through recognition of the 
challenges facing participatory development that change will occur in the actual 
practice of the donor agency. As DFID itself has said, much remains to be learned 
about the practice of participation. DFID recognises the need for further study into 
the costs and benefits of participation throughout the entire cycle of a development 
project for both the donor agency and the stakeholders, and examine what sorts of 
• 
outcome are produced by different kinds of participation. 58 
Although the INTRAC report is slightly outdated we have still been able to note 
DFIDs current approach from their 2000 paper 'Realising Human Rights for Poor 
People'. Despite the fact that this is the method that DFID has. taken after evaluation 
of its work in participatory development has been conducted, many criticisms still 
target their approach. These criticisms however are mainly concerned with the World 
Bank's approach, that of PRSPs. As highlighted above, DFID has forged strong 
partnerships with this international financial institution and uses similar, if not 
identical, methods in many of its development programmes. Thus the criticisms 
directed at PRSPs will also be an indirect criticism of DFID. The majority of these 
56 INTRAC, The Participatory Approach Learning Study .p. 7 
57 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.91 
58 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p~90 
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assessments have come from NGOs who, as also noted above, are recognised for 
their success in using participation and working in close relation to the poor and 
vulnerable in society. Their analysis, therefore, is particular geared towards 
highlighting the limitations in donor agency approaches. 
Christian Aid is one such organisation that has taken issue with the PRSP approach. 
One of their reports argues that 'the involvement of the poor people in drawing up 
policies and writing PRSPs has been minimal and superficial. '59 They note that while 
participation was invited for some policies, it was not for all, and even in the cases 
where participation occurred reports and information were provided in English only. 
Thus, Chritian Aid argues, the people merely became a rubber stamp for policies that 
they fundamentally disagreed with but which had already been drawn up prior to 
consultation.f><l However it must be recognised that much of this criticism is directed 
at the World Bank's use of PRSP. As Oxfam argues, despite the fact that the promise 
of poverty reduction through the PRSP model remains unfulfiHed '[PRSP] offers a 
key opportunity to put country-led strategies for poverty reduction at the heart of 
development assistance. ' 61 
Oxfam also notes that, having questioned partners in developing countries, consensus 
showed that PRSP was the most open policy dialogue in each of their countries to 
date. 62 This holds great promise for the process as a model for development. What 
success is reliant upon, therefore, is correct implementation by the donor agency. It 
could be said that DFID has been right to, adopt this approach, what they must do now 
is apply it in a participatory fashion, ensuring for example that people receive the 
59 Christian Aid. Ignoring the Experts: Poor People's Exclusion From Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(200 1) Available at: http://siteresources;worldbank;org/INTPRS 1/Resources/Comprehensi ve-
Review .christianaid l.pdf p.4 
60 Christian Aid, Ignoring tile Experts ... p.4 
61 Oxfam. From 'Donorship' to Ownership? Moving Towards PRSP Round Two Oxfam Briefing 
Paper (2004) 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/democracy rightsldownloadslbpSl prsp.pdf p.l 
62 Oxfam, From 'Donorship' to Ownership? ... p.6 
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necessary information in an appropriate language, and that the most vulnerable 
groups have their opinions heard. If New Labour really are committed to poverty 
reduction this is what we should see for, as noted above, this is the most promising 
way to sustainable poverty reduction. 
One further problem that has arisen generally out of the use of participatory 
development, rather than out of one specific model, is that of accountability. As Leurs 
notes, development agencies have to account for the money they spend in 
development, be it to the existing political institutions or to the general public in their 
home country. Thus the project/programme approach is the most desi.I:able approach 
to development for these agencies as it provides both for a measure of control in the 
policy and practice of the aid giving country and therefore a framework for 
accountability. This highlights then, that despite recognition among those working in 
development of a need to reverse structures of power and control in order for local 
communities to lead the way in project/ policy planning, this reversal is not occurring 
because of the need for accountability. What Leurs suggests has been more 
successful is the reversals of professional knowledge, rather than reversals of power.63 
Pratt argues that, with regards to the work of DFID, project cycle management was 
generally not supportive of participation as it was often not designed for the clients, 
but for Whitehall.64 However in response to these criticisms DFID is also addressing 
the issue of accountability. Andrew Norton has said, 
[DFID} is also investigating ideas of social accountability ... [we now recognise] that 
accountability to our development partners, including primary stakeholders is as 
important as accountability to the UK taxpayer, which is our traditional mode. 65 
What the INTRAC report argued was that participation requires a broader and deeper 
63 Leurs, 'Current Challenges Facing Participatory Rural Appraisals' pp. 129-130 
64 In Long, Participation ofthe Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.70 
65 In Long, Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives ... p.l40 
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accountability, to both donors and beneficiaries alike. 'There should be', it states, 'no 
question of choosing between accountability either to the donor (ultimately, the 
British taxpayer) or to the local stakeholders. What is needed is optimum 
accountability to both. ' 66 
Conclusion 
The current development models which DFID is employing are significantly different 
from traditional development programmes. A genuine commitment has been 
demonstrated by the department, to encourage changes at the institutional level that 
will help tQ develop local government commitment to both development and 
participation, and to work with primary and secondary stakeholders through all stages 
of the project cycle. These differences, which encourage local participation, do seem 
to be changing the success and outcomes of development projects, although the 
extent to which this is so remains to be seen. 
As noted in the discussion, DFID's approach has followed the current trends in 
development as practiced by the World Bank and although the World Bank's record 
in ensuring participation through PRSPs is extremely unreliable, there is hope that 
DFID can improve upon this record by building upon the lessons that the World Bank 
itself has highlighted and contributing its own breadth of e:x:pertise. This hope for 
success comes from both the fact that many still believe PRSP to be a successful 
model, and DFID's demonstration, both on paper and in practice, of a genuine 
attempt to involve governments and citizens in the development process. This is 
reinforced by DFID's e:x:pressed recognition that participation is a human right that 
must be guaranteed above and beyond the success it brings to development 
programmes. It is in the talk of rights that we also, again see the promotion of ideas 
central to the right to development, despite the lack of reference to either the concept 
or the Declaration. Yet, in using the language of rights, DFID' s commitment to allow 
66 INTRAC. The Participatory Approach Learning Study p.ll 
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participation, and overarching desire to tackling poverty moves beyond the arena of 
rhetoric and promises, and becomes more of a guarantee for those living in 
developing nations, who will be able to demand that their rights be fulfilled. Thus, 
the inclusion of participation in development programmes demonstrates again that, 
despite the opposition which the RTD faces, a workable programme is developing 
within development administrations which both incorporates, and relies upon for 
successful development outcomes, methods which are so central to the right to 
development. 
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ChapterS 
Development and Security: Placing the Right to 
Development in the Context of Contemporary 
Security Concerns 
In the previous chapters we have looked at both the changes in international 
development theory and what appears to be corresponding changes to development 
practice, especial,ly with reference to DFID. As Barder says 'DFID came into 
existence at a time of considerable change in international thinking about 
development' 1 and we have seen a definite response to these changes in the way that 
the department has altered its focus, towards the elimination of world poverty and the 
rights of citizens, by incorporating methods of partnership and participation. It is 
important however to examine other factors that may have contributed to these 
changes in development policy, ones which may be removed from development and 
altruistic concerns for the wellbeing of others. The principal factor under 
consideration in this chapter will be that of security, for as our sense of responsibility 
towards developing nations has been increased as a result of an increasingly 
interdependent world, and thus the recognition in international human rights 
documents ·Of shared responsibilities, so too has our awareness of security threats that 
transcend state boundaries and which alter traditional understandings of security and 
warfare. 
DFID itself has remarked on the changes that an increasingly interdependent world 
brings with it, noting both reasons for focusing on improving the lives of those in 
developing nations and eliminating poverty rather then continuing to seek self-
interested goals, and the security dilemmas that have also developed: 
1 Barder, 0, Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the UK Experience Working Paper 
Number 70 (Centre for Global Development, 2005) p.14 
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We live in an interdependent world. We are connected to other people and countries 
through trade, travel, culture, ideas and business. This enriches our lives. But these 
close connections can also give rise to threats when conflict, crime and 
environmental pollution cross borders. 2 
Thus, the statement highlights that, as well as sharing in the lives and cultures of each 
other, the world is also becoming a place where transnational crime and terrorism is 
possible, a particular concern at the present time. As Gearson notes, the 
interdependency of the world has made it possible for terrorists to now have both an 
increased technological ability, and members who are willing to engage in suicide 
attacks~ Therefore, although traditional means are stHl likely to be used by terrorists, 
we have begun to witness the ways in which terrorist organisations are adapting in 
order to use modem methods of attack. For example, terrorists now know that 
immense fear within a society can be generated through the use of modem media, and 
damage inflicted by offensive warfare on a country's information systems? 
We can note therefore, that, while coming into existence at a time of great change in 
development thinking, DFID was also born out of a time when other huge changes 
were occurring in the world, changes which threaten our national security. Both the 
changes in development thinking, and those in the area of security, will have 
undoubtedly contributed to the changes that we have seen in the development 
approach by DFID, and as this chapter will show, the two debates are also 
interconnected on many levels. However, in order to assess in any meaningful way 
the extent to which the RTD and changes in development thinking has altered state 
policy, we too must assess how security changes have affected development policy, 
2 Department for International Development Fighting Poverty to Build a Sustainable World (2005) 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securitYforall.pdf p.3 
3 Gearson, J. 'The Nature of Modem Terrorism' in Freedman, L (ed)Superterrorism: Policy 
Responses (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2002) pp.7-24, pp.7,17,19 & 22-23 
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examining both evidence which suggests a return to traditional development thinking 
which prioritises foreign policy aims, and existence of the resilience of new ideas, 
such as the importance of looking to long-term aims and tackling the problem of 
poverty. Underlying this discussion therefore is the question: to what extent are 
changes in development policy contingent on the RTD and principles that surround it, 
and to what extent have they been motivated by self-interest and the safeguarding of 
security i.e. is increased interconnectedness encouraging us to recognise shared 
responsibilities, or is it forcing a return to more traditional policies of self-interest 
that can so easily be masked in the rhetoric of aid (as we have seen in chapter two)? 
Using Foreign Aid for Political Gain 
Perhaps the most disturbing trend that the development rights of citizens, and the 
fight against poverty, continues to face is the use of foreign aid by major donor 
nations for their own political and strategic aims, a practice which can be noted 
greatly within the United Nations. Investigations into the use of foreign aid for 
political means within the United Nations have already been undertaken for many 
years. Academics such as Robert Keohane have studied the exercise of political 
influence within the UN General Assembly since the 1960s. Thus, academic writings 
such as these demonstrate that political and strategic forces have long been at play 
within the UN. 
Keohane argues that the political process within the General Assembly is a varied one 
where alignments and interests as wel'l as influence have the potential to alter from 
one issue to another.4 He argues that the existences of political alliances are 
especially important, and regional and cultural loyalties, to which votes are tied, can 
be noted within the UN. Having said this however, Keohane also recognises that on 
many occasions voting and alignments within in the UN go far beyond outside 
4 Keohane, R.O. 'The Study ofPoliticallnfluence in the General Assembly' in International 
Organization Vol. 21, No.2 (1967), pp.221-237,p. 226 
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loyalties. He notes: 
Both Cyprus and Turkey, however, went beyond simple persuasion and used both 
promises and "pressures"; that is, they offered rewards for help and indicated to 
other states that retaliation might be the consequence of antagonistic actions ... [for 
example] China, which sympathised with Turkey, was induced to abstain by Greek 
and Cypriot threats to support Communist Chinese admission to the General 
Assembly ifthe Nationalists voted against the Greek .. Cypriot draft. 5 
Thus, as Keohane himself says, the threats and promises of UN members are often 
the driving force behind coalition building within the assembly.6 
Wittkopf also conducted a study into similar questions of influence in the UN, 
building on the work of Keohane in 1973. The focus here lies on the use of foreign 
aid by the United States to ensure compliance by the other states within the UN on 
important foreign policy positions. As Wittkopf notes, figures within US politics 
have been open and blunt about the returns expected on the distribution of aid. 
Senator Hugh Scott is given as an example for 'expressing a common resentment 
[that] a good many nations we have helped generously with foreign aid over many 
years have shown a classic lack of appreciation.' 7 Statements such as these led many 
to recognise the importance attached, by the US, to foreign aid as a means by which 
to achieve political objectives. As Black argues, it became apparent that aid could be 
used to 'swing critical votes in international bodies. ' 8 This became especial'ly 
important with regards to the UN for, as Westwood notes, winning majority votes 
increasingly became dependent on the many underdeveloped countries that were 
s Keohane, 'The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly' p.231 
6 Keohane, 'The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly' p.223 
7 In Wittkopf, E.R. 'Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study' in The American 
Political Science Review Vol. 67, No.3 (1,973), pp.868-888, p.868 
8 In Wittkopf, 'Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes ... ' p.870 
113 
entering the UN.9 Thus, it is obvious how, when dealing more with poorer nations, 
aid could easHy become a weapon of bribery within the international institutions, and 
poverty itself a means by which to pursue foreign policy aims. This approach to 
winning votes became increasingly condemned. As Kaplan argued ' ... the United 
States should not seek to starve a poor country into support for its foreign policy.' 10 
However, as the previous chapters have shown, as well as academics, governments 
have also begun to condemn the use of aid for achieving foreign policy and political 
aims. 
Yet, recent studies highlight what appears to be the continued use of aid· giving for 
the exchange of votes in the UN, and as Burnell says' ... aid's usefulness as a bribe or 
reward in exchange for political concessions has not gone away.'11 Similar to the 
work of Keohane, Alesina and Dollar's more recent study suggests that political and 
strategic considerations continue to be considerably important in explaining aid 
flows, and political alliances that have formed as a result of this can stiH be 
distinguished in the voting blocs of the UN. The strategic use of aid, they argue, is 
not only attributable to the US but to other major donors in the UN, France and Japan 
in particular. 1~ Their findings conclude that voting patterns in the UN explain aid 
distribution better than if we were to study the political institutions or the economic 
policies of the recipients. 13 Yet Alesina and Dollar suggest that the use of aid as 
bribes may not be the only explanation for the correlation ·between aid recipients and 
UN voting. Rather, they argue, these correlations may be merely indicative of 
political alliances that exist between countries, both inside and out of the UN, 
alliances that already determine aid flows. In their opinion this explanation is more 
probable for, they argue, the majority of votes that actually take place in the UN are 
9 Wittkopf, 'Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes .. .' p.870 
10 In Wittkopf, 'Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes .. .'p;888 
11 Burnell, P. Foreign Aid Resurgent: New Spirit or Old Hangover? (Warwick, University of 
Warwick, 2003) p.lO 
12 Alesina, A and Dollar, D 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2000) pp.33-63, pp.38,40,50 
13 Alesina and Dollar, 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' p.55 
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not important from a strategic point of view. Thus, ratherthen seeing aid as a method 
as bribery, it is suggested that what we are actually seeing is 'an observable 
manifestation of "friendship"' within the UN votes. Changes in UN votes indicate 
therefore changes in geopolitical alliances, and thus changes in the distribution of aid 
too. As Alesina and Dollar note though, both interpretations of the link between 
votes and aid distribution reinforce the idea that aid is given on the bases of strategic 
considerations. 14 
Werker and Kuziemko also explore another explanation for increased aid to non-
permanent members of the Security Council that are removed from unashamed 
foreign policy aims and strategic interests. They suggest that, potentially, increases in 
aid may be dependent on the fact that, while holding a seat on the Security Council, 
developing nations can bring its needs to the attention of donor countries.15 
However, evidence would suggest that this is not the ·case for, as Werker and 
Kuziemko note, the year of election onto the Security Council, and the two yeats of 
service result in large increases of aid, yet this level of aid drops after service on the 
council to the pre-election level. Also, countries that served during particularly 
significant years, that is, when important resolutions were put forward, received a 
staggering increase in aid compared to countries that served in other years, almost 
$45nrillion dollars in comparison to an increase of $16mi1lion.16 As Tamura and 
Kunieda also note, patterns of aid distribution show that 'U.S. foreign aid is, in 
general, regarded as an inducement, as opposed to a reward, for the recipient to 
coincide with U.S positions in voting.' 17 
The Iraq Resolution and UN Bribes 
14 Alesina and Dollar, 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' p.46 
15 Kuziemko, I. and Werker, E. 'How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid 
and Bribery at the United Nations.' in Journal of Political Economy Vol. 114, No.5 (2006), pp.905-
930, p.906 
16 Kuziemko and Werker, 'How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth ... ' pp.918,924 
17 Tamura, F. and Kunieda, T. Vote-Buying Behaviour in the Security Council: Theory and Evidence 
from U.S Foreign Aid (Providence, Rhode Island, Brown University, 2005) p.25 
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However, we need not surmise about the use of aid as U.S. representatives in the 
U.N. have spoken openly about their aims and motives with regards to aid spending 
particularly in recent years. As Werker and Kuziemko, noted the U.S. 'issued 
"promises of rich rewards" to rotating members [in the security council] in exchange 
for their support during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.' 18 Thus in the days 
preceding the first Iraq resolution, reports that the U.N. Security Council would be 
faced with a 'barrage of bribes, persuasion and blatant threats' ensued.19 As Deen 
says, all Security Council members were voting under immense political and 
diplomatic pressure, and with the knowledge that, having seen an almost immediate 
cut of 70million dollars in aid to Yemen after their negative vote against another U.S. 
sponsored resolution, economic repercussions of their votes could occur.20 This fact 
would have been extremely concerning for Colombia, which received 380million 
dollars in U~S~ grants dllfillg ~002; Mexicq, who ~so received 12millioll dollars tn 
2002 from U.S. Economic Support Funds; as well as Cameroon and Guinea who 
have both received substantial :military grants from the U.S. The issue was also of 
great concern for Mauritius, which had recently joined the Security Council under 
U.S. sponsorship, and who had also received a U.S. aid package on the condition that 
Mauritius would 'not engage in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign 
policy interests.' 21 Therefore, it is clear that the U.S could muster support for the 
resolution purely by the economic power which it wields. 
However, despite the fact that the U.S. was the focus of such reports and allegations 
of bribery it is clear that Britain was also heavily involved in such tactics. Despite a 
lack of evidence that Britain was using aid packages and threats in the same manner, 
the support which was offered to the U.S. also suggests support for the tactics being 
used to secure votes. At the very least it is true to say that Britain did not object in 
18 Kuziemko and Werker, 'How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth ... ' p.906 
19 Vulliamy, E. Beaumont, P. 'Paton Walsh, N. and Webster, P. 'America the Ann-Twister' in The 
Observer (March 2nd 2003) Available at hnp://observer.guardian~co.uk/iraq/story/0 .. 905755.00.html 
20 Deen, T. US Dollars Yielded Unanimous Vote Against Iraq (Inter Press Service, November lllh 
2002} hnp://www;commondrearos.orglcgi-bin/printcgi?file=/headlines02/llll-02.htm 
21 Deen, US Dollars Yielded Unanimous UN Vote against Iraq 
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any way to the methods that where being used by the U.S. As The Observer reported, 
Bush and Blair made clear that together they would push for a vote that would 
authorise war, and Blair announced that he himself was determined not to back down 
on such a stance.22 This alliance with the U.S. not only led Britain into supporting 
the use of aid as bribes but drew it also into illegal acts against other Security Council 
members. As The Observer also reported the U.S. conducted a surveillance operation 
against other members of the Security Council. The telephones and emails of the 
New York delegates, not including Britain, were intercepted in order to obtain 
information on how the different countries would vote on the second Iraq resolution, 
as weH as to ascertain alliances, policies, and positions.23 However, this time the 
U.S. was not alone for it has since come to light that Britain too actively helped in the 
operation. The Observer reported that: 
Translators and analysts at the Government's top-secret surveillance centre GCHQ 
were ordered to co-operate with an American espionage 'surge' on Security Council 
delegations ... Sources close to the intelligence services have now confirmed that the 
request from the security agency was 'acted on' by the British authorities. 24 
The self-interested attitudes that have thus been displayed in the Security Council 
since 9/11 are both shocking and worrying if only because, as An-Na'im says, it 
shows both the failure of the international community to keep in check a unilateral 
response by the U.S. that was in clear violation of international law, and the 
perpetration of such crimes within the Security CouncH which is intended to be the 
guardian of international peace and security. They show, he argues, that the 
permanent members of the council a.Fe willing to 'paralyse the U.N. system for their 
22 Vulliamy et al 'America the Ann-Twister' 
23 Bright, M. Vulliamy, E. and Beaumont, P. 'Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to win Vote on Iraq War' in 
'The Observer (March 21111 2003) Available at 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk{iraq/story/0 .. 905936.00.htrnl 
24 Bright, M. and Beaumont, P. 'Britain Spied on UN Allies over War Vote' in The Observer 
(February gm 2004) Available at http://observer.guardian.co.ukllrag/Stocy/0.2763.1143572.00.html 
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political interests. ' 25 As Forsythe says, there have been many incidents of violence 
around the world in previous years which have constituted a threat to international 
peace and security, such as the war in Chechnya, that did not draw either attention or 
action from the Security Council. Thus, Forsythe says, we can see that the Security 
Council has always been dominated by realist principles that ensure a lack of 
response from the Security Council members unless their own narrow interests are 
threatened. Even where Security Council action is taken self interest still pervades, 
as was the case in Somalia when military presence was removed from the country 
after the murder ·of eighteen U.S. rangers, an incident that led to the blocking of any 
action in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.26 These incidents draw to our attention 
a fundamental conflict within the ethos of the U.N, one by which contradictory 
actions and ideas are formulated and propagated within a single institution. Thus, we 
can begin to see that in an institution responsible for international human rights, 
many actions that threaten this cause have been perpetrated by its own members. 
This discord, as we have seen, has severe repercussions for aid, and for the RTD on 
both a practical and theoretical level. One may ask, for example, having looked at the 
evidence presented on the attitude of Member States, whether the Declaration on the 
Right to Development is in fact flawed, because of the disharmony it has with the 
commitment of those party to it. It would be more appropriate however, to look to 
the calls for United Nations reform for, as protectors of peace and security, one could 
argue that to reject a Declaration which aims to secure the rights of development, and 
which offers a guide for the eradication of world poverty, because of the selfish and 
often violent acts of individual states would itself be an affront-to the human rights 
project that the U.N. has long worked to establish and protect. What we are seeing is 
a return to, or perhaps the continued ·use of, traditional approaches to aid: an approach 
which uses aid for political gain and which was rejected by the UK government 
25 An·Na'im, A. 'Upholding International Legality Against Islamic and American Jihad' in Booth, K. 
and Dunne, T. (eds) Worlds In Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) pp.162-171, pp.l62-163,171 
26 Forsythe, D.P. Human Rights in International Relations.200 Edition (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006)pp.60-63 
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because of both its ineffectiveness for addressing poverty and its moral 
questionability. Thus, it appem:s that the concern for the eradication of world 
poverty, and for the right of humankind that was expressed by world leaders has been 
discarded. As Woodward says, 
.. allocation of scarce aid resources according to the donors' geopolitical agendas 
rather than Jo need or potential effect reduces the effectiveness of aid in achieving 
objectives such as poverty reduction and health. 27 
Kuziemko and Werker too say that, 
[Our] results are also pertinent to ... the long-standing debate about the effectiveness 
of foreign aid ... As our results indicate that strategic interests have a causal impact 
on foreign aid decisions, they suggest a possible explanation for the disappointing 
track record of aid: as donor countries use aid strategically, they do not prioritise 
humanitarian concerns when crafting aid packages. 28 
The Effect that such Practices have on the Right to Development 
The effect that such actions have on the effectiveness of aid are obvious. However, 
that on the concept of a right to development is more contentious, and varying 
outcomes are possible. As noted above, one could argue that such attitudes and 
actions by member states may call into question the potential that the Declaration 
holds for development. Yet a very different stance can be taken. It may be argued 
that, given that using aid as bribes and prioritising security and foreign policy aims 
has been a traditional and almost continuous practice, the very fact that a concept of a 
right to development, and the adoption of the practices it promotes by development 
27 Woodward, D. 'Vote Buying in the UN Security Council' in www.thelancet.comVQl. 369 (2007), 
ff'l2-13, p.13 
Kuziemko and Werker, 'How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth ... ' p.907 
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agencies such as DFID, has been born and is flourishing in an environment that is 
hostile to such ideas, demonstrates both its resilience and importance as a concept. It 
would be difficult to imagine states accepting such principles, which challenge 
traditional uses of aid, without these principles having either moral weight behind 
them, or obvious advantages that will make for successful development programmes. 
Even if this is the case however, we must also be aware that while successful projects 
that incorporated RTD principles have been established, the continuance of such 
practices within the U.N. and other international institutions will contribute to the 
challenges that face development workers on the ground. For example, corrupt 
practices by Western leaders make it extremely difficult to tackle the corruption in 
developing nations, thus bringing into question both the possibility for leadership 
reform in developing nations, and of sustainable development. Continuous practice 
could also potentially render the partnership approach impossible, as shared 
commitments cannot be based on values that are not even respected in the donor 
country. 
Effects of such practices within the UN may not be confined to relations with 
recipient governments however; local participation might also be rendered difficult. 
As chapter four discussed, convincing citizens that their voices will be heard has 
proved challenging and so the knowledge that aid is supplied in return for votes will 
potentially escalate the perception that local ideas, and local development itself are 
unimportant, thus making it increasingly difficult to convince citizens of their role in 
the development process. The revelation of these practices also raises again the issue 
of accountability to British citizens, which DFID has sought to maintain throughout 
the development of new programmes and methods (as discussed in chapter four). 
Using aid for bribes highlights a lack of accountability which could therefore lead to 
disillusionment within the British public and a decrease in support for international 
development work. Thus, we can see that even if the concept of a right to 
development is proving resilient in the face of such practices, the continuation of acts 
such as these in the UN may have significant effects· on the right to development, and 
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rights based programmes. 
Exuloring the Relationship Between Development and Terrorism 
Terrorist attacks over recent years have also led to a different discussion though, one 
that is very much linked to the effectiveness and distribution of aid and explores the 
potential links between poverty, education and terrorism. This is a discussion that 
has ensued, not only amongst academics, but also in the responses of world leaders. 
For example, in 2001 Tony Blair stated that 'The dragon's teeth [with regards to 
terrorism] are planted in the fertile soil of ... poverty and deprivation.' 29 The 
argument that poverty leads to terrorism though has been both rebuffed and 
discredited by the findings of academics such as Krueger, Maleckova and Berrebi 
who claim that there is a causal link between wealth, education and terrorism, but one 
that is very different from that believed by politicians and leaders. 
These academics, in their studies of various terrorist organisations (which included 
Hizbollah, Hamas, and PIJ- Palestinian Islamic Jihad~ found that 'having a standard 
of living above the poverty line and having a secondary-school education or higher 
are positively associated with participation in [terrorism].'30 Berrebi's work showed 
that only 13 percent of Palestinian suicide bombers come from impoverished family 
despite the fact that a third of the entire Palestinian population lives in poverty. He 
also found that 57 percent had education beyond high school, while only 15 percent 
of the population of comparable age had.l1 It must also be noted however that 
Krueger and Maleckova recognise that 'participation in terrorist activities may well 
be highly context-specific', and ~gue that we should also take into consideration 
whether it is richer pe<>ple from poorer countries that are attracted to terrorism, for 
this may suggest that economic circumstances do still matter regardless of the 
29 In Berrebi, C. 'Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among 
Palestinians' (September 2003) Princeton University Industrial Relations Section working Paper 
NoA77. Available at hnp://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs{pdfs/477 .pdf p.6 
30 Berrebi, 'Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and 'Ferrorism ... ' p.8 
31 Krueger, A. 'Poverty Doesn't Create Terrorists', New York Times (May 29 2003) Business Section 
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evidence presented. 32 Yet these findings, it seems, are applicable to many other 
instances of terrorist attacks, including the September 11th attacks. As reported in the 
New York Times the hijackers were, 
•.. adults with education and skill ... spent years studying and training in the United 
States, collecting valuable commercial skills and facing many opportunities to 
change their minds ... they were not reckless young men facing dire economic 
conditions and dim prospects but men as old as 41 enjoying middle-class lives. 33 
Miller and Russell also found that the majority of those involved in terrorism are well 
educated, usually to university level or higher, and more then two-thirds of those that 
are arrested come from middle or upper class families.34 A similar correlation was 
found by Krueger and Maleckova in relation to supporters of terrorist attacks within 
the general public. Surveys showed that in Palestine the majority of the population 
supported attacks against Israeli targets, with 'strong support' from 72 percent of the 
educated/ occupational group; This supported findings from a 1994 survey in which 
only 40percent of those educated to M.A. or Ph.D. level supported dialogue between 
Hamas and Israel, in comparison to 60percent from those who had been educated for 
nine years or less. 35 
As Krueger says, a possible reason for this is that participation in terrorism may 
actually offer greater benefits for those with a higher education as there is a greater 
chance of obtaining a leadership position. In any case, terrorist organisations will 
often prefer to recruit educated individuals who have the ability both to prepare and 
carry out demanding assignments. 36 Another explanation for these findings, as also 
32 Krueger, A. and Maleckova, J. 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal, Connection?' 
in Journal ofEconomic Perspectives Vol. 17, No.4 (2003), pp.119-144, pp.121,137 
33 In Berrebi, 'Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.4 
34 In Krueger and Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.141. 
3s Krueger and Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' pp.125-126 
36 Krueger and Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.122 
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discussed by Krueger, is the opinion that educated people are more likely to 
participate in politics because of the expertise, interest and commitment that political 
causes often require. Thus, he says, those with higher income and education can take 
such an interest as they do not have to worry about minimum economic subsistence. 37 
Therefore, Krueger argues that suicide bombers, excluding cases where there is a 
promise of large payments to their families, are usually not motivated by economic 
gain but instead by their complete support for the movement. It is usually those who 
are better educated, he says, that tend to perceive such feelings of support more 
acutely.38 Yet it is important to note that financial compensation is awarded to 
families of the suicide bombers by fundamentalist charitable organisations. For 
example in the Gaza Strip payments to families increased from $10,000 to $25,000.39 
Thus, although in many cases where the bombers were relatively wealthy this will not 
be an influencing factor, llllowing the co11tinu~tion of such payments ultimately 
hinders the fight against terrorism. Therefore, von Hippel suggests, donors should 
focus on providing sufficient aid to local communities so that fundamentalist 
charities such as these cannot abuse the position of the poor for their own violent 
ends.40 
Berrebi offers a similar explanation to that of Krueger noted above. He says that 
better educated individuals are more likely to understand the moral and religious 
arguments that are offered as justifications for such attacks, and their education may 
possibly invoke in the individual a greater sense of social responsibility and the desire 
to contribute to political causes.41 As Kreuger recognises these findings seem to 
resonate with the words of Lerner, 'poverty prevails only among the apolitical 
mass. ' 42 It is this support for the ideological sentiments that act as the trigger for 
37 Krueger and Maleekova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.142 
38 Krueger and Maleckova, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism .. .' pp.122-123 
39 Von Hippel, K. 'The Roots of Modem Terrorism: Probing the Myths' in Freedman, L (ed) 
Superterrorism: Policy Responses (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2002) pp.25-39, p.27 
40 Von Hippel, 'TheRootsofModem Terrorism .. .' p.37 
41 Berrebi, 'Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism .. .' pp.17 -18 
42 Krueger and Maleckova, 'Education,.Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.l28 
123 
terrorism, Atran argues, for they are transformed by leaders into moral obligations to 
act against opponents. This, he says, becomes especially appealing in countries 
where there is a lack of other political opportunities or extreme political repression. 43 
Thus, the potential does exist for tackling terrorism through challenging political 
repression, which would then allow for development agencies to improve education 
that, when not under fundamentalist influence, will not create further dangers to 
international security. Although we have seen, in the previous chapters, arguments 
that convey distaste for what is perceived to be an imperialistic propagation of 
democratic institutions in countries where different political systems have developed, 
surveys show that in the case of Iraq many young adults actually favour American 
culture, despite their support for terrorist organisations. It has been found, by 
analysts such as Mark Tessler, that elected ,government, personal liberty, economic 
choice and educational opportunities are desired. What is opposed is U.S. military 
presence and foreign policy, especially concerning the Middle East.44 As Burnell 
argues, thankfully institutional reform can occur regardless of that country's 
economic situation, meaning that change is possible even in the poorest of these 
countries. However, he also notes that in many_ places the existing power structure 
has been resistant to change. Thus he says we should also recognise that 
interventions which are aimed at encouraging democracy can be extremely 
destabHising and have the opposite effect, causing greater threats to international 
peace and security.45 We have only to look at Iraq to see that this is the case. 
As Burnell says, it is also apparent that the promotion of democracy will face· 
challenges not only from developing countries, but from our own conflicting policy 
aims~46 Many academics, such as Atran, recognise that solutions could be sought in 
43 Atran, S. 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism' in The Washington Quarterly Vol. 27, No.3 (2004), 
ff·67-90, pp.83,74 
Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism' pp.73-74 
4
' Burnell, Foreign Aid Resurgent ... pp.12-13,17 
46 Burnell, Foreign AidResurgent ... p.l5 
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Western dialogue with Muslim leaders in an attempt to reconcile Sharia law with 
international}¥ recognised human rights. However, this will onl¥ be possible when 
America withdraws it support from repressive regimes, who support the war on terror 
but who systematical}¥ abuse the rights of, and deny political expression to their 
citizens.47 Also, as already noted in chapter 1, following the U.S. response to the 
terrorist attacks on September ll'th 2001, and reports of abuse of detainees, it will 
become increasingly difficult forthe U.S. to lead the way in human rights.48 
This dichotomy is furthered by Krueger's findings. He argues that civil liberties play 
an enormous role in determining which countries are likely to generate terrorists. It is 
in those countries that are lacking in civil liberties, he says, that we will see terrorists 
being produced regardless of the economic situation there. Thus the war against 
terrorism, which has seen the curbing of civil liberties of citizens, both of the West 
and the Middle East, is surely contributing to the fatal production of willing terrorists. 
The solution therefore lies in ensuring that the people of these nations are given the 
right to assemble and protest, free from government interference.49 The 
reconstruction of failed states, the building of democracy and the protection of civil 
liberties are ultimately connected, as are the challenges that face them. Thus, 
government responses will have to take into account ali of these aspects which have 
been highlighted by academic works. 
However, the ways in· which the Government will respond are important for both 
security and for the right to development. So far the connection between security and 
development seems relatively underdeveloped, as the response to terrorist threats 
have been manifested in the support for war despite the evidence to suggest that 
democracy building and the advancement of rights are required to improve security, 
aspects that, as we have seen, fall under the work of DFID, and are addressed in their 
47 Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism' pp.73, 74 
48 Forsythe, Human Rights In International Relations p.45 
49 Krueger, 'Poverty Doesn't Create Terrorists' 
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programmes of partnerships and participation. Although it could be argued that war 
also provides the impetus for regime/system change, and the establishment of rights 
mechanisms, it remains to be seen whether this has been a successful approach in the 
case of Iraq. It may thus seem that an appropriate way forward .is to recognise the 
potential benefits that the Declaration on the Right to Development could bring to 
this situation, and both to explore further the links between rights, development and 
international security and allow DFID to take a lead in what would have traditionally 
been seen as a purely defence/security arena. 
Also if the fight against terrorism is reliant on the West to change its policies with 
respects to our own record on human rights and questionable alliances, then that is 
what must be done for, as von Rippel says, failed states may be attractive to terrorist 
organisations because of the lack of government structures in place, and the inability 
for the international community to regulate trade and movement of people through 
the unguarded borders. Thus, he says: 
It is imperative that a serious effort is made to re-establish effective government and 
the rule of law in places where these are absent or weak, in order to counter the 
centrifugal forces that cause these states to collapse, the by-products of which could 
lead them to become attractive territories for terrorist activity. 5° 
Yet he also notes that it is not clear, despite the advantages such states may hold for 
terrorists, whether terrorists are actually using these states in any way. For example, 
bin Laden chose to seek refuge in the north of Sudan where the government is very 
much in control, rather then in the lawless south. 51 
The subject of failed states however brings us back to the issue of education. 
so Von Hippel, 'The Roots of Modem Terrorism ... ' p.34 
51 Von Hippel, 'The Roots ofModem Terrorism ... ' pp.31 
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Although academics have attempted to show that education is positively linked to 
terrorism this is very much dependent on the type of education received. Atran notes 
that many failed states have handed over responsibility for the social welfare of 
citizens to activist Islamic groups, who now provide school and health services, and 
with an efficiency that the govemment could never attain. 52 Stern highlights that 
these madrasahs offer education based in religion, ignoring many basic subjects such 
as maths and science, and so, 'without state supervision ... are free to preach a narrow 
and violent version of Islam. ' 53 Therefore, as Krueger says, if education is going the 
international community's answer to terrorism, the focus must be of the content of 
the education, not on the number of years one spends in education. 54 Yet von Hippel 
warns us that due to the long established fear of Westem corruption of education any 
intervention must be developed through negotiations and partnerships.55 As already 
discussed in the previous chapter, this is likely to be the most effective me_tho<l of 
change anyway. 
Policy Responses to the Academic Findings 
It seems that, to some extent, the findings of the academics are penetrating the beliefs 
of politicians and world leaders. Bush for example is noted to have said that, 
Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers ... Yet poverty, 
corruption ana repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak 
governments that are unable to enforce order or to patrol their borders and are 
vulnerable to terrorist networks. 56 
What is important though is to examine how this has been incorporated into the 
s2 Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism' p.78 
s3 Von Hippel, 'The Roots ofModemTerrorism .. .' p.29 
S4 Krueger and MaleckQva, 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism .. .' p.l42 
ss Von Hippel, 'The Roots of Modem Terrorism ... ' p.30 
s6 Krueger, 'PovertyDoesn'tCreate Terrorists' 
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physical and practical responses of the West. The unilateral military response of the 
U.S., and the restrictions placed on ci¥illiberties have already been noted. It is also 
essential though to examine if and how the government has altered development 
policy, because of the complexities of the root causes of terrorism that are so 
intricately linked to many of DFID's areas of concern such as poverty, education, 
participation and governance. DFID itself recognises this wide overlap in policy 
areas and states in the recent paper Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A 
strategy for Security and Development; that: 
At a broader level, DFID's work on poverty reduction also benefits global security. 
While there is no evidence that poverty directly contributes to terrorism, or that 
terrorists are from poorer communities, terrorist leaders do exploit the issue of 
poverty as a means of mobilising popular support and legitimising their actions. 
Many of the structural factors that increase the risk of terrorism also matter for 
development: unmet political and economic aspirations, lack of jobs for skilled 
labour, weak states and poor governance. 51 
Some academics such as Udombana have argued that national interests will always be 
a priority, even when devising aid packages; 'In international politics, there is no such 
thing as a free lunch; everything has to be paid for. Governments are, first and 
foremost, concerned about safeguarding the interests of the people they represent.' 58 
Yet, as the extent to which we are interconnected with other nations has become 
apparent, so too has the fact that, in helping to tackle world poverty, our government 
will be safeguarding the interests of British citizens. Perhaps it will be in this 
recognition that an increased support for the principles contained in the RTD will 
develop. 
57DFID Fighting Poverty to Build a Sustainable World 
http://www.dfid.~ov .uklpubS{files/securityforall.pdf p.ll 
58 Udombana, N.J 'The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium' 
Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 22, No.3 (2000) pp.753-787, p.783 
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Thus, we can see that potentially the expertise of DFID can help to combat 
international threats to peace and security, as is noted in the paper itself. However, 
within this particular paper DFID does not explicitly acknowledge the differences in 
causes between terrorism and other types of crime. The responses of DFID may thus 
be adequate for dealing with the threats that come from other forms of transnational 
crimes, yet entirely inappropriate for tackling terrorism. As the evidence above has 
already shown, and as Hassan argues, traditional models of crime, in which poverty 
has been found as a cause, do not apply to terrorism. 59 
Yet it is only recently that the work of DFID has been linked to security and, despite 
the closeness of this link, their main responsibility continues to, and should be, the 
eradication of poverty, not of terror. In this respect, Barder argues, DFID has been 
extremely successful at preserving the focus on poverty reduction, even under the 
pressure of the argument that, since 9/11, the Government should be directing 
resources towards the war on terror, and has attempted to ensure that aid has not been 
distorted by short term strategic and political interests. This has been helped by the 
existence of the International Development Act 2002, which prevents DFID from 
using aid to :finance programmes whose primary aim is to tackle threats to UK or 
global security.60 
Another positive aspect which arises from the paper is the potential that is shown for 
a consensus on aims across departments, as was hoped for by Blair in his plans for 
'joined-up' government. As Barder says, since 9111 UK foreign policy has set its 
focus onto the problem of failing states.61 While DFID recognises the problems that 
cooperation faces, for example lack of communication between departments and the 
challenge of different timescales to work to, it too seeks to address the issue of failed 
'
9 In Berrebi, 'Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism ... ' p.3 
60 Barder, Refonning Development Assistance pp.l8,28 
61 Barder, Re/Qnning Development Assistance p.l8 
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states which not only harbour terrorists but also present a problem to successful and 
sustainable development, and commits itself to focus more on regional conflict and 
insecurity because of the effect that these things have on the world's poorest.62 If 
departments within the Government can work together, therefore, then there is hope 
that a satisfactory approach to the situation can be found, Which incorporates 
specialist knowledge on both development and terrorism. As DFID says: 
Aid alone is not enough. Development cannot progress where there is instability. The 
security community on its own cannot build the institutions and opportunities 
necessary to prevent conflict. We need better collaboration between development, 
defence and diplomatic communities to achieve our respective and complementary 
aims.63 
Choosing an appropriate and successful response to the terrorist threat will ultimately 
be a challenging task for the Government, especially because, as Burnell says: 
While one school of thought cautions that a society's economic progress may actually 
increase the appetite for, and means to threaten, international violence, another 
argues that extreme poverty, resentment at gross international inequalities, and 
despair all provide fertile ground for such 'anti-systembehaviour'.64 
It is this divide that we have already seen in the difference of understandings between 
the academic and the international arenas, a divide that will ultimately have to be 
bridged in order to find a way forward that both tackles the terrorist threat in an 
appropriate way whHe respecting the direction which development theory and policy 
is travelling in. Yet some academics, such as Udombana, see hope for success having 
62 DFID Fighting Poverty to Builda Sustainable World, see Chapter 3 
63 DFID Fighting Poverty to Build a Sustainable World p.6 
64 Burnell, Foreign Aid Resurgent ... p.ll 
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recognised that in many cases the areas to be addressed for development, are also 
those that can bring democracy, such as freedom of expression and assembly, the 
advancement of women, and improved education. The two, he notes, go hand in 
hand for democracy, peace and stability cannot exist where there is poverty and 
neglect.65 What should be noted though is, as Scott Atran argues, the longer the war 
on terror continues, the greater the risk becomes of increasing radical Muslim 
sentiment against the West. This, he says, can be perceived from the fact that 
military action has not even diminished the occurrence of suicide attacks in occupied 
Iraq, and after major military operations the number of attacks actual'ly increased.66 
One very important point that von Hippel makes is that, considering the rising 
number of terrorists that have become radicalised within European and American 
cities, reform must also take place at home, for it is when we begin to marginalize 
those in our own societies that we aid the spread of terrorism,67 
.. . If a society feels threatened or under attack, a siege mentality will take hold, 
whereby people and groups tend to become more conservative and entrenched in 
their traditional ways of seeing and interpreting things. From this perspective, US 
foreign policy contributes to the erosion of the internal prerequisites for social 
change transformation, as well as reinforcing a sense of external threat that 
encourages conservative entrenchment ... It also encourages strong scepticism about 
the validity of universal human rights ... 68 
Buller has highlighted this conflict of interests that the government now faces. The 
conduct of a promised ethical foreign policy, he says, has become increasingly 
difficult since September 11th, especially when we consider that Blair forged an 
alliance with America and supported a war that not only lacked UN cover, but was 
strongly opposed by other members of the Security Council. T:his, Buller argues, will 
65 Udombana, 'The Third World and the Right to Development .. .' pp.785, 774 
66 Atran, 'Mishandling Suicide Terrorism' pp.67-71 
67 Von Rippel, 'The Roots.ofModern Terrorism .. .' p.37 
68 An-Na'im. 'Upholding International Legality Against Islamic and American Jihad' p.l67 
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have long-term consequences for the British foreign policy, and, I would argue, for 
development policy also. 69 An alliance with the U.S. which has consistently opposed 
the right to development, and continued abuse of rights, has the potential to destroy 
the 'progressive' work (as discussed in Chapter three) which DFID has managed to 
achieve and will continue to undermine the advances that it makes. Falk also notes 
that an apparent use of human rights as a foreign policy tool, for example the 
exposure of human rights violations in order to place sanctions on, or take hostile 
action, against another country, make human rights appear to be lacking in any 
meaningful substance. 70 This again, if it continues, could also seriously diminish the 
hopes that exist for the promotion of the right to development. As has already been 
argued in the previous chapters we are still faced with arguments against universal 
human rights, arguments which will be increasingly difficult to challenge while 
current policies are continued . 
. . . rights are best seen as a by-product of a functioning ethical community and not as 
a phenomenon that can be taken out of its context and promoted as a universal 
solution to the political ills of an oppressive world. 71 
Yet what this chapter has shown is the important connections between democracy, 
rights, poverty, governance, failed states and security. As we have seen, these 
connections are extremely complex, and do not always follow the anticipated pattern, 
yet the complexity of the situation cannot be a reason for ignoring the challenges it 
sets before us. We have seen that by working together, different government 
departments hold the knowledge .and expertise that can rise to this challenge in a 
meaningful and effective way. In terms of development what we are witnessing since 
the September ll'th attacks is a renewed effort to tackle world poverty. As Burnell 
69 Buller, 'Foreign and European Policy' pp.205-210 
7° Falk, R.A. Human Rights Horizons: Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (London, New York, 
Routledge, 2000) p.40 
71 Brown, C 'Universal Human Rights: a Critique.' In Dunne, T. and Wheeler, N.J, Human Rights in 
Global Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp.103-124, p.120 
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notes, Blair declared that 'There are times in politics when it is possible to do what 
we thought to be impossible a short time before.' Yet we should also heed the 
warnings of writers such as Burnell who recognise that, favouring certain countries 
with regards to aid allocation purely because they pose a threat to national security, 
will only result in other countries becoming marginalized further. This could not 
, 
only see the rise of threats from other parts of the world, but also the failure of 
sustainable development as foreign policy aims mask themselves as badly-designed 
aid programmes. 72 Thus it is essential that traditional means of ~d. as discussed in 
chapter two, are not returned to, as behaviour in the Security Council threatens. 
However, this chapter has also shown that any part that the right to development may 
hold in the protection Of security is, as of yet, unexplored and underdeveloped. The 
lack of mention that it has received "from DFID in the area of security may suggest 
that the current international climate and the new threat of transnational terrorism 
have rendered the values of the Declaration obsolete. However, as the previous 
chapters have shown, despite a lack of reference to the right to development in DFID 
policy papers, current development pFogrammes have been incorporating the ideas 
that are central to the declaration. It remains to be seen in what ways DFID will 
incorporate these ideas when faced with a security agenda. We may see that, once 
again, as was the case in previous administrations (as discussed in chapter two), 
security will usurp the work of development. However, as this chapter has noted, in 
the fight against terrorism, to undermine the place of development will prove 
detrimental, and success in war will be short lived. The first step to success, I would 
argue, is for the establishment of the 'joined-up government' which Blair promised, 
so that security and development advocates can truly work together in an area that is 
so obviously interconnected and inseparable. The second step is to ensure that the 
success which the right to development has brought to recent development 
programmes, through its focus on both partnerships and participation, is given the 
recognition that it deserves so that such ideas can be incorporated into the fight 
72 Burnell, Foreign Aid Resurgent ... pp.ll,20 
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against terrorism, rather then being given a ,back seat while once again traditional and 
ineffective uses of aid are brought to the forefront ofpolicy making. 
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Conclusion 
We have reached the point at which both areas of interest and further questions that 
the thesis has raised can be highlighted once more, and where those questions posed 
at the beginning ofthe thesis, and which directed the research, can be addressed. 
Chapter one drew attention to the many theoretical challenges which the right to 
development faces, highlighting numerous and competing positions and 
understandings of the concept. It was, at the earlier stages in the research, a concern 
that the challenges posed to the right, as manifested in these debates, would act as a 
deterrent to the application of the Declaration in states' development programmes, 
that the lack of conceptual clarity which the Declaration was accused of, would 
prevent its application and acceptance at the national level. However the evidence 
presented in the thesis shows a definite change in the way that development policy is 
thought about, constructed, and implemented in Britain. 
As chapter two noted, the 11997 New Labour manifesto and two White Papers that 
followed, highlighted a shift in focus away from traditional uses of aid and an 
understanding of development based on purely economic terms, towards a concern 
for the eradication of poverty and the securing of rights for those in developing 
nations based on ideas of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Hopes for the 
fulfilment of these aims were brought into question though, due to the similarity that 
these promises shared with those of previous administrations. Thus it may be the 
case that a future change in administration may trigger a return to more traditional 
approaches to development policy, ones which prioritise national interests above the 
rights of others and the alleviation of poverty. Such an outcome would indicate the 
weakness and provisional nature of the new ideas that are flourishing in the area of 
development. However, until a change in government, such outcomes can be but 
speculative at best. The success that the new development programmes have gained 
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suggests that a reversion to traditional models will not occur. 
As Chapter three discussed, DFID has created strong partnerships with recipient 
governments, partnerships that, it says, are based on agreed benchmarks and a shared 
commitment to human rights. This has been accompanied, as was also noted, by a 
somewhat unique policy that seeks to enable the implementation of development 
programmes within fragile states, despite the costs and risks that this entails. Thus, it 
was concluded from the evidence, that DFID's approach has not only been promising 
for a genuine and successful partnership approach, it has also been progressive in 
terms of advancing the RTD agenda. 
It should be noted however, that chapter three also drew our attention back to 
theoretical difficulties . that a right to development based program faces. It was 
highlighted that, similar to those arguments which were discussed in chapter one, 
points of view that rejected a universal notion of human rights, new approaches can 
also ~ criticized for ~mploying a notion of 'go()d gov~rnance', a concept which is 
also far from having an agreed and universal understanding and is, as Doornbos was 
noted as saying, conceivable within different socio-cultural and' political contexts.1 
Thus, again we see the accusation of Western imperialism by academics ,such as 
Fowler, and the insistence by others, such as Slater and Bell, that for partnerships to 
be , genuine, donors have to accept that the vision and political priorities of the 
recipient countries may be considerably different from those of the Western 
community.2 These challenges should net 'be dismissed for they do raise some very 
interesting questions for further study. The claim of Western imperialism forces us to 
ask the question, what do partnerships really mean? As chapter three noted, there 
1 Doornbos, M. "Good Governance': ];be Rise and Decline of policy Metaphor?' in Hennes, N. and 
Lensink, R. (eds) Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A New Paradigm? (London, 
Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pp.93-108, p;99 
2 Slater, 0; and Bell, M. 'Aid and the Geopolitics of the Post-Colonial: Critical Reflections on New 
Labour's Overseas Development Strategy' in Development.and Change Vol. 33, No.2 (2002) pp. 335-
360, pp.351 and 353 
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may be a natural progression from current partners~p models to a point at which 
recipient governments take the lead in the development process. Many academics 
doubted that donor nations would let this occur though for fear, as was also expressed 
over the Declaration on the Right to Development itself, that an attempt would be 
made to establish a New International Economic Order. Yet, with donors retaining 
control, then claims of cultural imperialism and the spread of democracy will remain. 
Thus, this challenge returns us to a central problem in rights theory, that of competing 
rights, and a hamer to the realization of the right to development. It appears that the 
sovereign rights of states will be pitted against the right to development of citizens, 
and that one will have to be trumped in favour of the other. Thus, further research is 
necessary to enquire whether the eroding away of traditional concepts such as the 
nation state is acceptable, or likely to occur; for the furtherance of the rights project 
which nation states themselv~s have worked to establish-, and ask if this erosion really 
matters in a globalising world where the ideas of nation states are already changing. 
However, in determining the current effect that these criticisms are having on the 
application of right to development models, it is important to recognize that, as noted 
above, previous theoretical challenges have not deterred states from implementing 
such models in their development work. The effect at present may thus be minimal. 
We should also question the truth of such claims for, although we have seen DFID 
appealing to notions of good governance, they have also, it was argued, borne the 
costs and risks of working in fragile states because they ·recognised that 'development 
and stability can be achieved with very different governance arrangements, as 
demonstrated by the experience of countries as diverse as Botswana, China, Chile, 
Mozambique and Vietnam. ' 3 Thus, if donor countries continue to work through 
models that adhere to right to development principles and the theoretical challenges, 
although raising awareness of theoretical difficulties that the concept faces, do not 
impact upon its application then there is hope, as the UN Economic and Social 
3 DFit> Why we Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States (2005) 
http://www .dfid.gov .uk/Pubs/files/fragilestates-paper .pdf p.20 
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Ceuncil believes for a consensus to be reached in the attitude of the development 
community and that of human rights advocates. This will be found, it was argued, 
through the notion of partnerships, and while often lacking reference to the right to 
development itself, may become a means by which the right is promoted. Yet the UN 
Economic and Social Council also note that such an approach must place human 
rights at the centre of the process, and not merely refer to them when they become of 
instrumental value, that is, when the use of human rights will further poverty 
reduction strategies. Statements by Andrew Norton may quash this concern for, as 
noted in chapter four, he says: 
There is a new agenda emerging. Participation is not just seen as an option to 
improve effectiveness, but is seen in a new context where it is linked to governance, 
human rights, and strengthening accountability, policy and institutional systems ... so 
that [governments] can respond better to the needs of society and the poor and the 
excluded in particular. 4 
This statement typifies DFID's recognition that participation is a human right that 
must be guaranteed above and beyond the success it brings to development 
.programmes. In the talk of rights, DFID's commitment to participation moves 
beyond the arena of rhetoric and promises, and becomes mere of a guarantee for 
those li,ving in developing nations, who will be able te demand that their rights be 
fulfilled. Thus, the inclusion of participation in development programmes 
demonstrates again that, despite the apposition which the RTD faces, a workable 
programme is developing within development administrations. Thus, the relationship 
between rights and development that is emerging in the work and attitude of DFID 
seems to be a promising one for the right to development especially when we see it in 
the area of participation, a principle that is not only central in the Declaration, but 
which was also fundamental in the writings of Sen, whose work was highlighted in 
4 In Long, C. Participation of the Poor in Development Initiatives: Taking Their Rightful Place 
(London, Sterling, VA, Earthscan Publications, 2001)<pp.171-172 
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chapter one as central to the changes that were occurring in development thinking. 
Chapter four, therefore, also drew our attention to another successful area of DFID's 
development work, one which again incorporates principles that the right to 
development promotes. The area was that of participation, involving primary and 
secondary stakeholders through all stages of the project cycle. It was argued that a 
genuine commitment had been demonstrated by the department to encourage changes 
at the institutional level that will help to develop local government commitment to 
both development and participation, and that these differences seemed to be changing 
the success and outcomes of development projects, although the extent to which this 
is so remains to be seen. 
However, another fundamental challenge was also highlighted in chapter four that of 
the assumption which exists with regards to the concept of community. It was noted 
that, as Cleaver argues, a belief persists in participatory development practice that 
there will be an identifiable community with which to work, without taking into 
account evidence of the shifting and overlapping nature of communities, and the 
dramatic differences in wealth, education, status, ethnicity and gender that exist 
within communities. 5 Donor agencies need to refocus their attentions away from the 
practicalities of implementation and towards a clearer understanding of the wider 
dynamics of society, institutions and community.6 Although DFID has addressed this 
concern to some extent, through policies such as Drivers of Change, this criticism 
emphasises the complex situations that development administrations face. Thus, 
ensuring participation in a meaningful manner seems increasingly difficult, and that 
such an assumption has been noted, brings us to question the real validity of the 
participatory projects that have gone before. 
5 In Cleaver, F. 'Paradoxes of Participation: Questioning PartiCipatory Approaches to Development' 
in.Journal of International Development Vol. 11, No.4 (1999) pp.597"612, p.603 and ]])S Workshop. 
'Reflections and Recommendations ... ' p.138 
6 Cleaver, 'Paradoxes of Participation .. .' p.609 
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What these chapters have shown therefore is that, while theoretical challenges exist 
and practical challenges are arising, initial objections to the right to development 
have not deterred DFID from adopting new approaches that incorporate many aspects 
of the Declaration on the right to development. However, chapter five highlighted 
that the primary challenge to this approach may in fact come from competing state 
interests, such as security, and the possibility that new methods have been motivated 
by the safe-guarding of national security. If this were the case, it would show that 
traditional attitudes to aid had per&isted, and that new ideas within development 
disciplines had little effect on the construction and implementation of development 
programmes. 
The chapter did draw attention to much evidence which could suggest that traditional 
attitudes had indeed remained, thus calling into question the potential that the 
Declaration holds for development. However, I argued that, given the persistent 
practice of using aid as bribes and prioritising security and foreign policy aims, the 
very fact that the practices which the right to development promotes has been used 
by development agencies such as DFID in an environment that is hostile to such 
ideas, demonstrates both its resilience and importance as a concept. It would, I said, 
be difficult to imagine states accepting such principles, which challenge traditional 
uses of aid, without these principles having, either moral weight behind them, or 
obvious advantages that will make for successful development programmes. 
Yet the challenges that these continued practices cause were also noted, for example 
the difficulty that is posed towards tackling corruption in developing nations if 
corruption continues to prevail within Western states and international institutions 
such as the UN, and the effect that this will have on the creation of successful 
partnerships. Thus again, as with the issue of competing rights, it would appear that 
one of these, either the corrupt practices of states or the implementation of the right to 
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development, will have to give, as the two are incompatible in both aims and 
methods. Which one succeeds also remains to be seen. 
Chapter five also drew attention to another area for further study, that of the conflict 
which exists in the UN between the ideas that are formulated and the actions of 
member states, the repercussions of which will be felt beyond the right to 
development. Continuous abuse of rights by member states in their dealings with 
other countries, as well as the corruption that persists, will challenge the human rights 
regime in its entirety. Thus, while calls for UN reform might force the institution to 
address this question of conflict within its establishment, questions about the 
possibility for change in state practice also need to be asked. Is such a change 
possible, and if not what are the implications for human rights as a whole? 
The important and complex connections between democracy, rights, poverty, 
governance, failed states and security were also discussed in Chapter five, the 
findings of which merits attention again he:r:e. It was highlighted that the work in 
these areas fall under the scope of both security and development, thus both DFID 
and right to development principles hold great potential for contributing to 
international security, and whose work can help to combat transnational crimes. Yet 
this relationship between security and development, it was noted, is currently 
unexplored and underdeveloped. Thus, further research will be required into both 
how the Government inco:r:porates DFID into plans for security, and also how/if DFID 
will draw upon the right to development in its security agenda. Potentially, what we 
will see from such research is a replaying of what has gone before in previous 
administrations, as discussed in chapter two. That is, development work once again 
being usurped by security policy and the masking of foreign policy aims with the 
rhetoric of aid. Yet, as argued in chapter five, the obviously interconnected and 
inseparable nature of security and development requires the close working of 
departnients within Governments for an alternative route of separation would, I 
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believe, be detrimental to the achievement of security aims. The outcome of such 
research may be closely linked to questions that were raised in chapter two on the 
nature of influence that departments have within Government. As Lambe argued, 
DFID's influence depends to a great extent, not on the expertise it holds, but on the 
leadership in government and the attitude of senior ministers towards development 
policy.7 Thus, DFID's place may continue to depend on the attitude of ministers, as 
will the acceptance of the right to development for, as chapter three argued, one of 
the main obstacles to the realisation of this right and this to effective development 
policy is the attitudes of leaders. 
It was asked in chapter one how successful has the change in theory been in terms of 
affecting the way in which state actors understand development? When we look at 
recent policy papers and development projects that DFID has issued and used, then 
we can almost certainly answer that the changes in theory have been extremely 
successful in altering the way in which state actors understand development. Focus 
has moved away from traditional policy aims within the department, and, despite the 
challenges that have come from other areas of government, DFID has begun to 
successfully incorporate methods such as partnerships and participation that both 
adhere to the principles of the RTD and aim at the elimination of world poverty and 
the securing of rights for citizens of developing nations. However, one important 
point must be noted, and that is that DFID has rarely discussed the right to 
development, and does not refer to it in its policy work. 
This has led academics, such as Piron, to claim that DFID has not in fact built its 
approach on the ideas contained in the RTD but instead upon two premises: (i) a 
moral duty to alleviate poverty, and (ii) self-interest that comes from the recognition 
of the interdependence of the world. 8 The first of these, which DFID has claimed as 
7 Lambe, J. 'The Future of the Overseas Development Ministry' ODI Review No.3 (1969) pp. 56-62, 
fP· 58-59 
Piron, L.H. The Right to Development: A Review of the Current State of the Debate for the 
Department for International Development (2002) Available at 
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its priority, will incorporate many similar ideas to those of a right to development 
approach, for programmes incorporating partnership and participation can contribute 
to both the alleviation of poverty, and the promotion of the right to development. 
Thus we are faced with the possibility that DFID may not have been influenced by the 
Declaration on the Right to Development but on simil'ar understandings of 
development. 
As Piron has noted, although DFID originally displayed an instrumentalist approach 
to human rights, the practice has evolved. Now, within DFID policy papers there is a 
growing reference to the protection of human rights for their own value, and because 
of the success that they bring to development projects. Thus it was argued by Piron 
that DFID's work is progressive in development practice and human rights, and can 
further the right to development project because of the strong similarities between its 
approach and the RTD. However, as the thesis noted, the adoption of a human rights 
approach to development, even if influenced by an internationally changing notion of 
development, is not the same as the right to development. The right to development, 
Hamm argues, cannot replace a human rights approach to development because of the 
vagueness that surrounds the notion, the lack of consensus that the right has, and 
because of the lack of a legal obligation in the international treaty.9 The changes that 
we see in DFID do seem to be attributable to this internationally changing notion of 
development. As Barder says: 
As with most successful revolutions, the changes [made by New Labour] succeeded 
in part because they found resonance in a long evolution of thinking and in part 
because they ... were in line with a new international mood that while increases in aid 
were an important part of the development agenda, it was essential also to pay 
attention to the broader set of policies that affect developing countries. 10 
http://www.odi.uk/rights/publications/right to dev.pdf p.35 
9 Hamm, B.I. 'A Human Rights Approach to Development' Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 23, No.4 
(2001) pp.l005-1031, p.l010 
10 Barder, 0. Reforming Development Assistance: Lessons from the lJK Experience Working Paper 
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It appears therefore that the notion of a right to development is a product of the 
changing ideas about development as discussed in chapter one, in the same way that 
current British policy is. Thus, I believe that, while both are products of the same 
ideas, the right to development has not been the influencing factor on British 
development policy. This explains why there is a significant lack of reference to the 
right to development in DFID policy papers, yet why it is so similar to, and 
incorporates so many aspects that the right to development advocates. 
This however, does not make the prospects for the Declaration on the Right to 
Development redundant in the influence that it too may have on state policy in the 
future. As the thesis highlighted, many objections to the Declaration came from a 
lack of conceptual clarity and understanding, rather then from a rejection of the 
underlying principles. This was, I suggested, the case with the U.S. stance on the 
right to development, and it seems also the case with Britain. Yet, the right to 
development may still prove to be a useful label for the general changes that are 
occurri.ng in development thinking, and now, with the practice of states to study as a 
guide, the conceptual incoherence which pervades the Declaration can be addressed 
and practical and realistic guidelines put in place for the future practice of states. 
Thus, if these difficulties inherent in the Declaration are addressed, then it is possible 
that in future policy we will see greater reference to a right to development, a term 
which will be more then just a promising idea, but a firm guideline for a successful 
development programme in which the rights of citizens can be realised. 
Number 70 (Centre for Global Development, 2005) p.30 
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Appendix 
Declaration on the Right to Development 
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December Jl986 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the pw:poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
relating to the achievement of international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human ri.ghts and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, 
Recognizing that development is a comprehensi,ve economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits 
resulting there from, 
. Considering that under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully realized, 
Recalling the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Recalling further the relevant agreements, conventions, resolutions, 
recommendations and other instruments of the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies concerning the integral development of the human being, economic and 
social progress and development of all peoples, including those instruments 
concerning decolonization, the prevention of discrimination, respect for and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the maintenance of 
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international peace and security and the further promotion of friendly relations and 
co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter, 
Recalling the tight of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they have the 
right freely to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development, 
Recalling also the right of peoples to exercise, subject to the relevant provisions of 
both International Covenants on Human Rights, full and complete sovereignty over 
all their natural wealth and resources, 
Mindful of the obligation of States under the Charter to promote universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, 
Considering that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of the human 
rights of the peoples and individuals affected by situations such as those resulting 
from colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, all forms of racism and racial 
discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, aggression and threats against 
national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and threats of war would 
contribute to the establishment of circumstances propitious to the development of a 
great part of mankind, 
Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as well as to the 
complete fulfilment of human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter alia, by the 
denial of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and considering that all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indiv:isible and interdependent and that, 
in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect for and 
enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the 
denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
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Considering that international peace and security are essential elements for the 
realization of the right to development, 
Reaffirming that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development 
and that progress in the field of disarmament would considerably promote progress in 
the field of development and that resources released through disarmament measures 
should be devoted to the economic and social development and well-being of all 
peoples and, in particular, those of the developing countries, 
Recognizing that the human person is the central subject of the development process 
and that development policy should therefore make the human being the main 
participant and beneficiary of development, 
Recognizing that the creation of conditions favourable to the development of peoples 
and indiv.iduals is the primary responsibility of their States, 
Aware that efforts at the international level to promote and protect human rights 
should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic order, 
Confirming that the right to development is an inalienable human right and that 
equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of 
individuals who make up nations, 
Proclaims the following Declaration on the Right to Development: 
Article 1 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of 
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both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable t:ight 
to fuH sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. 
Article 2 
1. The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development. 
2. All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and 
collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can 
ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore 
promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for 
development. 
3. States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development 
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting there 
from. 
Article 3 
l. States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international 
conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development. 
2. The realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles 
of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
3. States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and 
eliminating obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their 
duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on 
sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all 
States, .as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights. 
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Article 4 
1. States have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate 
international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of 
the right to development. 
2. Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing 
countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective 
international co-operation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate 
means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development. 
Article 5 
States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the 
human rights of peoples and human beings affected by situations such as those 
resulting from apartheid, al11 forms of racism and racial discrimination, colonialism, 
foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign interference and threats 
against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and 
refusal to recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. 
Article 6 
1. All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and 
strengthening universal respect for and observance of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion. 
2. All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; 
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, 
promotion and protection of civ:il, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
3. States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from 
failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as economic social and cultural 
rights. 
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Article 7 
All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of 
international peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to achieve 
general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as to 
ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for 
comprehensive development, in particular that of the developing countries. 
1. States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the 
realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, 
housing, employment and the fair distribution of income. Effective measures should 
be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process. 
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to 
eradicating all social: injustices. 
2. States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor 
in development and in the full realization of all human rights. 
Article 9 
1. All the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present Declaration are 
indi,visible and interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context 
of the whole. 
2. Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, or as implying that any State, group or 
person has a right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
violation of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the International Covenants on Human Rights. 
Article 10 
150 
Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the 
right to development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
policy, legislative and other measures at the national and international levels. 
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